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Abstract
What is the nature of the relationship between communication ethics and rhetoric?
How may study of the interplay between dialogue as a communication ethic and ground
of rhetoric contribute to greater understanding and constructive meeting of the narrative
and virtue contention that characterizes the contemporary postmodern historical moment?
A prominent alleged source of postmodern value contention and a neglected source for
advancing the study of the interpenetration of ethics and rhetoric, Friedrich Nietzsche, as
a novel hermeneutic entry to engage these questions and demarcates the fields of inquiry
this study addresses.
The present work begins with meeting the contemporary historical moment
characterized by metanarrative disintegration. With metanarrative disintegration,
difference and multiplicity are now privileged. The privileging of difference
communicates a turn to dialogue rather than the modern bias towards telling in shaping
communicative activity. Meeting the alterity within the temporal existential moment
occurs through the operative of metaphor. Levinas’ focus on the dialogic tension
between saying and said displays the manner in which meeting emerges to offer temporal
ground. The multiplicity of ways meanings emerge to offer temporal ground become
realized through the imbricating architectonic Nietzschean metaphors of perspectivism,
genealogy, and revaluation of values, producing a dialogic ethic of meeting. This
outcome interprets otherwise the work, as Levinas also does, of whom many consider the
founder of deconstruction, Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s dialogic ethic displays the
ongoing interplay of recognition of decaying said and the ongoing hope in the saying as
meeting.
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Chapter One: Nietzsche’s Dialogic Ethic Meeting Metanarrative Disintegration

The present study articulates a communication ethic that constructively engages
difference that drives contemporary narrative and virtue contention in an age after
metanarrative disintegration. The ground for this constructive communication ethic
arises from interpreting otherwise one of the subterranean springs of our contemporary
postmodern historical moment, Friedrich Nietzsche. Dialogue serves as the alternative
hermeneutic entrance taken into Nietzsche’s work rather than engaging his writings from
the standard deconstructive bias. The present work argues that dialogue, not the
monologic, mechanistic unmasking of indeterminacy within texts of human language,
animates Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of his communication ethic. Dialogue and
rhetoric are viewed as united through their primary interpenetrating function, the
disclosure and articulation of meaning, meaning communicable through whatever form
the temporal, existential situation avails, through word, gesture, or act, for example.
Approached from this dialogic perspective, the meeting of difference embedded
in competing values, morals, and traditions affords opportunities for questioning,
interpretation, criticism, judgment, and action, the recurring interplay of dialogue and
rhetoric that simultaneously gives meaning to our words and deeds. Opportunities
discovered through interpreting otherwise Nietzsche’s metaphors of perspectivism,
genealogy, and revaluation of values then reveal the architectonic rhetoric of a
constructive communication ethic, dialogic meeting. Dialogic meeting, the articulation
of interrelationships of Nietzsche’s guiding metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and
revaluation of values, describes Nietzsche’s communication ethic meeting the ills of his
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age through a renewed dialogue with, not only a deconstruction of, tradition, in the
contemporary and eternally recurring contest of competing values.

Introduction
For the present work, dialogue provides the ground for Nietzsche’s metaphors:
perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation. Dialogue then rhetorically embeds traditions
within a contemporaneous temporal moment of meeting whereby the said of tradition is
resurrected through the saying of its critique and simultaneous embedding within the
historicity of dialogic meeting. Dialogic meeting draws its characterization of these
imbricating Nietzschean metaphors from Mikhail Bakhtin’s meditations on dialogue and
Levinas’ dialogue with Martin Buber on Buber’s idea of meeting. The resurrecting of
tradition through dialogue in an existential moment of temporal meeting reveals
Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting. This communication ethic culled
from Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric posits truth not as a consequence of individual
human agency but as an eternally recurring consequence of the dialogue of word and
deed, flesh, mind, and spirit unfolding in meeting the drama of temporal moment and
society.
Dialogic meeting results from Nietzsche’s engagement with the aporias of his
modern historical moment. To address the dangerous rising tides of decadence, nihilism,
and resentment, Nietzsche offered his contemporaries a fitting response through the
architectonic rhetoric of metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of
values that when viewed collectively disclose his situated, constructive communication
ethic, dialogic meeting. Perspectivism provides a dialogic orientation to interpretation
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and invention through a return to classical understandings of rhetoric. Genealogy
provides the means for rhetorical inquiry and criticism as a revolutionary process of
resurrecting traditions through their existential meeting in dialogue with the temporal
contemporaneous moment. Revaluation then provides the epideictic revaluation of
values that dialogic meeting calls forth through its architectonic rhetoric, rhetoric
revalued not as mere tropic play and persuasion but rather as an architectonic art of
making meaning grounded in the guiding values of its communication ethic, dialogic
meeting. An architectonic rhetoric engages in the making of perspectives out of the
resurrecting of tradition through their epideictic embedding within the temporal moment
of their meeting. “Art is architectonic with respect to making, and the architectonic art of
making is rhetoric, in so far as rhetoric is an art of thought” (McKeon 4). Nietzsche
advances an architectonic rhetoric, an art accomplished through the interpenetrating
metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of all values. Levinas’
understanding of the communicative activity, as witnessed in the tension that binds
saying and said, grounds interpretation of the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric as they
congeal into Nietzsche’s fitting response, his communication ethic of dialogic meeting.
Through his imbricating actions, Nietzsche invited his contemporaries to join his
interpreting otherwise of the modern metanarratives of Science, Church, State, and
Progress, which he perceived to dominate his times. Returning to Nietzsche’s invitation
to dialogue through his works, we perceive in consideration of his imbricating metaphors
of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation, the possibilities for an architectonic
rhetoric grounded in the saying of a constructive communication ethic, dialogic meeting.
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An architectonic rhetoric and communication ethic disclosed through dialogic
meeting intertwines word and deed, affect and logic, substance and style. In this way,
dialogic meeting affords a fitting response to the aporias of what Alasdair MacIntyre
names in After Virtue as “emotivism,” radical relativism, and deconstruction as the
aftershocks of a post-Enlightenment, post-Christian modern historical moment of
metanarrative decline and apparent dissolution after virtue. However, within the shadows
and echoes of these metanarrative ruins that once held sway echoes opportunity: The
opportunity afforded through engaging traditions through dialogic meeting, calling forth
their rhetorical orderings of life and meaning through their saying, through exploration of
how traditions can become resurrected through their embedding within the temporal,
existential moment of dialogic meeting. Dialogic meeting provides the communicative
space for persons to meet tradition embedded within the contemporary historical moment,
offering an unsaying of the said and resurrection of the tradition through enactment of its
meeting of the situation and moment of its encounter, an encounter that changes
situations as resources of traditions called forth to meet and affect reality as alternatives
to contemporary ethics of word and act.
The present study seeks to afford an interpretation and exploration of such
opportunities through a dialogical and rhetorical investigation and extension of
Nietzsche’s communication ethic and its architectonic rhetoric evinced through the
interrelationships enacted by his guiding metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and
revaluation of values. Through a close reading and genealogical accounting of these
metaphors throughout Nietzsche’s corpus, it will be disclosed how these metaphors,
taken collectively, construct a communication ethic grounded in the values that guide its
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enactment, dialogic meeting. Dialogic meeting embeds rhetoric as a necessary
constructive component to a communication ethic guiding response to contemporary
exigencies. A fitting response emerges to the ethical debates that question our
contemporary historical moment through the saying of an architectonic rhetoric inspired
by Nietzsche and his insights. This communication ethic, dialogic meeting, hence
employs an architectonic rhetoric as a guide for fitting constructive rhetorical response to
the ethical questions that shape the contemporary postmodern historical moment after
illusion amid metanarrative disintegration.

Nietzsche: Implicated in Postmodernity
Questions of why to turn to Nietzsche are answered by witnessing his pervasive
influence in contemporary scholarship and culture across disciplines and hermeneutic
biases. Early examples of Nietzsche’s burgeoning influence are recorded in the writings
of philosophers such as Georg Simmel, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul
Sartre (Kaufmann, introduction, Basic Writings of Nietzsche ix). Writers and poets such
as Albert Camus, André Gide, Thomas Malraux, Thomas Mann, Herman Hesse, and
Rainer-Maria Rilke all cite Nietzsche as a major influence upon their works (Kaufmann,
introduction, Basic Writings of Nietzsche x). Even in the field of psychology, Freud,
Adler (Ibid) and Jung (Magnus & Higgins, “Nietzsche’s works and their themes” 24)
drew upon his ideas. Freud had even “claimed to have stopped reading Nietzsche’s work
for fear that Nietzsche had anticipated too many of his own ideas about human nature and
the role of unconscious forces” (Leiter 2). Within theology, Paul Tillich considered
Nietzsche, along with Marx and Freud, as the “greatest modern “Protestants””
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(Kaufmann, introduction, Basic Writings of Nietzsche xi). However, Nietzsche’s
prevalence weaves through modern philosophy, ethics, psychology, and literature.
Nietzsche remains a presence among contemporary popular culture through varied
references in music, television, and films that testify to his continuing influence (Magnus
and Higgins, introduction, The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche 2).
Additionally, “the British moral philosopher Bernard Williams, and the American
pragmatist Richard Rorty [. . .] situate their thought with respect to its debt to Nietzsche”
(Leiter 1). Nietzsche even serves as a key protagonist to Alasdair MacIntyre’s narrative
of the perennial importance of Aristotelian tradition and noble virtues in morality and
ethics in his influential works, After Virtue, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, and
continuing through MacIntyre’s latest work, Dependent Rational Animals.
In addition, MacIntyre’s works disclose a consequence of our contemporary
postmodern landscape within the discourse on morality and values, the loss of universals
and traditions to guide judgment (Lucaites and Condit 11). Stuart Sim states that the
leading contemporary philosophical style “is ‘antifoundational’” wherein one disputes
“the validity of the foundations of discourse, asking such questions as ‘What guarantees
the truth of your foundation (that is, starting point) in its turn?’” (3) The struggle for a
substantive standpoint from which to enter the conversation on values becomes
paramount. How to interpret, articulate, and enact a communication ethic in a world
shaken to its cornerstones by emotivism, deconstruction, and the traumatic terror and
wars of the past two centuries, recurs throughout the shifting currents of the postmodern
conversation. Sim continues,
Postmodernism has drawn heavily on the example set by
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antifoundationalist philosophers, perhaps most notably the iconoclastic
nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, whose call
for a ‘revaluation of all values’ constitutes something of a battle-cry for
the movement. (3)
Nietzsche often hailed as a precursor of poststructuralism and postmodernism, therefore
stands as a foundation for antifoundational contemporary thought.
However, the problem of articulating a constructive communication ethic within
the contemporary postmodern condition is complex. The topic rises to the fore of
MacIntyre’s influential study, After Virtue. MacIntyre therein states
What we possess [. . .] are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts
which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We
possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key
expressions. But we have – very largely, if not entirely – lost our
comprehension, both theoretical and practical, or morality. (2)
Regarding the practical enactment of moral ideals and traditions through their
communication and aesthetic, architectonic rhetorical constructions, MacIntyre later
reports that “There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our
culture” (After Virtue 6). If no foundations remain that gain communal consent upon the
meaning of good and evil, truth and lie, how could agreement on guiding values for
thought, speech, and action be reached? The difficulty of locating communal common
ground amid political, corporate, religious scandals of recent years and rising tides of
unreflective cynicism and emotivism, claiming “all moral judgments are nothing but
expressions of preference” only reinforces the severity of the problem (MacIntyre, After
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Virtue 12). If correct, then undecidability of such fundamental human questions of truth
or lie, right or wrong and the ground upon which to decide such questions to guide word
and deed would designate postmodernity as after morality, as after illusion of
metanarrative Truth.
One way out of this conundrum is to further investigate dominant influences upon
our current legitimation crisis. Jean-Francois Lyotard opens a fruitful path of inquiry by
reminding us of the textured present in which we eternally reside, our contingent human
condition. Lyotard posits that “Post modern would have to be understood according to
the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo) (81). Therefore, Lyotard characterizes
the postmodern condition as bereft of the traditional metanarratives that previously
justified values and ethical reasoning: the postmodern present simultaneously always
adrift amidst the currents of the past and the unspoken possibilities of the future.
Situating itself within this tension, the present study takes one route to address the
problems posed by our contemporary context by investigating a major source of
suspicion that plagues judgment between competing value claims today, the maelstrom
that howls in the wake of Nietzsche’s revolutionary revaluations. Nietzsche’s notion of
moral inquiry, genealogy, evolves into revaluation, as an eternally recurring invitational
dialogue demanding that individual agency be perceived as a contextual element always
embedded within historicity. Drawing from the diversity of narratives calling for the
opportunity to serve as the foundation for future action, Nietzsche authors a drama of
ethics and moral reasoning through the play of epideictic rhetorical prose. “His brilliant
style does not hide or cloud issues but dramatizes them” (Solomon, introduction, Reading
Nietzsche 8). The present study seeks to explore and explicate the play and turning points
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of the plot of ethical argument in our lives from the vantage of Nietzsche’s thought
embedded within the storm and stress of authoring an ethical life.
Authoring by necessity implies an awareness and engagement of difference.
Dialogue serves as a constructive path on which to embark beginning at the interplay of
dialogue and rhetoric, the meeting of difference after metanarrative disintegration and the
illusions of ‘public disclosure.’ Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, following
Nietzsche’s deconstruction of metanarratives, foresaw the benefit of employing a dialogic
perspective from which to engage and meet the multiplicity that the temporal moment
afforded. “Life by its very nature is dialogic” (Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoyevsky’s
Poetics 293). Given this perspective, the dialogic meeting of exigencies of the existential
moment provides constructive affirmation of alterity through the interplay of dialogue
and rhetoric as architectonic art of constructing perspectives from which to work.

Bakhtin: Dialogue as a Metaphor of Nietzsche’s Meeting Difference
The tradition of dialogue that springs from the work of Russian philosopher
Mikhail Bakhtin aids our understanding of Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the
architectonic rhetoric of his genealogical inquiries and epideictic revaluations of values.
Bakhtin’s ideas of dialogue and monologue as communicative practices and orientations
to knowing serve as bridges between Nietzsche’s countering of perspectivism and
asceticism and Levinas’ ideas of saying and said. In this way, Bakhtin serves as a
meeting in dialogue between these key figures and opens possibilities for different ways
of engaging their work through the metaphor of dialogic meeting that emerges through
the process of this study. To fully realize this connection, we extend our discussion of
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Nietzsche’s metaphors. Engagement begins with Bakhtin’s ideas on dialogue, adding
Levinas’ and Buber’s dialogue on meeting, and further augmenting this theoretical
ground are Levinas’ ideas of saying and said as ways Nietzsche manifests these notions
in his architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting.
An important issue to be cognizant of in reading the work of Russian philosopher
Mikhail Bakhtin is that his notion of being, be it that of the self or of meaning in
language, is one of becoming, one of dialogue. For Bakhtin, “the very being of man
(both external and internal) is the deepest communion. To be means to communicate”
(Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics 287). A quest that leads him to conclude, “the word
is born in dialogue” (Dialogic Imagination 279). Meeting difference in dialogue helps to
unfold Nietzsche’s perspectivism as an existential grounding of knowing and its
communication in the dialogic orientation to making meanings known through meeting
others in dialogue.
Therefore as Holquist notes, “the situatedness of the self is a multiple
phenomenon: it has been given the task of not being merely given [. . .] it is dominated by
a “drive to meaning,” where meaning is understood as something still in the process of
creation” (Dialogism 23). For Bakhtin, as he states in his Speech Genres and other Late
Essays, this drive is not one geared to a single, absolute meaning but to understand the
multiple nature of every single unit of meaning, of every utterance. The limits of
meaning exist in dialogue through the change of speaking subjects. It is through this
dynamic interplay of voices that meaning arises, through the process of dialogue
(Bakhtin, Speech Genres and other Late Essays 92-3). Therefore, Holquist states that the
being of each speaking subject engaged in dialogue is then one of “co-being,” “an event
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that is shared. Being is a simultaneity; it is always co-being” (Dialogism 25). This leads
one to further explore the nature of being which Bakhtin saw as evidenced through
consideration of consciousness. For as he states
Consciousness is in essence multiple . . . Not another person remaining the
object of my consciousness, but another autonomous consciousness
standing alongside mine, and my own consciousness can exist only in
relation to it. (Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics 288)
It is this notion of consciousness, which further describes the interrelation of
consciousness, being, and dialogue. Other people’s consciousnesses cannot be perceived
or defined as objects or things. Consciousnesses can only relate to one another through
engaging each other in dialogue. “To think about them means to talk with them;
otherwise they immediately turn to us their objectivized side: they fall silent, close up,
and congeal into finished, objectivized images” (Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoyevsky’s
Poetics 68). The ground of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, it will be shown, follows a similar
path in stressing how communication shapes and orders consciousness according to a
dialogic meeting of difference (The Gay Science 354). This relation Bakhtin articulates
also alludes to the Levinasian notions of saying and said as extensions, adding further
texture to this seminal difference between perspectives of meeting in existence and
experience.
Consequently, within the developing conceptual framework of Mikhail Bakhtin,
“Life by its very nature is dialogic” (Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics 293). Engaging
other consciousnesses in open dialogue allows a person to participate wholly and
throughout his “whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body
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and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the
dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium” (Bakhtin, Problems of
Dostoyevsky’s Poetics 293). Meeting difference in dialogue discloses in multiple ways
the nature of human identity as multiple, as born in relation, as well as the contours of
relation and meaning as informed through meeting.
Bakhtin further explains the glaring importance of recognizing meaning as
becoming within the sociohistorical context through his concept of heteroglossia.
Situatedness serves a crucial role for Nietzsche as well in his interpreting otherwise
objectivity not as disinterest but as situated positions. Affect and interestedness are
defining characteristics of knowing and communication. Heteroglossia, as presented in
The Dialogic Imagination is the
base condition governing the utterance. It is that which insures the
primacy of context over text. At any given time, in any given place, there
will be a set of conditions, social, historical, meteorological,
physiological-that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that
time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other
conditions. (Bakhtin 438)
It is this layering of communication, this necessary recognition of the dialogues behind a
specific dialogue, “that permit language to be used in ways that are indirect, conditional,
distanced,” that allow for ironic and parodic interpretations and utterances (Bakhtin, The
Dialogic Imagination 323). Consequently, these ironic elements constantly remind us of
the “normal language” that informs the current, highlighted dialogue (Bakhtin, The
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Dialogic Imagination 314). Heteroglossia is therefore properly described as a quality of
language itself, which is necessarily various.
The ironic and double-voiced character emphasized as heteroglossia is a quality
of a language becoming meaningful at a particular historical moment. “Heteroglossia,
like most of Bakhtin’s other concepts, is both historical and normative; it refers to both a
variable state of affairs and to one which is constant” (Vice 18). “The authentic
environment of an utterance, the environment in which it lives and takes shape, is
dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously concrete,
filled with specific content and accented as an individual utterance” (Bakhtin, Dialogic
Imagination 272). Meaning occurs meeting difference, others, in dialogue, seeing
meeting as a saying of the said of experience. “The word in language is half someone
else’s” (Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination 293). Nietzsche foresaw this co-being as
productive of meaning as a dialogic encounter of multiplicity within and without the
person. As both Bakhtin and Nietzsche prescribed awareness of alterity each also,
through the course of their writings, enacted a constructive dialogue with difference that
affords the embracing of the traditions of the said through their revaluation as saying in
the temporal existential moment.

The Metaphor of Meeting
Meeting presupposes distance that draws forth difference in one’s experience of
reality. Without recognition of difference, be it of other, time, culture, text, or
perspective, one’s theoretical construct of self would impossible, or at least
unrecognizable, to a Western understanding. Meeting conveys one’s orientation to
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interpretation and the making meaning of one’s experiences through communication.
Meeting concerns how one enters consciousness of this communicative space in which
difference draws forth one’s subjectivity. Subjectivity is known through the opening of
communication as the will to power directing consciousness, consciousness born out of
the dialogic life processes, the intake, interpretation, and response to stimuli, for example.
Meeting also provides a way to explain Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of
dialogic meeting as the concretion of speech and activity, perhaps best realized through
his own manner of thinking. Kaufmann describes Nietzsche not as a “system-thinker but
a problem-thinker” (Nietzsche 82). Nietzsche, in his unyielding existential testing of
traditions and their presuppositions against the questions of the temporal moment,
personified the type of understanding of self as meeting as attributed to him by Buber
below. “Only problems that present themselves so forcefully that they threaten the
thinker’s present mode of life lead to philosophic inquiries” (Kaufmann, Nietzsche 89).
Inquiry becomes a form of meeting guided by the questions one asks resulting from the
engagement with the difference of relations that the question unfolds. “Questioning
means experiencing fully, with an open mind and without reservations” so one may fully
attend to the multiple meanings meeting may afford (Kaufmann, Nietzsche 90). In this
way, being becomes accessible as the becoming event of meeting situated within the
contours of concrete experience, “All truths are for me soaked in blood” (Nietzsche as
qtd. in Kaufmann 90). The texture and contours of meeting as communication, the
activity of relation between self and difference we now develop through discussion of the
ground of meeting as metaphor.

Prellwitz, Chapter One 15

The theoretical sources of this metaphor come from the thought of Martin Buber
and Emmanuel Levinas whose insights help to sharpen the language used to explain how
Nietzsche’s rhetoric articulates this metaphor of values and morals that influence
communicative activity. According to Levinas’ treatment of Buber’s theory of
knowledge
it is in man that its action [that of being] unfolds (BM, 203). Man is not a
subject who constitutes: he is the very articulation of the meeting. The
human self is not a being among beings, but a being who is a category,
and who since Nietzsche, according to Buber, has been recognized as such
(BM, 155). He is meeting. He is that which puts itself at a distance (and
already the anonymous existence of the world and of things that have
survived the use we make of them is affirmed in that distancing) and he is
at the same time the entering into relations with that world which is
distant—other. (“Martin Buber” 24)
We communicate our being through meeting difference in the other, in the alterity of
experiences with the ever-changing textures of human temporality and historicity. We
exist in our activity of meeting for in this activity we communicate the meanings we
make of our being. Meeting makes the meanings of one’s self-perception as well as
one’s interpretation of reality, the difference that characterizes the situatedness of human
existence.
The human person then simultaneously exists “as possibility of distance and
relation” (Levinas, “Martin Buber” 24). In this way Levinas explains how one’s concrete
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situatedness conveys the contour of one’s being, the totality of a person in how one meets
otherness.
He is not at the center [of being] by virtue of being a thinking subject, but
in his totality, because his totality is the concreteness of his situation. His
totality sustains his thought itself, and is already transcendence. ‘Only
when we try to understand the human person in his whole situation, in the
possibilities of his relation to all that is not himself, do we understand
man’ (BM, 181). ‘It is not by a relation to oneself but by a relation to
another than man can be complete’ (BM, 168). (Levinas, “Martin Buber”
24).
The understanding of meeting as one’s relation to difference, to all that is not oneself
comes to explain subjectivity through articulation of this relation in speech and act.
Communication becomes not an effect but a cause of consciousness as it directs how one
meets difference in the concrete situation of the events of meeting that express one’s
being. This leads to how this meeting can be explained through the lens of
communication (as event of being or how being in its becoming may be made knowable
through its thematization and communication) as dialogic meeting.
A useful way to describe the metaphor of dialogic meeting is to describe its core
elements. First, we begin with the notion of dialogue. Second, the notion of meeting as
derived from the communicative sense of saying and said drawn from the works of
Emmanuel Levinas. Why employ Levinas’ notions of saying and said as the perspective
of dialogic meeting? First, dialogic meeting implies the possibility of reconciliation of
word and deed within a postmodern moment of crises. Second, saying and said articulate
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the temporal imbricating textures of dialogue, discourse, within a communicative context,
dialogue viewed as speech. This enables the exchange of meaning between word and
deed in accord with the values out of which each arises, not ignorance of the ground from
which they spring. Saying and said employ communicative terminology or names to
signify the architectonic rhetoric guided by dialogic meeting.
Through the perspective of dialogic meeting, Nietzsche provides a foundation for
erecting a constructive response to decisions and the crises of ignorance or denial of the
ground of word and deed. An architectonic rhetoric emerges from a rhetorical reading of
Nietzsche through the prism of dialogic meeting. Herein, the affirmation of all life he
calls for may emerge grounded in the values and perspectives his words enact. They are
not meant to refute or solve but to respond. Nietzsche, with the resurrection of the values
that ground temporal existence and meeting, offers a trace of the flowing of meaning
between moments of past, present, and future. A trace anchored by the values and
perspectives we resurrect, revalue, and carry forward in our discovery and creation of
responses to the questions our lives author embedded in the everyday mysteries of the
human condition.
Architectonic rhetoric describes rhetoric of making meaning through dialogic
meeting of difference, be it meeting of ideas, events, histories, traditions, or other persons
situated within the horizons of the temporality of engagement. It discovers perspectives
to guide creation through the experience of human existence and operates to disclose
perspectives via genealogical inquiry into the bases of these communicative acts.
Revaluation resurrects traditions resulting from genealogical inquiry guided by dialogic
meeting, the values that direct criticism and creation within the temporal moment.
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Making meaning through an architectonic rhetoric grounded in dialogic meeting allows
for the resurrection of perspectives within the horizons of temporality of human existence
and experience. Communication as dialogic meeting acknowledges it picks up the
currents of previous conversations, engages the flow of these ideas, and leaves ripples to
be interpreted by others, granting that meaning remains a malleable metaphor of human
consciousness and communication.

Levinas’ Saying and Said: A Framework for Nietzsche’s Architectonic Rhetoric
The language used to situate and explain these metaphors and broach their
potential contribution to contemporary discussions on ethics and rhetoric comes from
Levinas’ notion of the saying and the said. These interrelated metaphors explain how
dialogic meeting, sketched from interpretation of Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric,
functions.
According to Smith, “the meanings discoverable in phenomena represent the
“said,” the orderly world of Newtonian physics: the “saying” is their interpretation” (46).
Nietzsche, through his architectonic rhetoric, seeks to shake these traditions from their
totalized hijacking by Modernity and return them to the world of life as it is lived, as
saying malleable to meet the questions of a pluralistic postmodern historical moment.
For Levinas, interpersonal communication demands “correlation of the saying and
the said, that is, the subordination of the saying to the said, to the linguistic system and
ontology, is the price that manifestation demands” (Otherwise than Being 6). In other
words, Smith explains that
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What the saying ‘is’ transcends language as the term is normally used at least,
since language must, in order to be language, accept the ‘conditions’ of linguistic
expression, those very conditions that are “scorned by prophetic discourse.
Language is equivocation or failed simultaneity, not the steady light of truth but
the twinkling light of what we think we might have seen but [. . .] well, perhaps
not. (55)
The subject or speaker is not solely determinative of meaning. Even self-understanding
is ultimately determined at least in part from without through interaction with others’
interpretations. Hence, Nietzsche’s repeated pleadings “Hear me! For I am such and
such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone else.[ . . .] Have I been
understood?” (Ecce Homo, preface 1; “Why I Am a Destiny” 9). In other words, do not
totalize me, do not misinterpret me.
Such statements demonstrate that Nietzsche did perceive some stability of
meaning, at least a passing stability in which one could ground one’s words to be able to
communicate, to assume meaning of one’s words could be understood. Each represents a
trace of infinity, knowable to us only as a trace, within the intertwining threads of
historicity, contingency, and natural mystery at the core of the human condition, threads
like those of the web that change in the morning light and evening dew, swayed by
autumnal winds. Light opens new lines previously obscured by darkness present within
perspective on what lies ahead as communication occurs within the noise and confusion
of hope that one can be understood despite distraction and disinterest.
This states acceptance of the transient nature of revelation of truth the human
being can discern embodied through more truthful, honest language. Hence, language is
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metaphor, “language is rhetoric” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 107). Meaning
is realized through dialogic meeting. Dialogue provides the communicative ground upon
which rhetoric may employ language to author meanings of meeting difference.
However, monologue remains a part of this process, of seeing difference at the
heart of making meaning of mysteries one confronts in the face or words of another.
Until the monologic grasping for meaning seeks to use, until its will to power becomes
driven by conquest, ownership, control, and resentment. Monologue then becomes the
negative reactive drive to totalize in one’s own image and idea, without consideration of
the difference that strains for breath beneath the imposition of one’s interpretation as the
interpretation. Monologue resides as a tension against dialogue until monologue seeks
not to know but to silence, crushing difference into the similarity of the known.
As the process of translating thought and emotion into language involves a latent
totalizing of experience to the constrictions of standardized linguistic agreement to be
communicable, one must be attentive to but also not unnecessarily exceed the bounds of
propriety in this totalizing translation. Each word frames the unframeable for the other;
therefore, one accepts a fine risk in writing the words of an other to an other.
A fine risk is found in how the said influences communication.
The said thematizes the interrupted dialogue or the dialogue delayed by
silences, failure or delirium, but the intervals are not recuperated [. . .] The
interruptions of the discourse found again and recounted in the immanence
of the said are conserved like knots in a thread tied again, the trace of
diachrony that does not enter into the present, that refuses simultaneity.
(Levinas, Otherwise than Being 170)
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Without dialogue, its possibility remains, without meaning. Dialogue provides the
necessary space with which the activity of communication can employ rhetoric to name
without imposition. Saying enacts dialogue as an emergent sense of meeting while the
said enacts a monologue of embedded meaning shaped by the past.
Yet imposition is required for communication, for agreement upon meanings
within language for ideas and perspectives to be shared between persons when
encountering reality.
In totalizing being, discourse qua discourse thus belies the very claim to
totalize. This reversion is like that which the refutation of skepticism
brings out. In the writing the saying does indeed become a pure said, a
simultaneousness of the saying and of its conditions. A book is
interrupted discourse catching up with its own breaks. But books have
their fate; they belong to a world they do not include, but recognize by
being written and printed, and by being prefaced and getting themselves
preceded with forewords. They are interrupted, and call for other books
and in the end are interpreted in a saying distinct from the said. (Levinas,
Otherwise than Being 171)
This study carries out such an interruption of Nietzsche’s works that through its saying
offers an unorthodox said of Nietzsche’s thought. Seen differently, values work as limits
to halt totalizing forces inherent within language and communication for Nietzsche.
Interpreting as saying is distinct from the said seen in Nietzsche’s persistent
intertextualism (Genealogy of Morals, preface 4, III; Ecce Homo). Making requests to
consider earlier works in reading later works Nietzsche calls his readers to see his works
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as sayings, saying dependent on their engagement for their meanings, as his later prefaces
appended to his earlier works designates unfinalizability. As Nietzsche states of his late
work, On the Genealogy of Morals he was “still seeking my own language for my own
things [. . .]” (preface 4). One begins as an interruption of the said by means of a saying,
of making meaning of the reserves of language within a new, temporal existential
moment of context.
Returning to old works, to the said of one’s thought, provides textures as
reflection provides a loophole for saying of the said. “Interpretation is thus a way of
returning the said to saying: the said, which were it not for the forces of philosophy,
poetry, and prophecy, would enclose itself in a totality of silence” (Smith 55).
Interpretation urges the resurrection of tradition, of the said, within human experience
and existence, interpretation as discovering meanings amid the mud of human
temporality and historicity embodied in the moment of meeting. This is not interpretation
undertaken solely as the resurrection of categories to silence difference within experience
and remove responsibility from actor to the tradition out of which they claim to act. In
the communicative activity necessitated in saying, a speaker forces meaning into the
domain of the said, thereby betraying it. Levinas’ text twists and turns as it wrestles with
this problem: saying is never fully present in the said, yet the said also constitutes the
only access we have (Otherwise than Being 78-81). Levinas’ texts struggle as
Nietzsche’s texts struggle with these ever shifting limits because neither wishes to
totalize, asceticize, monologize dialogue. Dialogue must remain to enable and maintain
possibilities for life, for one’s words to adapt to its ever-changing waves that reorder and
resituate speakers, readers, and the language that divides and unites them.
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This recalls the nature of dialogic meeting as here conceived through human
language. “Saying is communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all
communication, as exposure” (Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 81-2). Nietzsche with
Levinas rejects humanism for a naturalism or organicism that goes beyond mere
humanism. De-situating through genealogy works to check the possibility of replacing
the other with the self. As exposure, meeting is a precondition to speech,
communication, and ethics, Nietzsche emphasizes the only way to knowing is through the
known—who, what, why, questioned with the understanding of one’s placement or
emplotment within the context of natural, physical forces and influences.
In agreement with Levinas in favoring significance over signification, Nietzsche
removes foundations to resurrect traditions. Nietzsche criticizes and questions the
grounds of taken-for-granted values and perspectives to author change, to re-engage
traditions in the temporal, existential moment of meeting. In meeting, traditions, the said,
may be freed from their abuse, imprisonment, and suffocation, induced by the ministers
of modernist dogma of Progress, of the technicians of knowledge in the employment of
how without recourse to why.
We live according to where our attention is focused. When, who, why, and how
become questions one struggles with, not questions one answers. For in answering
communicative activity states steps to impose power on others. Such a technician’s
communicative activity blindly leads to monologizing and the said of breathless words
and the silencing modernization of traditions as techniques and known answers to
unasked questions. Traditions not met in the existential contemporaneous temporal
moment of difference remain not as living reservoirs for ordering life and granting
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meaning but rather as bodies without skeletons. Meaning emerges through a dialogic
orientation to the encounter with alterity and others, meaning emerges perhaps most fully
and naturally through dialogic meeting amid the unknown saying of the temporal,
existential moment.
The present work begins with meeting the contemporary historical moment
characterized by metanarrative disintegration. With metanarrative disintegration,
difference and multiplicity are now privileged. The privileging of difference
communicates a turn to dialogue rather than the modern bias towards telling in shaping
communicative activity. Meeting the alterity within the temporal existential moment
occurs through the operative of metaphor. Levinas’ focus on the dialogic tension
between saying and said displays the manner in which meeting emerges to offer temporal
ground. The multiplicity of ways meanings emerge to offer temporal ground become
realized through the imbricating architectonic Nietzschean metaphors of perspectivism,
genealogy, and revaluation of values, producing a dialogic ethic of meeting. This
outcome interprets otherwise the work, as Levinas also does, of whom many consider the
founder of deconstruction, Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s dialogic ethic displays the
ongoing interplay of recognition of decaying said and the ongoing hope in the saying as
meeting.
Nietzsche wrote as a dramatist of the human condition. He presupposed that the
drama he critiqued was already known. People were living that drama. His task is to
make visible what people already know. In keeping with Nietzsche’s spirit, this work
foregrounds Nietzsche’s drama and then like Nietzsche seeks to illuminate that which
when met simply requires us to nod in affirmation.
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Chapter Two: Deconstructing Nietzsche’s Thought within Rhetorical Studies

The second and third chapters serve to situate contemporary communication and
rhetorical studies of Nietzsche as a hermeneutic background against which to develop the
arguments and course of the present study. How will this saying of the said of
Nietzschean scholarship within communication and rhetorical studies enrich the
investigation of the problem this study addresses? The comparative dearth of scholarly
commentary on Nietzsche’s potential contributions to understandings of the interplay
between dialogue and rhetoric and most importantly, towards a constructive
communication ethic reveal ways in which the present study may provide an original
contribution to contemporary conversations on rhetoric, dialogue, and communication
ethics. A contribution glimpsed by employing dialogue, not deconstruction, as a
hermeneutic entrance to interpret otherwise Nietzsche’s corpus as articulating an
architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting, a communication ethic disclosed in meeting
difference within the temporal existential moment of contemporary narrative and virtue
contention after illusion and metanarrative disintegration.

Introduction
The relative silence and neglect of Nietzsche’s dialogic perspective and ethic and
his rhetorical moral inquiries has augmented the problem of defining the ground he clears
for contemporary scholarship on the interplay of dialogue, rhetoric, and communication
ethics. McGuire alludes to this situation: “First, that existentialism in general and
Friedrich Nietzsche in particular have been overlooked by persons making statements
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about the ethics of rhetoric” (“The Ethics of Rhetoric” 133). Perhaps Nietzsche’s
rhetorical style of philosophical argumentation enacted through a myriad of forms from
aphorism, poetry, parable, narrative, to standard essays has complicated and arguably
obfuscated necessary inquiry into how his styles impact reception of the substance of his
writings. How do the metaphors and tropes, the material of his rhetorical philosophy on
the genealogy of values and morals, inform the content of his epideictic revaluation of
values? This study will address this and related questions and their potential effects.
How do they impact the present status of the problem? Because while Nietzsche has
received belated but increasing attention for his contributions to the definition and theory
of rhetoric, the discipline of communication and rhetorical studies remains relatively
silent on the question of the ethics his rhetoric performs and thereby advocates despite the
vast intellectual vistas his shadow touches.
Chapter two begins to explore the significance of this influence as it engages
scholarship on Nietzsche's definition of rhetoric and descriptions of his rhetorical theory
and practice. The conversation opens with scholarship detailing Nietzsche’s rhetorical
strategies, including Paul de Man’s influential interpretations of Nietzsche’s theory of
rhetoric. De Man's early and continuing influence on interpretations of Nietzsche,
especially his characterization of tropes in regard to rhetoric, becomes a point of
contention for Thomas, framing his disagreements with de Man. These opening issues
inform discussion of Thomas’s Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically, which remains the only
book-length treatment of Nietzsche’s rhetorical theory and practice.
Chapter three extends engagement with these scholarly conversations on
rhetorical theory and practice as it engages characterization of whether Nietzsche's works
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suggest an aesthetic or epistemic character for rhetoric. Considerations of the character
of Nietzsche’s rhetoric imply questions of influence and subsequently turns to
connections between his ideas and those of Kenneth Burke. Articles by Desilet, Hawhee,
Thomas, and Bruner chronicle Nietzsche’s influence on Kenneth Burke and Burke’s
comments on the place of ethics within Nietzsche’s poetic and rhetorical philosophy.
Finally, there are discussions of Nietzsche directed toward concerns related to the
interplay of rhetoric, communication, dialogue, and ethics. Analysis of McGuire’s 1980
article, “The Ethics of Rhetoric: The Morality of Knowledge” will be augmented by those
of Conway and especially that of Hawes, whose perspective approaches parallel
standpoints of the present study. McGuire’s work offers the only current scholarship that
directly treats Nietzsche’s potential contributions toward an ethic of rhetoric and
foreshadows key strategies for constructing a communication ethic from Nietzsche’s
works, the central concern of the present study beginning with the fourth chapter.
Chapter three concludes the portrayal of the scholarly background against which
the present study proceeds as it explores scholarly comment on ethical issues related to
Nietzsche’s rhetoric. This last area of emphasis serves as the gate through which the
present study begins to unfold. Emphasis and focus upon Nietzsche’s seminal concerns
with values and morals suggests that greater attention paid to these areas discloses
important insights. The present study then engages Nietzsche’s writings as a rich field to
cultivate our understanding of rhetoric as communication, the interplay of rhetoric and
dialogue, and his constructive communication ethic of dialogic meeting.
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Nietzsche’s Theory and Practice of Rhetoric
The first path of inquiry within communication and rhetorical studies seeks to
infer and develop Nietzsche’s implicit definition, theory, and practice of rhetoric. This
path begins the review in that its concerns are foundational, what is Nietzsche’s
understanding of rhetoric and how is it enacted throughout his writings? Scholarly
inquiry of this topic begins with de Man’s early studies of Nietzsche’s rhetorical theory
and practice. His inaugural studies frame later discussions of Nietzsche’s rhetorical
methods and strategies, highlighted by the appearance in 1994 of an issue of Philosophy
and Rhetoric devoted solely to Nietzsche, Douglas Thomas’s book, Reading Nietzsche
Rhetorically, and other separate articles by Heckmen, Merrow, and Thomas. These
works address Nietzsche’s strategies of interpretation and persuasion through an array of
topics that include the relationship between physiology, aesthetics, metaphysics,
epistemology, and rhetoric. Understanding of the philosophical import of his choices of
style illustrated, for example, in Crawford’s discussion of his practice of genealogy and
its relation to questions of truth. In addition, Heckman’s article explores Nietzsche’s use
of metaphor in his early posthumously published but influential essay, “On Truth and
Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” and Merrow addresses Nietzsche’s comments in Ecce
Homo on Demosthenes as a symbol of Nietzsche’s style and view of truth as an effect of
persuasion.
Deconstructing Persuasion: De Man’s Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Rhetoric
However, before we analyze these later works in depth, we must first return to the
beginning of such inquiries regarding Nietzsche within contemporary rhetorical
scholarship, the work of Paul de Man. The work of Paul de Man functions as a dominant
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perspective on interpretation of Nietzsche within and without the field of communication
and rhetorical studies. De Man’s influential articles and book, Allegories of Reading, in
many ways inaugurate the modern discussion of “Nietzsche’s Theory of Rhetoric,” a title
of a 1974 Symposium article authored by de Man. Here and in the sections devoted to
analysis of Nietzsche in Allegories of Reading, de Man offers his interpretations of
Nietzsche’s theory and practice of rhetoric. De Man, throughout his analyses and texts,
relies heavily upon Nietzsche’s posthumously published lecture notes on rhetoric and the
influential but also posthumously published early essay, “On Truth and Lying in a NonMoral Sense,” both dating from 1872-1874, and Nietzsche’s first published book The
Birth of Tragedy appearing in 1872. De Man’s selections of texts thereby limit his
interpretations to the near total exclusion of works upon which Nietzsche’s contemporary
reputation largely rests, such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-5) and On the Genealogy
of Morals (1887). This serves as a common hermeneutic bias among scholars writing
along deconstructive lines of Nietzsche research within and without communication and
rhetorical studies. The consequence of this philological strategy or hermeneutic bias is
that it isolates Nietzsche’s ideas on rhetoric to his explicit comments on rhetoric in his
early texts regardless of his evolving ideas and practices that illustrate the multifarious
ways he employed rhetoric in his later, better known writings.
Interpreting these early-unpublished texts, de Man quoting Nietzsche, brings
forward a common interpretation framed as a synecdoche of Nietzsche’s views, “. . .
Language is rhetoric, for it only intends to convey a doxa (opinion), not an episteme
(truth) [. . .]” (“Nietzsche’s Theory of Rhetoric”35). While the possibilities and
implications this statement raises for understanding human language and the nature of
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meaning are discussed at length, the inherent ethical issues this statement raises receive
no comment by de Man. He continues, “Tropes are not something that can be added or
subtracted from language at will; they are its truest nature. There is no such thing as
proper meaning that can be communicated only in certain particular cases” (“Nietzsche’s
Theory of Rhetoric” 35). A consequence of such a perspective implies the existence of
relativism inherent within human language whereby meaning derives less from context
than by subjective awareness and interpretation of the subtle play of tropes. The structure
of meaning inherent within human language can then be marshaled as evidence in
support of deconstruction since it follows directly from the nature of the text or discourse
under analysis.
Later in the same essay commenting on “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral
Sense,” de Man adds, “This essay flatly states the necessary subversion of truth by
rhetoric as the distinctive feature of all language” christening the beginnings of
“Nietzschean deconstruction” (“Nietzsche’s Theory of Rhetoric” 39). Toward the close
of the discussion recorded at the end of the article, de Man states:
Every interpretation can be said, in Nietzsche’s terms, to be both truth and
lie, and this double aspect can best be understood with regard to the
complex relationship between literal and figural meaning within the
linguistic sign. Nietzsche uses at least two terms for ‘misreading’: one is
‘will to power’ and the other is simply ‘interpretation.’ Both combine in
the forceful reading that presents itself as absolutely true but can then, in
its turn, be undermined. The will to power functions as the willful reinterpretation of all reality. (“Nietzsche’s Theory of Rhetoric” 50)
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These two statements greatly inform the view of Nietzsche’s theory of rhetoric perceived
by other important contemporary French interpreters of Nietzsche such as Derrida,
Foucault, Kofman, Deleuze, and Bataille, as well as those of Heidegger and many
prominent Anglo-American deconstructionist critics such as Norris and Miller. Meaning
is an endlessly recurring contest of fluctuating validity among interpretations.
However, the important variable as to how to judge between competing
perspectives unfolds in the shadows where truth remains merely a chimera. As de Man
states, the imperative demands not truth but plausibility, “the proposition therefore
contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that which should count as
true” (Allegories of Reading 120). The Gordian knot of not being able to know how to
decide between competing interpretations, of the relative nature of evaluative criteria,
arises out of the nature of language itself; we are committed to it as we are committed to
language. De Man follows this process by describing how the past only becomes known
in the future and how the truth established in the future then determines the meaning of
the past (Allegories of Reading 124). From this endless turning of reversals “there is no
escape from this, for the text also establishes that deconstruction is not something we can
decide to do or not to do at will. And this use is compulsive or, as Nietzsche formulates
it, imperative” (Allegories of Reading 125). One outcome of this conception of the
hermeneutic process foregrounds rhetoric, rehabilitating “persuasion as the final outcome
of the deconstruction of figural speech” (Allegories of Reading 131). Rhetoric and
philosophy are now united in ways Plato fervently sought to deny for “if the critique of
metaphysics is structured as an aporia between performative and constative language,
this is the same as saying that it is structured as rhetoric” (Allegories of Reading 131).
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Recalling Nietzsche’s earlier statement, as language can only disclose opinion, not truth,
all language and meaning remain eternally open to the changing interpretation of
competing wills to power.
The deconstructive standpoint then supports a rhetorical reading of Nietzsche’s
writings because the resituating of the relationship between nature and metaphysics
parallels Nietzsche’s own discourse. As de Man characterizes it, “And in Nietzsche we
are dealing with a radically ironic rhetorical mode” (“Nietzsche’s Theory of
Rhetoric”45), a mode this study will seek to explore more fully through the ethical
consequences of such a perspective for rhetoric and communication ethics in our
contemporary postmodern moment. Before doing so one must first attend to challenges
Thomas makes to de Man’s influential and groundbreaking interpretation of Nietzsche’s
theory of rhetoric.
Countering De Man: Thomas and the Recurring Question of Value in Rhetoric
Thomas begins his alternative interpretation in response to de Man in a May 1996
Communication Theory article, “Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric.” According to
Thomas, de Man’s reading of “rhetoric along Nietzschean lines” is “misdirected”
(“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 189). The result of this misunderstanding of
rhetoric “as exclusively tropological (as de Man does), produces a misreading that, while
perhaps productive for de Man’s project of deconstruction, is untenable for guiding
theories of critical practice and interpretation” ultimately producing not new insight but
“error” (“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 189). The corrective Thomas presents is a
deconstructive reading of de Man’s deconstructive interpretations. Thomas claims that
his interpretation illustrates “not only the necessity of incorporating a theory of value into
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a Nietzschean approach to rhetorical theory” but also de Man’s untenable denial of “the
construction of value in his formulation of the aporia between trope and performance”
(“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 189). According to Thomas, de Man’s error then
compels him to falsely deny or fail to recognize how Nietzsche’s conception of rhetoric
“parallels earlier historical articulations of rhetoric, which rely on a fusion of trope and
persuasion as a means of the social production of knowledge” (“Reading De Man
Reading Rhetoric” 188). Therefore, from this perspective, de Man posits Nietzschean
rhetoric as one in which form exists separately from content and persuasion that
subsequently exist independently of the social, cultural, and historical forces that call it
forth into being.
The separation of trope and persuasion, of form and content also devalues the
value inherent in rhetoric as a naturally occurring social undertaking.
The result, for de Man, is to classify rhetorical reading as a ‘state of
suspended ignorance’ as ‘any question about the rhetorical mode of a
literary text is always a rhetorical question which does not even know
whether it is really questioning.’ (“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric”
191)
Thomas claims that de Man further extends his deconstructive characterization of rhetoric
as he concludes his seminal work, Allegories of Reading. “[R]hetoric is a text in that it
allows for two incompatible (persuasion and trope), mutually destructive points of view,
and therefore puts an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any reading or
understanding” (de Man qtd. in Thomas, “Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 194). A
possible escape from indeterminability comes from Nietzsche as de Man returns to
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Nietzsche’s essay, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense.” De Man claims that
Nietzsche “provides the possibility of escaping from the pitfalls of rhetoric by becoming
aware of the rhetoricity of language” (Allegories of Reading 110). Recognition of the
rhetoricity of truth and meaning in human language therefore provides the means to use
this knowledge to author one’s own truths and meanings from the words at hand.
However, such an espousal of an endless relativistic deferral of meaning does not
gain support from Nietzsche’s writings, “A figure which gains no buyer becomes an
error” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 108). As Thomas remarks, “Clearly,
Nietzsche’s key concern here is not the rhetoricity of language but instead the social
effects of language and the values that language imposes on us as social beings”
(“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 195). The rhetoricity of language is a means of
making known the social nature of valuation, for what tropes are accepted, those which
find buyers, subsequently reveal the rhetorical and persuasive nature inherent within the
linguistic combinations of human language adopted by that society at that time. The
social nature of language discloses the inherent potential persuasive and rhetorical
elements when enacted through choices made by the “taste of the many” (Nietzsche,
“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 108). Such a concession to the guiding influence of the herd
or society and community in determination of meaning also limits the scope of
subjectivity as the dominant interpreter of meaning, value, and rhetoricity within the
activity of human language, activity that occurs between persons, texts, and times.
Another important component of de Man’s analysis, which Thomas critiques,
refers to the disembedded nature of rhetoric from Nietzsche’s tasks. Failing to see how
Nietzsche employed rhetoric limits how one can infer Nietzsche’s theory of rhetoric. On
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the other hand, Thomas takes the approach of joining rhetoric to Nietzsche’s work,
“rather than relating rhetoric to structure [as de Man does through his separation of trope
and persuasion], Nietzsche set out to relate rhetoric to perspective” (“Reading De Man
Reading Rhetoric” 196). This connection is crucial in that it explains Nietzsche’s
approach through his use of rhetoric within his works, showing that rhetoric also carries
an inherently hermeneutic element in its nature, as Nietzsche’s recurring emphasis on
perspectivism shows. Perspective can only be ascertained through acknowledgement of
the rhetoric one employs in describing their hermeneutic standpoint. Announcing the
biases from which a perspective operates implicitly announces the values and judgment
enacted through its articulation and adoption or rejection when engaging the question
demanding response. Perspectivism requires awareness of the embedded nature of
communicative activity that speaks and writes from and to and with perspectives such as
time, place, gender, class, etc., perspectives that simultaneously describe and prescribe.
Thomas’s book, the only book-length study of Nietzsche within communication
and rhetorical studies, further develops this link between rhetoric and hermeneutics by
claiming
Nietzsche’s contribution [. . .] amounts to a deconstruction of Platonic
philosophy—an inversion of the value hierarchy that places truth and
essences prior to interpretation—and a theory of interpretation that follows
the logic of the supplement, demonstrating how Platonic truth is always an
artistic construction of the human subject. (Reading Nietzsche
Rhetorically 1)
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Rhetoric serves as the basis of philosophical argument as each truth appears as a
construction of human art. Argument becomes more a productive practice of aesthetic
appeals than dispute between competing epistemological claims. The action of rhetoric is
thereby “marked by overflowing possibility, wherein the experience of one’s emotions
and imagination, rather than the empirical experience of “historical accuracy,” is the
guiding force” (Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically 4). What Nietzsche offers then
is a dramatizing of the interpretative process, “It is frequently the very process of
engaging the thought, the idea, the text, or the language that constitutes an argument
itself” (Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically 5). Reading becomes an action driven
by emotion, dictated by pathos, not logos. As a result we reach the gray poststructuralist
conclusion that “truth is revealed as a human, artistic creation both freed from and bound
to the constraints of language as a representational medium” (Thomas, Reading Nietzsche
Rhetorically 13). As truth becomes an act of creation and not discovery, philosophy
becomes the pawn of rhetoric rather the traditional situating of rhetoric as handmaid to
philosophy.
The revised rhetoric Thomas claims Nietzsche provides is “a rhetoric of value,
which is at once a questioning of the origins of values and a problematizing of the
process by which we create values in the world” (Thomas, Reading Nietzsche
Rhetorically 15). The inquiry into the values that undergird perspectives places “the
ground on which one evaluates interpretations of discourse” open to question (Thomas,
Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically 41). Thomas claims that
For the rhetorician, Nietzsche’s arguments provide answers to two
essential questions: What does it mean to have a rhetorical epistemology?
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and What does it mean to do rhetorical inquiry? (Thomas, Reading
Nietzsche Rhetorically 41)
Thomas claims that Nietzsche affirms the placement for decision-making criteria firmly
within the social sphere. Additionally, Thomas claims that Nietzsche’s thought calls
forward a “new sense of inquiry [. . .] characterized by the absence of metaphysical and
ontological claims, which are replaced by a controlling epistemology of untruth,
grounded in the simulacrum” (Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically 41). Thomas states,
quoting Deleuze, that the simulacrum is, “‘an image without resemblance [. . .] always
engulfed in dissimilarity’” (Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically 40). The simulacrum
provides an alternative to the constricting limits of dialectic hobbled as it rests upon false
opposites and dichotomies. There exists no truth/untruth, only truths and/or untruths
determined by the time and context at which the question is open to interpretation and the
will of the interpreters. According to Thomas, Nietzsche’s thought and works are then
grounded “in a rhetorical epistemology of perspectivism, which affirms the power of the
simulacrum and provides such a basis for inquiry and critique” (Reading Nietzsche
Rhetorically 41). The goal of this practice of inquiry and critique “is the reversal of
Platonism” (Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically 41). A reversal characterized by
admission of the inherently contingent, rhetorical plays of truths as linguistic
constructions, not Truth as unquestioned fact of existence knowable only through reason
and dialectical discovery.
Therefore, what does this reversal achieve for rhetoric, as human will and
experience become the arbiters of decision-making and not Truth? Nietzsche invites
participation into the ‘dangerous maybe’ of the creation of truth through the metaphorical
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process of translating thought, feeling, impulse, into human language (Thomas, Reading
Nietzsche Rhetorically 72). The determination of what is true or false rests within the
social sphere as a question of kairos. As Thomas concludes, time “determines the
functions of language, art, Truth, danger, vision, and ultimately, style” (Reading
Nietzsche Rhetorically 170). Time perceived within the community determines whether a
message’s style provides a fitting response to a present exigence.
Therefore, Thomas’ argument claims a Nietzschean rhetoric provides insight into
how we negotiate meaning within community (Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically
173). Also, theoretical insights develop from the dual nature of the rhetorical enterprise
so conceived. “As endorsement, Nietzsche asks us to change the way we live in the
world, to embrace art and illusion, to advocate risk and danger, to place ourselves beyond
good and evil” (Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically 174). Nietzsche asks us to
abandon Plato and embrace Protagoras as we remake truth in our time, as context and not
essence, serves as the arbiter of truth. Second, as critique, Nietzsche provides a revised
rhetoric as a means to investigate the social construction and negotiation of the world
through language “without the blinders of metaphysics or negation. It is a freedom from
the ascetic ideal that has dominated contemporary Western thought and has poisoned
rhetoric as philosophy’s other” (Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically 174). Rhetoric
and its eternal process of revision become Nietzsche’s legacy, the compelling call for the
conversation to continue.
Reversals: Resituating Rhetoric as Deconstruction
The engagement with contemporary scholarly work shifts to work by Heckman as
his article illustrates how scholars explicitly link Nietzsche, Derrida’s deconstruction, and
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rhetoric. The essay follows a path similar to Thomas’s in its origin, growing out of a
disagreement with de Man’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s essay, “On Truth and Lies in a
Non-Moral Sense.” Turning to “a somewhat finer net” than de Man’s reading affords,
Heckman claims that Derrida’s process of “questioning the metaphors that structure
philosophical discourse” offers greater understanding of Nietzsche’s argumentative
process in “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” (Heckman, “Nietzsche’s Clever
Animal” 303; 304). Metaphor, a term that inherently defies definition, constructs the
bridge between philosophy and rhetoric. For as Derrida notes in describing metaphor,
“What is defined, therefore, is implied in the defining of the definition” (“White
Mythology” 230). The core claim being that metaphors are offered to define metaphor
itself, in seeking to define metaphor one cannot avoid using the idea being defined,
metaphors, in their definition (“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 303). It is this circularity
that draws Heckman to the thesis of his essay that the relationship between words and
what they claim to represent is a metaphorical relationship, “So it is the metaphorical
character of our knowledge that guarantees our incapacity to attain the truth”
(“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 311). This insight Heckman claims Nietzsche articulates
in the famous section from “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense.”
What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies,
anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which became
poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed [übertragen],
adorned, and after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding;
truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions;
worn-out [abgenutzt] metaphors which have become powerless to affect
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the senses; coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer
of account as coins but merely as metal. (Nietzsche as qtd. in Heckman
311)
This consequence reiterates an important point made by Thomas in his disagreement with
de Man; one must always acknowledge the great social value Nietzsche placed upon
rhetoric and hence, penultimate rhetorical claims, those to truth. Such validity rests not
in theory but in use in the public sphere as effaced coins purchase no capital so dead
metaphors gain no ear.
Despite these revolutionary insights into the nature of the relationship between
word and meaning, ultimately the problem remains: how can one argue for literal truth?
Heckman claims that according to Nietzsche at least within “On Truth and Lies in a NonMoral Sense” one cannot. Yet results are not the focus of Heckman’s inquiry, it is the
insights that Nietzsche brings forward that deserve greater attention. Of Nietzsche’s
essay Heckman claims “the text enacts precisely the predicament it describes”
(“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 318). The irony of this turning over of the metaphorical
nature of Nietzsche’s rhetorical claims is that it concludes along similar lines to those of
de Man, supporting a deconstructive reading. As Heckman concludes, "For if the
message concerns the impossibility of literal truth, the point cannot be made in a literal
manner” otherwise it contradicts itself (“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 319). It cannot
disclose that which through its saying it denies exists.
Therefore Nietzsche’s claims ultimately contradict themselves just as Derrida
illustrated that philosophical definitions of metaphor contradict themselves by employing
the idea being defined in its definition, in essence leaving a self-defining definition of the
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idea being defined. Therefore, if this is the case, Nietzsche’s text “must insist on the
subversion of its own literal message; this is in order to show what cannot be described”
(“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 319). Although this leaves the matter unsettled, Heckman
states that “[. . .] the extent that he makes us aware of the issue, Nietzsche fully deserves
our attention” (“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 319). This attention is centered on the
impossibility of communicating that which Nietzsche’s texts claim to communicate.
The irony of the circular path of Heckman’s analysis foreshadows undercurrents
in several of the studies of Nietzsche’s rhetorical theory and practice in the special issue
of Philosophy and Rhetoric devoted to him in 1994. We begin at the beginning of this
special issue with Conway’s article, “Parastrategesis, Or: Rhetoric for Decadents.”
Conway’s article revolves around the idea of parastrategesis, which he defines as “a
rhetorical method he [Nietzsche] develops in order to circumvent the deleterious
formative influence of his own decadence” (“Parastrategesis” 181). Given this
identification of Nietzsche’s method, decadence becomes a central concern as “he
attempts to create the sort of readers who will detect, and correct for, his own complicity
in the decadence of modernity” (“Parastrategesis” 181). So why would Nietzsche call for
his readers to treat his works for their decadence? Why did not he edit and remedy the
symptoms? Because as Conway notes, Nietzsche freely admitted, “I am, no less than
Wagner, a child of his time, a decadent” (Nietzsche, The Case of Wagner, preface). Yet
why would Nietzsche adopt such a concern for lack of proper style as central to the
“critical apparatus” of his “post-Zarathustran philosophy” (“Parastrategesis” 181)? How
could such a lack be discerned if style was a contingent affair of relativistic adjustment to
circumstance?
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To answer these questions we turn to Conway’s definition of decadence as the
core symptom of Modernity.
Nietzsche understands decadence as an internal, “physiological,” disarray
that involves, in alternative expressions, “the degeneration of the instincts
[Instinkt-Entartung]” (TI 9:41), or “the disgregaration of the instincts” (TI
9:35). He also offers the following two “formulae of decadence”:
“Instinctively to choose what is harmful for oneself” (TI 9:35); and the
need to “fight the instincts” (TI 2:11). Modernity, he claims in his postZarathustrian writings, is an epoch beset by creeping decay, which can be
neither reversed nor arrested. Any attempt to implement political
countermeasures will only exacerbate the decadence of modernity and
hasten its advance. Modernity shares this fate, we now learn, with its
greatest critic. (“Parastrategesis” 182)
The consequences of Nietzsche’s self-diagnosis as an arch-decadent are many. Conway
claims that for Nietzsche he must “relinquish all claims to rhetorical mastery, for he
cannot enforce an effective distinction between esoteric and exoteric teachings”
(“Parastrategesis”182). Therefore, the distinction between the “many,” the real herd
audience and the “few,” the ideal audience, dissolves so only misunderstanding follows
in the wake of this overturning of distinctions and cues to interpreting Nietzsche’s works.
Nietzsche’s works become decadent in style as their words turn on each other and foster
chaos of meaning. Because the irony of his ideas is no longer able to be discerned, there
is now no way to distinguish between literal and ironical, between what may be intended
within a horizon of significance and what is being criticized in the rhetorical flourishes of
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Nietzsche’s diseased style. Nietzsche’s works deconstruct themselves as they
deconstruct the traditions upon which they are built and only subjective relativism and
the absence of meaning retain meaning.
Therefore if rhetorical mastery means what Conway claims, “the strategic
deployment in the service of larger political ends” (“Parastrategesis” 182-3), Nietzsche
“serves merely as a vessel or medium for the esoteric wisdom he bears”
(“Parastrategesis” 187), the significance of this wisdom left for his disciples to enact.
“He is dependent upon his readers not only to continue the epochal work he begins, but
also to bring it to fruition” (“Parastrategesis” 188). The results of his labor would not be
realized in the audience of his modern world but could only emerge through his
posthumous birth in a postmodern age for Nietzsche “makes the parastrategic dimension
possible, while his readers make it actual” (“Parastrategesis” 190). In a note following
this quote, Conway states that his “account of Nietzsche’s parastrategesis is indebted to
the constellation of readerly strategies collected under the general rubric of
'deconstruction'” (“Parastrategesis” 200). As is common, Conway aligns Nietzsche’s
rhetoric with deconstruction. Deconstruction of Nietzsche’s texts, as Conway claims
Nietzsche encourages his readers to do to complete his texts and cure the decadence of
his style which he himself cannot escape, “initiates [. . .] a heroic, manly agon, wherein
worthy successors are molded through mutually empowering contests with their master”
(“Parastrategesis” 192). Nietzsche apparently envisioned his readers and successors as
what Conway terms “a knightly vanguard of warrior-genealogists” (“Parastrategesis”
191). Readers who would carry on the war on meaning Nietzsche inaugurates in his own
deconstruction of the inherent decadence within his diseased style.
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However, could Nietzsche’s readers and followers have betrayed his trust and by
ignoring his direction have turned the “insider outside” away-unfulfilled
(“Parastrategesis” 194)? According to Conway, the grand experiment Nietzsche sought
to complete in his readers perhaps as Frankenstein hoped to author through the monster
dies stillborn. Conway characterizes Nietzsche’s “actual readers” not as “warriorgenealogists” but rather as “creatures of ressentiment, versed in the “effeminate” arts of
subterfuge, duplicity, and deception” (“Parastrategesis”197). Despite this record of
abysmal failure in accomplishing his alleged task, Conway concludes by stating that
“Nietzsche has in fact exerted a powerful influence on the course of twentieth-century
thought, and he commands an ever growing influence as we approach the millennium”
(“Parastrategesis” 197). On the other hand, given the critique the article proffers,
Conway claims on the last page that the fact that Nietzsche “has been lionized by sundry
permutations of the reviled “man of ressentiment,” is, finally, beside the point”
(“Parastrategesis” 198). “In the end, Nietzsche may be ‘born posthumously’ after all, in
spite of himself” (“Parastrategesis” 198). Alternatively, perhaps “Nietzsche may be
‘born posthumously’” in spite of the caricatures deconstructive readings tease from his
thought.
The link between genealogy and deconstructive interpretation forms the core of
Claudia Crawford’s essay, “A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche.” Crawford
explores the possibilities of Nietzsche’s genealogical division of worlds between being
and becoming, appearance and the real, thought, language and the world symbolized.
The significance of this course is that it claims to reveal the consequences of Nietzsche’s
characterization of the world as will to power by seeking to create, “after Nietzsche’s
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prompting, a genealogy of worlds” (Crawford “A Genealogy of Worlds According to
Nietzsche” 202). The origination of these different worlds, the actual world, the world of
becoming, the world of being, the ‘apparent’ world, and finally, the Dionysian world,
Nietzsche’s affirmation of the reality of appearances, form this critical path (Crawford,
“A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 202-17). The source of these divisions
and possible falsifications parallels what Nietzsche posits as the misinterpretation of
language as directly reflecting the reality it describes rather than recognizing the
metaphorical and symbolic nature of human language (Crawford, “A Genealogy of
Worlds According to Nietzsche” 203-04). What this rupture reveals for Crawford is the
bases upon which to follow Nietzsche’s genealogy of worlds and the relation of this
characterization of reality as will to power. Because of this rupture between sign and
signified, between thinking and being, “[. . .] language and thinking are only fleeting
fictional adaptations of the becoming of will to power [. . .] we and all our fictions are
this will to power” (Crawford, “A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 208).
Meaning in language manifested only through giving away to the dominant interpreting
will to power.
The consequence Crawford's view poses for interpretation of Nietzsche’s famous
metaphor is that it emphasizes the danger inherent in his genealogical investigations. The
danger of toppling worlds requires the recognition that all is fiction, which leaves no
ground upon which to stand. As Crawford follows Nietzsche’s philological pretensions
and deconstructive readings of the master myths of the world of being behind the sensual,
natural world, she concludes that while “Heidegger still courts a ‘true’ world. For
Nietzsche fictions are what we have and what we only always will have” (“A Genealogy
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of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 212). Crawford’s readings seem to follow the
circular path evidenced in Heckman’s and Conway’s previously noted scholarship,
finding Nietzsche searching out ways to decipher and make meaning of what one
perceives, floundering in attempts to author a formidable foundation for interpretation,
judgment, and action other than merely subjective relativism. “For Nietzsche,
appearance is also always necessarily disappearance—Being (permanence) cannot be”
(Crawford, “A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 215). Therefore, the
history of metaphysics and morality fail as systems of control over the chaos of meaning,
of the supreme translations of the real into the contingent actual world we inhabit.
Crawford concludes that leaves us at the ledge of the deconstructive part of the
process, “we are not yet at the realization of the ‘Dionysian’ world (D), where the ‘real’
world (C1) becomes ‘appearance’ (B1) affirmed. This would be a fiction of yet another
order” (“A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 217). The genealogical
critiques of Nietzsche revealed the false foundations of Western metaphysics and the
erroneous interpretation of language as being, not as a socially contingent form of
becoming, not merely symbolizing the ideas it metaphorically communicates. Now
Nietzsche’s self-appointed task remains: how to move beyond the mere interplay of
forces and competing wills to power?
How does the metaphor of will to power signal a natural evolution of multiplicity
of ground when no metanarratives remain? Wills to power connected to a multiplicity of
ground, revealing the other side of rhetoric—rhetoric as deconstruction, in addition to the
traditional characterization of rhetoric as efforts at persuasion. However, the metaphor of
will to power has been attached to Nietzsche with more overt clarity than Nietzsche
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himself intended (Kaufmann, Nietzsche 247-54). Nietzsche utilizes the metaphor of will
to power, not as a singly privileged metaphor, but rather as a metaphor of action
articulating an ongoing struggle with difference and multiplicity.
Nietzsche’s Task: Rhetoric as Social Strategy
The importance of recognizing the material nature of language for Nietzsche’s
practice of rhetoric recurs in Porter’s study, “Nietzsche’s Rhetoric: Theory and Strategy.”
Nietzsche’s isolation of the material being of language and “affirmation of the rhetorical
essence of language itself be part of a larger rhetorical strategy,” (Porter, “Nietzsche’s
Rhetoric: Theory and Strategy” 221) that authors a critical “assault on inherited and
habitual ways of imagining the world” (221). The association between form and content
determines the contours of Nietzsche’s rhetoric as it does the exchange of all meaning
through human language. “Rhetoric is “speech” through and through. It is
performativity, and not just the possibility, of discourse” (Porter, “Nietzsche’s Rhetoric:
Theory and Strategy” 237). It is the social and contingent nature of the performance of
rhetoric that emphasizes and embodies the analogous social nature of interpretation.
Therefore, the task is framed by the context, the speech redefined and remade
through its extension as it is interpreted; the meaning of the speech unfolded and
augmented as it is shared among its audiences. As Porter later comments, “our reading of
Nietzsche’s rhetoric would be incomplete were we to forget that the performative value
of his writings is their rhetorical value, even when rhetoric is no longer the explicit
theme” (“Nietzsche’s Rhetoric: Theory and Strategy” 241). While the only texts where
Nietzsche explicitly discusses rhetoric remain his 1872-1874 lecture notes for a course
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while teaching at the University of Basel, the rhetorical performances his works enact
provide a rich field for inquiry.
Porter claims that emphasis upon the performative nature of Nietzsche’s rhetorical
practice reveals “that language is uncontrollably historical, overlaid with inheritances,
fraught with entanglements and contradictions that are of its nature only to the extent that
it has no autonomous nature, but only a history” (“Nietzsche’s Rhetoric: Theory and
Strategy” 241). Language as history brings forward not only the inherently rhetorical
nature of language but also of interpretation. Meaning then becomes an agon, a contest
whereby the truth emerges through the competing forces and perspectives vying to
determine how events, persons, and ideas are to be remembered and understood.
That history . . . is comprised, variously, of memory traces and
forgetfulness, conscious or otherwise. Nietzsche’s rhetorical artfulness
consists in the attempt to awaken their memory, and to implicate both
himself and the reader in them. Reading Nietzsche, then, is like a perilous
balancing act: one is forever in want of ground on which to stand.
(Porter, “Nietzsche’s Rhetoric: Theory and Strategy” 241)
Nietzsche’s rhetorical performances then enact his genealogical investigations, seeking to
uncover the motives behind dominant perspectives, those rhetorical standpoints that
attain power at different historical moments. However, it will be argued later in the
present study that the unnoticed dialogic style of these performances reveal a potentially
destructive and constructive rhetorical theory. Such a dialogic orientation to Nietzsche’s
ideas activates its audiences to become part of the history of the process of language,
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style, and meaning shifting with the tides of power and changing times by meeting the
difference these contexts disclose.
While the multifarious ways style reveals a dialogic tendency in Nietzsche’s
rhetorical performances will be developed later in this work, Gilmour addresses the
complimentary ways that style reveals more about the philosophical perspectives
Nietzsche develops to affirm life (246). Again, the conflict over the being of language
and the becoming of the reality it seeks to symbolize conflate the communication of truth
according to Nietzsche, “the truth about language (which Nietzsche attempts to capture in
language) is that language is incapable of capturing truth” (250). The question then
becomes how does Nietzsche attempt to address this paradox through his language,
which both helps and hinders communication?
A solution arises ironically as Gilmour notes how Nietzsche addresses ways
language frames the boundaries of human thought and how grammar drives ideas to
become concepts. Concepts being ideas that have garnered social acceptance and usage.
“The main point of all these observations is that Nietzsche’s various stylistic gestures
serve to defamiliarize the very activity of communication” (261). Defamiliarization then
personalizes language and demonstrates how Nietzsche’s “language calls into question
and interrupts the anesthetizing process of “socialization” to which, he says, all language
is suspect” (Gilmour 261). Socialization here functions as an error from Nietzsche’s
perspective as it yields to the falsification of the becoming of the real world through the
being of the falsified world of the systems and grammar of language, especially that of
metaphysics. Yet how can one escape the necessary lies of Western philosophy,
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metaphysics, systems and grammar in order to communicate to others but through the
shared systems of language that embody human thought and experience?
Gilmour claims Nietzsche seeks his answer and escape from this dilemma through
recourse to the least socialized and most defamiliarized forms of language, poetry (266).
Philosophy serves as a type of socialized language that needs to be cured of its false
pretenses. To this end Gilmour claims that for Nietzsche “the ironic serves to bring
philosophy back to its aesthetic origins, to “poetry” understood perhaps in the way
Nietzsche understood it, “in the most radical sense of the word” (266). Evaluation of
this aestheticizing process Gilmour places within his question, “To what ends, indeed, is
Nietzsche’s speech shared” (266)? Gilmour’s conclusion remains mixed, in that while
Nietzsche’s “essentially ambiguous, dissimulating character of his practice as a writer”
leads often to obfuscation and illumination (266-67). Personalizing language thereby
generates multiplicity of interpretations as the current state of Nietzsche scholarship
indicates, some informative others less so depending upon the conditions in which and
the perspective from which meeting occurs.
Kathleen Merrow confronts the ambiguities associated with Nietzsche’s many
styles by suggesting that Nietzsche posits himself in Ecce Homo as an heir to the famed
Greek orator, Demosthenes (285). The illumination of this self-styled genealogy of
persuasion leads Merrow to suggest that in “choosing Demosthenes as alter ego for his
own art of style . . . Nietzsche chooses to foreground truth as an effect of persuasion—
just that aspect of rhetoric most troubling to the ‘philosophical Greeks’ and their
descendants” (286). Merrow begins her genealogy of the influence or connection of
Demosthenes with Nietzsche’s rhetoric from his early 1872-73 lecture notes claiming that
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“Nietzsche’s early lectures become raw material for his later published works, which take
the material in new directions” (287). This intertextual connection which Nietzsche
himself encourages in his readers (On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 4) remains an
important element of the dialogic quality of his style which will be developed later in the
present study.
Contrary new directions that Merrow charts include ways Nietzsche cites the
rhythms of becoming and appearance as tools to deconstruct traditional ideas of Truth as
well as the opposition between philosophy and rhetoric. The central metaphor of rhythm
associated with Demosthenes characterizes style but also “for Nietzsche . . . rhythm was
the form of becoming itself and thus the world of appearances. . . . as the most primary
sensation of time, as the very form of time at the very heart of cultural perception” (298).
The kairotic nature of communicative activity of nonverbal gesture or tone of voice also
plays a significant role in the evolution and evocation of style within rhetorical
performance.
The significance of this perspective on style for interpretation of Nietzsche
underlies his abiding contention that “truth “exists” only in and through form—that truth
is made by the persuasion of style and form rather than simply decorated by them”(300).
Through his conceptions of Dionysus and the metaphor of the will to power Nietzsche
then revalues appearance and truth (304). “Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power then
attempts to bring truth and deception, truth and persuasion, truth and style back together
outside of the oppositions that were generated when Being and being came apart” (304).
Truth and the sources and forms of its creation revolve around a contingent rhetorical
poetical center. “Truth” is refigured by Nietzsche as a human poetic process: a “making
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believe” rather than a process of discovery, a result with a history rather than an origin”
(304). The will to power then changes as the rhythms of time change altering the truth
that is made in different contexts. As Merrow concludes, “Nietzsche’s texts present a
playful, cheerful affirmation of the worlds appearance, dissimulation—an artistic,
creative attitude towards life and reality once it is grasped that values, truths, and selves
are made, not found” (307). From a value perspective, the contingent world of becoming
becomes the only real realm where truth can be fashioned, a world of possibility to be
made and remade eternally through the changing poetic and rhetorical persuasion
authored by competing perspectives that attain power.
The issue of power resonates with Bruner’s discussion of the convergence of the
rhetorical and the political spheres in his use of Nietzsche’s rhetorical philosophy of
language to ground limit work as a politicized form of rhetorical criticism in his 2002
Western Journal of Communication article, “Rhetorical Criticism as Limit Work.” Bruner
explores how a wide array of thinkers including Kenneth Burke and Nietzsche “have
analyzed and critiqued the discursive processes through which human subjectivity is
constructed, maintained, and transformed, and in so doing have consistently pointed to a
convergence between identity philosophy and “critical” rhetoric” (“Rhetorical Criticism
as Limit Work” 281). Bruner sees in Nietzsche the acceptance and articulation of “the
fundamentally metaphorical nature of language makes all meaning making rhetorical”
(284). Working to expose the political ramifications of this aesthetic stance, Bruner
emphasizes a connection to identity philosophy as he states: “The art of rhetoric, then,
within Nietzsche’s philosophy of language, becomes the art of identity production and
management” (284). If all ideas are at their core discursive creations why not identity,
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both on personal and political planes? However, how can one ethically maneuver
between the personal and the political given these parameters? Each choice of aesthetic
construction involves a subsequent suppression of all other alternatives and each choice
establishes “aesthetic, and politically and materially consequential limits” (285). Bruner
argues that one space to seek guidance lies in the realm of failed dramatic discourse, not
the traditional domain of successful speeches because “dramatically rejected speech
signals a transgression of ideational limits” (286). Transgression of known limits then
provides access to previously unknown corridors of idea creation through engaging
dramatically rejected speech.
Recognition of the signs of rejected dramatic speech brings rhetoric into the “very
heart of politics, for rhetorical criticism becomes the art of criticizing the function and
relative virtue of limits and absences associated with being a citizen-subject” (Bruner
286). Bruner notes that the connection between rhetorical criticism and politics evolves
out of the socially constructed meanings that enable communication and social evolution
through ““stabilizations” (mutually recognize meanings)” (286). Stabilization then
becomes a shifting mediational space for rhetorical criticism of political possibilities.
However, the notion of limit work augments this analysis by illustrating the limits
these stabilizations also place on social discourse and decision making as well as how
they can potentially enact negative hegemonic practices (Bruner 286). “As noted, limit
work is based on the analysis of transgressive discourse, for it is through transgressions,
or resistance, that limits are revealed” (Bruner 288). The absences these limits reveal
demarcate orientations toward differences within different situations and also potentially
“a great deal about constraints on subjects within the ideational (and material) economy”
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(Bruner 287). Bruner applies the insights gained from the use of rhetorical criticism
augmented by the lens of limit work and identity philosophy to national identity
construction processes in various rhetorical situations such as 1988 West Germany, 1993
Russia, and 1995 Quebec (290-95). The goal of these studies serves to reinforce the
importance of maintaining possibility for continued progress and the opportunity to
change when situations dictate. “The primary goal of limit work is to maintain a critical
practice that keeps those articulations from devolving into socially destructive
certainties” (Bruner 296). Freedom involves opportunity for self-creation, interpretation,
criticism, and expression within the social sphere.
To impose a single ideational identity upon all parties in a particular social or
national setting destroys the potential artful living Nietzsche and others call for, what the
human and democratic spirit calls for in the “endlessly limiting process of identity
formation” (Bruner 295-96). Limit work as rhetorical criticism offers a means to analyze
and help protect the democratic principle in the practice of public persuasion and assure a
place for minority perspectives in social discourse.

Implications
The first path of rhetorical studies of Nietzsche articulates the recurring influence
of deconstructive interpretations and appropriations of Nietzsche as a seminal source
within major proponents of this approach, especially De Man and Derrida. However,
these approaches have been increasingly called into question by recent Anglo-American
philosophical studies of Nietzsche (Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality 3). As the present
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chapter shows, deconstructive approaches take little account of Nietzsche’s prominent
concern with value and morality, among other issues.
Chapter Three will therefore expand the scope of potential contributions of
Nietzsche’s thought for communication and rhetorical studies. Chapter Three traces the
final three discernible paths that serve as the roots of contemporary rhetorical readings of
Nietzsche. They likewise function as the background, the said, that will help inform and
propel the present inquiry into Nietzsche’s corpus and how his thought offers a dialogic
alternative to the academic deconstructive stance dominating interpretation of his thought
within the discipline. This interpreting otherwise of Nietzsche presents an architectonic
rhetoric and communication ethic that affirms life through its meeting of difference. To
ground our reading, we now turn to this scholarly background. Rhetorical scholarship as
said provides added texture to the present study's articulation of Nietzsche’s architectonic
rhetoric of dialogic meeting generating meaning through meeting difference in the
temporal, existential moment after illusion. In the spirit of Nietzsche, chapter three does
what Nietzsche did as it provides a dialogic reading of Nietzsche’s ideas in a time of
recognized multiplicity.
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Chapter Three: Hermeneutic Background for Interpreting Nietzsche Otherwise

Chapter two articulates Nietzsche’s rhetoric as clearly aimed at one rhetorical
task, disarming and dishonoring of a societal lie undergirded by a metanarrative that is no
more. In the spirit of Nietzsche, chapter three deconstructs deconstruction moving from
technique to implication. The question this chapter addresses is when viewed from a
constructive framework, what is pointed to by this unknowing dialogic ethics prophet?
Continuing exploration through a saying of the said of the final threefold roots of
rhetorical studies of Nietzsche serves as the topic of Chapter Three. Having discussed
the foundational concerns with defining and theorizing about how rhetoric works through
the prism of Nietzsche’s writings, we move to related theoretical concerns. Influences of
perspective emerge as primary concerns in seeking where to situate Nietzsche, either as
the author of a rhetoric concerned mostly with aesthetics, epistemology, as a precursor to
Burke’s rhetorical work, and alternatively, as providing ground for the construction of an
ethic of rhetoric. Discussion of these final threefold roots of contemporary rhetorical
studies of Nietzsche frames the background against which the present study responds.
This analysis lays out a foreground of Nietzsche’s contributions to rhetoric as a task
primarily concerned with the creation and communication of meaning drawn from the
meeting of difference in dialogue. Dialogic meeting then serves as a textured metaphor
of an architectonic rhetoric and anchor Nietzsche’s contributions toward a constructive
communication ethic for a postmodern historical moment after illusion unmasked amid
metanarrative disintegration.
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Introduction
Continuing the saying of the said from the previous chapter, we build upon the
foundation laid by those seeking to discern the definition, theory, and praxial discoveries
of scholars writing on Nietzsche. The saying of the final three roots of rhetorical
scholarship on Nietzsche seeks to define the background against which the present study
and its concerns develop interpreting Nietzsche otherwise than from the deconstructive
hermeneutic bias. Discussion of major themes within discovery of a Nietzschean
rhetoric, the final three roots further extend these possibilities. Growing out of the
defining of rhetoric from the previous chapter there surfaces a lingering debate over the
primary focus of Nietzsche’s writings in authoring either an epistemic or an aesthetic
rhetoric. The situating of Nietzsche’s rhetoric within a primarily aesthetic or epistemic
focus implies important consequences into seeing or effacing concerns at the heart of any
rhetorical communication: ethics, values, and the awareness of audience, with each
perspective offering allegedly dramatically different perspectives from which to speak.
Other alternative perspectives emerge on rhetoric when situating Nietzsche
against some of its most noted scholars, for example, tracing the Nietzschean roots of
Kenneth Burke’s writings on rhetoric. The final alternative opens out of engagement
with the fourth and final root of scholarly inquiry on Nietzsche, inquiry into Nietzsche
and the ethics of rhetoric. This path centers on work by two scholars, McGuire, and
Hawes. McGuire authors the only article in the discipline to explore in depth the
possibilities of constructing an ethic of rhetoric culled from Nietzsche’s works. Hawes
extends this line of though by linking elements of Bakhtin’s ideas on dialogue with
Nietzsche’s rhetoric on values and morals. These two works close the said of Nietzsche
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within communication and rhetorical studies as they open the turn from background to
foreground. These scholarly encounters mark the turn to dialogic meeting of Nietzsche’s
corpus and the primary concerns of the present study. Nietzsche’s writings and the
possibilities they accord understanding of the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric, the
unbreakable union shared with communication ethics, a connection it will be claimed
Nietzsche consistently explored even if such a seminal concern has not noted the same
level of scholarly attention within the discipline.

Nietzsche as Advocate for an Aesthetic or Epistemic View of Rhetoric?
The question of theoretical ground shaping Nietzschean rhetoric traces the
directions of work which posits Nietzsche as a contested point of entry in the heated
debate over the possible epistemological character of rhetoric or whether Nietzsche offers
through his writings an alternative aesthetic characterization of rhetoric. This path
chronicles the continuing debate between Poulakos and Whitson et al., McGuire,
Thomas, and Hikins. Poulakos and Whitson et al., McGuire, and Thomas all affirm
Poulakos and Witson’s seminal 1993 Quarterly Journal of Speech article, “Nietzsche and
the Aesthetics of Rhetoric,” claiming Nietzsche’s works offer evidence for articulating an
aesthetic characterization of rhetoric. Hikins serves as the foil for this approach, cast as
the “epistemic pest” (Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson 121) who claims that rather,
Nietzsche provides the foundation for an eristic epistemic characterization of rhetoric
(Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 354). Hikins later affirms
that “Nietzsche has been catapulted to the center of discussion in rhetorical theory” (“The
Seductive Waltz” 380). Hikins here concludes that closer attention to Nietzsche’s later
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works often left mostly unnoticed by rhetoricians yields a “new philosophical foundation
for rhetoric,” leading to “a very different rhetorical epistemology” (Hikins, “The
Seductive Waltz” 395-96). Hikins names this new epistemology “rhetorical
perspectivism” that seeks the “processural evoking of knowledge through the discursive
comparison and contrast of multiple perspectives” (“The Seductive Waltz” 396).
Therefore, we begin to view this localized strand of scholarly debate on Nietzsche’s ideas
as a source for an aesthetic or epistemic based rhetoric.
Nietzsche’s Rhetoric as Creating Art: A Celebration and Critique
Poulakos and Whitson inaugurate this line of inquiry by invoking Nietzsche as a
source that authors an aesthetic alternative to the debate over the epistemic nature of
rhetoric. Welcoming Scott’s “recantation” regarding rhetoric as epistemic Poulakos and
Whitson build upon “Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology” which they claim “makes
rhetoric into an artistic, not an epistemological enterprise” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics
of Rhetoric” 132). The refutation of epistemology evolves out of the Nietzschean
assumption that “art, not truth, . . . serves the purposes of human life . . . it goes on to
suggest that any and all epistemologizing relies on unrecognized aesthetic impulses”
(“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 132). Thereby the authors conclude
“Nietzsche provides a discursive lifeboat for all who have abandoned the ship of
epistemics” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 132). Aesthetic concerns then
usurp the throne as the guiding light of rhetorical invention, judgment, and performance.
The grounds for the rejection of the epistemic nature of rhetoric in favor of an
aesthetic rhetoric must be made clear from the outset as they serve as the seminal point of
stasis between these competing perspectives. Nietzsche according to Poulakos and
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Whitson rejects epistemology because “Knowing the “real” or seeing “the same real
properties” is nothing but a subject’s attempt to construe “all the rest of the world from its
own viewpoint. . . .” (Nietzsche, Will to Power 636 qtd. in “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics
of Rhetoric” 133). At the center of this debate lays the conception of knowledge as either
a stable entity, which can be possessed and known or rather as a continuing process of
competing claims of knowledge seeking to gain adherence and acceptance, to prove their
right to be called ‘true.’ Truth then becomes determined not by recourse to an objective
reality but rather to the subjective judgment of a localized audience and their response to
the art of persuasive argument offered it.
Consequently rhetoric exists inherent to the ways of knowing as it becomes
inseparable from the ways of interpreting and communicating what one perceives from a
single perspective in a given context or time. Alternatively, from the traditional
philosophical perspective of the Western Platonic tradition, rhetoric merely serves as a
veneer to embellish and persuade one of the real ‘truth’ that exists independently of any
claims made describing or arguing for its veracity. The consequences of this revision of
traditional Platonic thinking which Nietzsche asserts emphasizes the inherent and
determinative social and public characteristics of what “knowledge” represents, “If selfconsciousness is the outcome of social interactions, then it is the “we” that makes the “I”
(“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 135). The self originates not in the
unconscious or subconscious realm but through consciousness of one’s social self, how
one interprets oneself based upon information gained from the situation one temporarily
inhabits.
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However, Poulakos and Whitson follow Nietzsche closely and do not claim that
this implies a complete rejection of the possibility of knowledge; rather they reject one
traditional Western Platonic characterization of knowledge.
By questioning the very possibility of knowledge, Nietzsche probes the
aesthetic presuppositions of knowing. In so doing he argues that no
epistemic project can denounce its artistic origins [. . . ] For Nietzsche,
rhetoric is not an epistemological undertaking but rather part of a greater
artistic act—the act of ordering the chaos of life. (“Nietzsche and the
Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 136)
All acts of communication then become part of the inherently rhetorical process of
shaping and conveying knowledge through the art of constructing knowledge, through the
signs and symbols of human language and discourse. These artistically created
metaphorical forms shape human thought and speech for it is only through these forms
that we may come to know. At ground, knowledge cannot escape the inherently
metaphorical and artistic nature of human language through which it is made known.
Accordingly, the artistic not the epistemological criterion becomes penultimate as
“What we call knowledge, then, is a gestalt of effective aesthetic appearances created to
satisfy people’s needs for life” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 138).
Rhetoric arises out of a communal or social need, the need for the translation of a
perspective from the intra- to the interpersonal domain. “Language operates rhetorically
because it highlights only one out of countless perspectives and because it transforms
perceptual limitations into significations. Language, then, is rhetorical because it
signifies one’s preferred view of something” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric”
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139). Rhetoric enables the communication of preference between persons enabling
argument and the possibility of choice between competing perspectives. According to
Nietzsche’s skepticism regarding knowing, knowledge of a perspective is all the
knowledge to which humans have access, access granted through organizing the chaos of
the material world into the socially agreed upon and accepted forms of cultural,
contextualized human language, or the art of rhetoric.
The organizing and ordering function of language achieved through rhetoric
implies distance and separation as Nietzsche notes "[a]ll knowledge originates from
separation, delimitation, and restriction; there is not absolute knowledge of the whole”
(Nietzsche qtd. in Poulakos and Whitson, “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric”
140). The emphasis upon the aesthetic nature of language, how signs and symbols
represent metaphorically the ideas, persons, things, and events of which they are
comprised, becomes the ground of judging arguments. As recognition and understanding
of difference serves as the seedbed of knowledge, aesthetic evaluation and judgment
becomes the criteria of contingent truth, what moves a particular audience validates.
Therefore, knowledge of rhetoric or the construction of an aesthetically
satisfactory appeal to truth or knowing through artistic means derives from its public
results. While epistemic rhetoric is said to speak to the “world’s inner logic with a
cerebral language said to correspond to it. . . . By contrast, aesthetic rhetoric draws its
strength from seeing an audience affected by its message” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics
of Rhetoric” 141). Hence as there is no knowledge of the whole, there are no collective
standards, and rhetoric emerges out of its success in specific situations. A shift in
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perspective on what rhetoric is occurs through this movement from epistemic concerns to
aesthetic concerns. Poulakos and Whitson state
the project of rhetoric changes significantly the moment we ask not what
is known but how a language utters the hitherto unsaid, and in so doing
how it unsettles familiar propositions of truth or knowledge. For our part,
we are not saying that there is no relation between listener and speech,
reader and text, subject and object; what we are saying is that in all three
cases the relations obtain aesthetically. (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of
Rhetoric” 143)
All knowledge created through the metaphors and tropes that adorn and order human
thought as it is translated into language, comprise the domain of rhetoric as choice
becomes a question of which aesthetic appearance persuades and which fails. Each act of
language implies an audience, those localized audiences then become the standard against
which one measures the success or art of their words.

Reclaiming Rhetoric as Nietzsche’s Epistemic Quest
However, James W. Hikins interrupts the funeral march for rhetoric as epistemic
with two articles in response to the aesthetic rhetoric perspective Poulakos and Whitson
argue Nietzsche offers. Hikins first counters “Nietzschean aestheticism” with claims that
Nietzsche offers an epistemologically grounded eristic rhetoric in contrast to the aesthetic
option brought forward by Poulakos and Whitson (“Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric
of the Possible” 353, 353-77). Then in his second 1999 reply to Poulakos and Whitson,
Hikins claims that Nietzsche’s later writings revalue his earlier notions of truth and
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rhetoric as especially presented through his early writings and lecture notes on rhetoric
(“The Seductive Waltz” 380-99). The significance of these revisions illustrates Nietzsche
authoring a rhetorical epistemology of perspectivism.
Hikins begins his description of an eristic rhetoric culled from Nietzsche’s
writings by identifying the ground from which he perceives Nietzsche works. Quoting
Nehamas, Hikins notes Nietzsche’s multiple styles are “that ‘facts are precisely what
there is not, only interpretations” (Nehamas as qtd. in Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the
Rhetoric of the Possible” 356). This theoretical standpoint defines Nietzsche’s critique of
the traditional Western Platonic philosophic tradition and is said to serve as “Nietzsche’s
tool for disassembling philosophy” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the
Possible” 357). Hikins defines this unique variety of rhetoric as implying not an aesthetic
but rather an “Eristic rhetoric” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the
Possible” 357). For Hikins, Eristic rhetoric is
an imaginative art, driven by strife and discord and characterized by play
(as in playing a game), whose object or telos is the momentary securing of
a perspective, that is, a transient realization of a point of view or attitude,
typically expressed via the modality of the sublime [. . .] the principal goal
of Eristic is constructive in its efforts to explore facets of imaginable,
alternative worlds, fictive domains erected by means of the Eristic. Eristic
seeks to capture, if even momentarily, the sense of a world other than that
described by a given culture at any point in history. In short, the
competent practitioner of Eristic is a master of the possible [. . .] Eristic
transforms this proclivity for the possible into an archetypal rhetorical
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strategy. (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible”
357)
Therefore, unlike the traditional philosophical method of dialectic, eristic rhetoric does
not seek adherence or a final solution but rather to discover and state possibilities that
arise in a given situation (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible”
358). Yet can any contest involving language ever really lose completely a concern with
the forms that touch the ear, mind, and heart of the audience, are these not inseverable
from the threads that bind rhetorical communication?
However, the means through which hearers are persuaded of the existence of
these alternatives is the aesthetic domain, “the Eristic art transcends the dialectical by
virtue of the aesthetic—it becomes aestheticism” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the
Rhetoric of the Possible” 359). The point turns on how Hikins situates eristic rhetoric in
relation to epistemology and argumentation as he proffers his initial response to Poulakos
and Whitson. Hikins claims that Poulakos and Whitson in following Nietzsche undercut
their own perspective on rhetoric as anti-epistemic in that “any artistic performance
requires a context of reality” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the
Possible” 364). Any aesthetic performance is grounded in or implies a specific
perspective on contested ideas such as truth, knowledge, or reality (Hikins, “Nietzsche,
Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 364). “In other words, reality constrains
aestheticism” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 364). Hikins
contends that the main premise of Poulakos and Whitson is flawed, “Aestheticism thus
cannot replace or “oppose” knowledge with art, for art is essentially dependent on
knowledge” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 364). Art
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becomes a type or variety of knowledge as eristic becomes a type or variety of rhetoric,
each inescapably relies to some extent upon knowledge.
Hikins then concludes his first counter-argument against the proposed aesthetic
rhetoric with the claim that ultimately what is called for is a “knowledge-oriented
rhetoric” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 371). Such an
epistemologically oriented rhetoric differs in three main ways from an aesthetically
oriented rhetoric according to Hikins. First, a knowledge-oriented rhetoric “holds the
incorporation of knowledge in discourse (as a component of the grounds for human
action) as a chief goal” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible”
371). Second, a knowledge-oriented rhetoric “views knowledge as cumulative, building
subsequent discursive inquiry on previous knowledge . . . it recognizes that some
knowledge claims may well be mistaken . . . as the discursive process reinspects the stock
of knowledge, erroneous claims are culled out” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the
Rhetoric of the Possible” 371). “Third, a knowledge-oriented rhetoric recognizes that a
rhetor’s aesthetic choices must be tempered by an understanding of the consequences of
the “sensual process of seduction” beyond rhetorical efficacy” (Hikins, “Nietzsche,
Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 371). Granted that rhetors choose what to name
and explain about a situation, a knowledge–oriented rhetoric has the added benefit of
recognizing the ethical responsibilities that adhere to one’s discursive choices. Choices
which enact ethical consequences beyond the mere aesthetic criterion of discourse
achieving persuasion or not (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible”
371). Judgment between competing rhetorical claims then falls outside the bounds of art
or within the domain of ethics, between truth and lies.
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Therefore truth reappears as a point of contention between these competing
varieties of rhetoric as knowledge influences judgment that implies a social basis for
justification of choice and action. According to Hikins, while Poulakos and Whitson
posit Nietzsche “as an archenemy of truth” they fail to consult opposing views as those
offered by Maudemarie Clark. Hikins cites Clark’s contention that Nietzsche later
rejected his early position on truth and that further research in his later works might
discover the “grounds (suggested even Eristically!) for a Nietzschean epistemic
rhetoric—one producing truth and knowledge?” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the
Rhetoric of the Possible” 371) Yet, could this miss the distinction between rhetoric as a
producer and servant of knowledge, knowledge that does not equal truth?
While a knowledge-oriented rhetoric may account for and dispute claims of truth
or lie, Hikins claims that an aesthetic rhetoric which opposes art to knowledge “ignores
the ethics of rhetoric completely” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the
Possible” 371). Because an aesthetic rhetoric as envisioned by Poulakos and Whitson “is
exclusively effects oriented” Hikins claims it invites ethical abuse as truth entails only the
success, not the propriety of the discourse given the situation (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic,
and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 373). The far reaching consequences of this collapse of
criteria for evaluating rhetoric, amputating its ethical sense, results in limiting rhetoric to
nothing more than “mere performance” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of
the Possible” 374). This is a crucial point of contention not to be underestimated, the
bond between the meanings of words, their saying, and the multiple unknown meanings
the audience constructs of the ideas, values, and ethics, these words state and enact.
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An escape from the ruination of rhetoric as licentious performance appears as
Hikins dances with Nietzsche’s later works, works that he claims offer the basis for a
“new philosophical foundation for rhetoric” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 395).
Hikins begins by noting that “Nietzsche has been catapulted to the center of discussion in
rhetorical theory” (“The Seductive Waltz” 380). Hikins then claims that “sensitivity to
Nietzsche’s mature position calls into question a whole range of postmodern views that
our field has appropriated from thinkers caught up in the seductive waltz with
Nietzsche’s eventually abandoned skepticism” (381). Therefore in contrast to the
prominent view of Nietzsche as a critic and skeptical of any notion of truth as illustrated
through de Man’s appropriation outlined above, Hikins states that greater attention needs
to be paid to Nietzsche’s “later theory of perspectivism, as requiring significant reevaluation of his oft-cited lectures on rhetoric” (“The Seductive Waltz” 381). Limiting
Nietzsche to his early notes as stated above risks ignoring the works for which he is
known and misrepresenting his ideas and their development over the course of his career.
Hikins’ invitation to embrace Nietzsche’s “mature position” on truth,
epistemology, and rhetoric, contributes to the conversation of a Nietzschean turn in
rhetorical theory by seeking to “familiarize rhetorical scholars with a perspective on
Nietzsche that has been submerged and marginalized by those who use his work to
ground postmodern rhetorics” (“The Seductive Waltz” 381). Greater attention paid to
Nietzsche’s later works reveals his abandonment of his skeptical views on truth as
articulated in his lecture notes on rhetoric and early essays, essays that serve as the
foundation for the common contemporary postmodern interpretation of Nietzsche,
especially as discussed above within the discipline. According to Hikins
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the later Nietzsche repairs to a faith in science as “the sound conception of
cause and effect” (Nietzsche, The Antichrist, 49), embraces a version of
the correspondence theory of truth (Clark, 135), and regards his early
view of art as having attained an “importance he later came to regard as
preposterous” (Tanner, 10)” (“The Seductive Waltz” 381).
Hikins augments this claim by producing a genealogy of postmodern theorists whose own
works build or rely upon the view of Nietzsche culled from his early works, such as
Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, Bataille, Deleuze, Althusser, and Irigary (“The Seductive
Waltz” 381-84). Therefore, “The theoretical beginning points for the views of all these
central figures in postmodern rhetoric lie in a particular interpretation of Nietzsche’s
theory of truth” (“The Seductive Waltz” 381). These theorists all gather around
Nietzsche’s alleged insights regarding skepticism of truth and "belief that language is
essentially figurative and not referential or expressive” (Selden qtd. in Hikins, “The
Seductive Waltz” 383). Language then once uttered slips into the ether and out of time
and any contextual situation that would shape interpretation, creation of meaning, and
response.
In addition, the ethics of rhetoric is oriented around the supposedly Nietzschean
notion that “There is no absolute ethic or universal knowledge system; there are only
linguistically based perspectives” (Gilman, Blair, and Parent qtd. in Hikins, “The
Seductive Waltz” 384). Hence, if this holds, the central significance of Nietzsche’s
concerns with the relativistic nature of knowledge is merely the play of tropes it employs
to generate adherence to its views as emphasized in his early posthumously published
notes and essays.
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Hikins claims the reasons for this limited selection of Nietzsche’s primary texts
rests on the predetermined skeptical theoretical commitments of these commentators as
well as those of Thomas, Poulakos and Whitson (“The Seductive Waltz” 385). Their
view of Nietzsche as enacting a stable, consistent skepticism throughout his literary
corpus “is untenable” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 385). According to Hikins, the
source of this misrepresentation of Nietzsche’s ideas rests upon the excessive dependence
on Nietzsche’s unpublished works, a hermeneutical practice that has drawn criticism
from numerous prominent Nietzsche commentators such as Kaufmann, Clark, Alderman,
and Magnus (“The Seductive Waltz” 387). Why does this selection of texts misrepresent
Nietzsche’s ideas? The untenability of this unnecessarily limited reading of Nietzsche’s
corpus results in misunderstanding the importance of major metaphors such as will to
power as well as misrepresenting Nietzsche’s differentiation and critiques of
transcendental truth and empirical truth (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 387). Could
greater inclusion of the entire corpus lead to dramatically different interpretations?
Then, what does inclusion of Nietzsche’s later works (and greater reliance on
Nietzsche’s published works) add to the discussion of his thought? A new Nietzsche
appears who is not solely an unfaltering critic of transcendental truth but rather a strong
proponent of empirical truth since this reveals the one true world which humans and
nature collectively shape (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 389). Such a conclusion does
not deny the complete uselessness of dialectic, in contrast it repositions dialectic as a tool
for humans to utilize “in discovering empirical truths” (“The Seductive Waltz” 389).
From this view, rhetoric then creates and could advance new types of knowledge within a
continuing of conversations on knowledge.
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Given this revised foundation, what consequences do these new vistas hold for
further investigation of Nietzsche’s rhetoric? Hikins finds an interesting answer by
contrasting the expanded conception of Nietzsche’s works with the early lectures on
rhetoric and unpublished works that he claims elaborates a new Nietzschean rhetoric
(“The Seductive Waltz” 393-96). A rhetoric Hikins characterizes as an amalgamation of
a more inclusive hermeneutic consideration of knowledge embedded within Nietzsche’s
rhetoric.
Five tenets then comprise the foundations and major contours of this new
Nietzschean rhetoric as outlined by Hikins. First, acknowledgment of important truths
that can be communicated between persons resituates ethics as a crucial concern of the
rhetorical enterprise but “must be at least in part a function of humans’ cognitive interest
and the ‘objective’ knowledge our perspectives reveal” (“The Seductive Waltz” 395).
Second, given Nietzsche’s rejection of transcendentalism, representationalism, and the
related notions that “rhetoric cannot be based on ‘the essence of things,’” and “that
rhetorical acts comprise, entirely and exclusively, human artifacts” appearance as
criterion of truth is replaced by empirical interpretation as a conveyor of contingent truth.
For “Without question, on occasion rhetoric functions referentially and veridically to
evoke knowledge claims about real aspects of the empirical world” (Hikins, “The
Seductive Waltz” 395). Knowledge cannot be denied as a necessary resource for the
social functioning of rhetoric.
This revised version of the possibility of perceived truth leads Nietzsche to
replace a “representational theory of truth” undergirding rhetorical appeals and argument
with what Hikins terms the third tenet revealing an “attenuated correspondence view of
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truth” (“The Seductive Waltz” 395). Nietzsche, now allegedly relieved of the dogma of
“the reality/appearance dichotomy and the representational view of language” is freed to
recognize “that some language, including the “little truths of science,” does communicate
knowledge, even if this knowledge is perspectival” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 395).
While truth claims may then always call for possible revision given the contingent nature
of human existence and knowledge, Nietzsche’s rhetoric enacts a perspectivism that
“mediates between radical objectivism and radical constructionism, generating both doxa
and episteme” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 395). The perspectival standpoint allows
for integration of a multiplicity of appeals to knowledge as aids to rhetoric and
persuasion.
Recognition of these foundational ideas prompts Hikins to state that this now
provides “a new philosophical foundation for rhetoric” (“The Seductive Waltz” 395).
This fourth insight Hikins names “perspective realism” which states that all human
knowledge is perspectival. Against the background of an empirically perceived natural
world, humans “perceive . . . various aspects of multi-aspected things, whose aspects are
all there is to perceive; hence, the disappearance of appearance and with it the claim that
sensations are “presented externally through an image” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz”
396). We live then not only in symbols and humanly constructed images and
interpretations but are able to evaluate these competing interpretations against the
background of the empirical, natural world.
This perspectival standpoint concerning truth and knowledge ushers in the fifth
and final tenet and a “very different rhetorical epistemology, one best described as
rhetorical perspectivism” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 396). Hikins claims that the
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goal of this new rhetoric is "neither the direct discovery of knowledge (a view often
labeled positivism), nor the wholesale linguistic creation of knowledge
(constructionism), but instead the processural evoking of knowledge through the
discursive comparison and contrast of multiple perspectives” (“The Seductive Waltz”
396). Now because “our revised Nietzschean rhetoric . . . wherein language operates
both referentially and tropically in evoking truth (or pursuing play), as it encompasses
perspectives” thereby supplants the merits of either “objectivist or constructionist
formulations” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 396). However, does Hikins’ realignment
of Nietzsche and revaluation of predominant contemporary aesthetic interpretations of his
collective thought leave us a new Nietzsche who “has learned new steps with which we
must now become familiar” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 397)? On the other hand,
does Hikins merely offer a semantic recasting of Nietzsche behind merely another mask
for a different use?
Dissonant Recurrences: Defining Nietzsche’s Rhetoric Between Art and Knowing
McGuire casts Hikins’ waltz as out of tune with Nietzsche’s consistent skepticism
regarding the attainment and communicability of Truth (“Dancing in the Darkness” 96104). The counter argument against Hikins’ views emanates from a disagreement
regarding Nietzsche’s alleged recantation of his skepticism and what in fact denotes a
“rhetorical” interpretation of Nietzsche from those of “other fields” (McGuire, “Dancing
in the Darkness” 96-101). An unnecessarily limited view of rhetoric implicates Hikins as
committing the same error he attributed to the flawed and constricting aesthetic view of
Nietzsche’s rhetoric discussed above.
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McGuire begins his critique by noting that “anyone dealing with Nietzsche’s
extensive writings on language is in fact working “in” the field of rhetoric” (“Dancing in
the Darkness” 97). This broader designation of what constitutes a rhetorical
interpretation re-situates the epistemological description of Nietzsche’s views on truth in
and of language as a “communication question” (McGuire, “Dancing in the Darkness”
97). This positioning allows McGuire the space to claim that Nietzsche’s skepticism
regards rhetoric not epistemology. “One can believe that no One Truth can be proved or
communicated even at the same time one believes there is One Truth” (McGuire,
“Dancing in the Darkness” 97), a belief inherent in the preceding claim itself. McGuire
states investigation and articulation of this doubt and other related ideas about the
relationship between language and consciousness make “Nietzsche a rhetorical
phenomenon worth attention” (“Dancing in the Darkness” 97). The rhetorical interest in
Nietzsche then emanates from the well-worn path of the Greeks for “Rhetoric deals, as
Plato knew, not with what is real, but with what is apparent, that is, what can be made to
seem real. In my view, such a claim would be generally agreed upon underpinning of
any rhetoric” (McGuire, “Dancing in the Darkness” 97). McGuire then grounds Hikins’
rhetorical reading of Nietzsche as a biased and miscast interpretation of why Nietzsche is
worthy of rhetorical study, a reading based more on epistemology, cosmology, and
ontology than rhetoric or the arguably rhetorical elements of these areas.
McGuire continues by questioning Hikins’ assumptions regarding the merit of
Nietzsche’s later works as greater than those of earlier writings and Hikins’ means of
gathering textual support for his interpretations. “First, by what fiat is it suddenly true
that any writer’s later works are always better than early ones?” (McGuire, “Dancing in
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the Darkness” (97). In addition, while Hikins’ emphasizes the importance of necessary
attention be paid to Nietzsche’s mature writings, McGuire states that he fails to cite from
many of the pivotal works of that period, often agreed as beginning with the works of
1881 until Nietzsche’s collapse in 1889. These works include The Dawn, The Gay
Science, Beyond Good and Evil, and The Wagner Case, works McGuire states Hikins
failed to cite or interpret in his essays in support of the exegesis of these texts as crucial
for understanding Nietzsche (“Dancing in the Darkness” 98). The significance of these
omissions by Hikins is that hermeneutical conceit works only to further Hikins’
theoretical commitments, “rehabilitating Nietzsche into some sort of Britishphilosophical uniform” while missing “Nietzsche’s very point of departure—his
beginning—the threshold of his philosophy” (McGuire, “Dancing in the Darkness” 101).
Rather than comply with the nihilism inherent in asceticism as Nietzsche interpreted it, he
sought to offer the path toward an affirmation of life. Despite all its potential cruelty and
ugliness, Nietzsche offered possibilities of a revaluation of values, a rhetorical turning of
what tradition, institution, and the State dictate as important for the individual.
This rhetorical turn is what served as a base of sorts for Nietzsche and emphasized
the role of aestheticism in his thought. Since we live in appearance, the work of
arranging and rearranging appearances as the basis for life becomes a more honest means
to willing life. As McGuire concludes, these errors demonstrate that “Hikins’ has missed
the entire point of Nietzsche’s pursuit of truth and discovery that there is none in any or
all of the philosophical or religious systems of humankind” (“Dancing in the Darkness”
103). According to McGuire, Hikins then misunderstands the crucial importance of
rhetoric to Nietzsche’s philosophy as Hikins
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fails to see in the absence of truth as a basis for values not the opportunity
that Nietzsche sees to self-create, but only the nihilism, the depression,
that precedes the frenzy of creative activity through which life is made
meaningful by and for the individual. (“Dancing in the Darkness” 103-04)
The aesthetic qualities of self-creation and revaluation Nietzsche presents in his later
‘mature’ works then itself overturns and invalidates Hikins’ and subsequently not
Nietzsche’s ‘rhetorical perspectivism.’
Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson re-enter the fray in their 2002 reply to Hikins by
questioning his hermeneutic practices for their reply “does not advance an explicit
interpretation of Nietzsche; rather, it reasserts the importance of primary texts as starting
points of interpretation” (“Mistaking Nietzsche” 121). Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson
begin with McGuire’s earlier contention that Hikins’ division of “Nietzsche into the
early, middle, and late Nietzsche” (“Mistaking Nietzsche” 121) is seriously flawed
because “Hikins blunders when he claims that Nietzsche abandons his earlier works”
(“Mistaking Nietzsche” 122). In 1886, Nietzsche wrote a new Introduction to his first
work, The Birth of Tragedy, originally published in 1872. His 1888 late work Ecce
Homo offers an evaluation of his entire corpus, evidence to counter the notion that
Nietzsche’s later published writings offer the only valuable entry into his work to the
ignorance of earlier discarded texts. Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson also claim that
textual evidence abounds for a more comprehensive view of Nietzsche’s works when
interpreting his thought as illustrated by On the Genealogy of Morals.
If this book is incomprehensible to anyone and jars on his ears, the fault, it
seems to me, is not necessarily mine. It is clear enough, assuming, as I do
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assume, that one has first read my earlier writings and has not spared some
trouble in doing so: for they are, indeed, not easy to penetrate. (Nietzsche
22 as qtd. in Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson 123)
This mistake and misinterpretation of what evidence is available illustrates Hikins’
failure to acknowledge the claim at the heart of the early aesthetic characterization of
rhetoric by Poulakos and Whitson. Can the grammar of human language escape the
traditional Platonic and Western metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of the
ability of language to capture things as they are, to capture truth in its letters?
Nietzsche rejects this possibility as Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson quote from his
Gay Science (354) and Twilight of the Idols (“‘Reason’ in Philosophy” 5) in support of
their counter argument. “For Nietzsche, then, it is simply foolish to believe we have
discovered ontological categories when all we have done is affirm the grammatical ones
with which we are working” (“Mistaking Nietzsche” 123). The escape of these snares
involves “an art of exegesis” as described in Nietzsche’s Preface to On the Genealogy of
Morals (22-23) resting on the aphoristic form and its interpretation. The connection
between aphorism and interpretation points toward an earlier contested issue, “In effect,
Nietzsche reiterated what students of rhetoric have known all along: figuration cannot be
taken out of language” (Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson, “Mistaking Nietzsche” 124).
Not surprisingly, this merges nicely with the aesthetic rhetoric the authors previously
claimed Nietzsche promotes throughout his works.
Therefore, Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson propose that such purposeful ignorance
taints Hikins’ hermeneutical practices and explains “why he wants to remove “Truth and
Lying,” The Birth of Tragedy, and The Will to Power from the bookshelves (386-387)”
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(“Mistaking Nietzsche” 124). This leads to a key to this debate over what Nietzsche
offers rhetorical scholarship.
The problem is that Hikins deforms Nietzsche and subordinates
rhetoric to philosophy. Wishing to “open the door to knowledge of the
only reality there is, namely, the world we perceive” (395), he sings the
praises of perspective realism: “we now possess a new philosophical
foundation of rhetoric” (395). Had Hikins consulted “On the Prejudices of
Philosophers,” [from Nietzsche’s 1888 work Twilight of the Idols] he
would have seen that a philosophical foundation of rhetoric was not what
the “late and mature” Nietzsche had in mind: “What makes one regard
philosophers half mistrustingly and half mockingly is not that one again
and again detects how innocent they are [. . .] but that they display
altogether insufficient honesty, while making a mighty and virtuous noise
as soon as the problem of truthfulness is even remotely touched on.”
(“Mistaking Nietzsche” 126-27)
So we return to where it may have begun with the question of rhetoric and/or philosophy
as enacted between Plato and Gorgias more than two millennia earlier. Moreover, a
parallel note to this contemporary enactment of the eternal debate on newer Nietzschean
ground, at least within rhetoric, both end with ethics, though neither develops the values
that guide both standpoints. Granted, an ethic of rhetoric is not the proposed foci of these
articles. However, it remains a relatively silent and missing foundation of either
rhetorical edifice be it art, knowledge, or both.
Changing Reflections: Rhetoric as Simulacrum
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Yet could a consequence of this debate over defining rhetoric as aesthetic or
epistemic miss the point? Could this centerpiece of contention within rhetorical
scholarship merely be the mimicry of the eternal rift between philosophy and rhetoric,
between objective truth and contingent truth with automaton-like, reactive political drives
and declining returns, if any returns arise at all? Douglas Thomas claims that these
debates demand or voice the need for “a new way of thinking about the way we think
about rhetoric . . . rhetoric as simulacrum” (“Reflections” 72). Thomas claims that
understanding rhetoric as simulacrum extends the aesthetic view of rhetoric presented by
Poulakos and Whitson in three important ways. Before addressing these three
contributions, it is important to understand how Thomas conceives of rhetoric as
simulacrum.
According to Thomas
This simulacrum is the very internalization of differences, which reflects
the observer and is reflected by the observer[ . . .] Rhetoric becomes a
multiplicity, internalizing and processing disparities and differences. The
implication, then, for a Nietzschean turn in rhetoric, is to begin by treating
rhetoric as a multiplicity, rather than a singularity. (“Reflections” 72).
As no collective whole is knowable so then is no single conception of rhetoric valid
across different situations.
The first benefit of this acknowledgment of the difference at the core of rhetoric
helps to explore how to revise the tradition, “exploring the “rhetoricity of philosophy,”
thus reversing the phrasing from “rhetoric as epistemic” to “epistemology as rhetorical”
(“Reflections” 74). This situates the will to knowledge and truth within the domain of
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social life, judging claims on how they relate to life experience not solely against
theoretical constructs.
The second benefit Thomas claims for the rhetoric as simulacrum perspective is
that it implicates the actor within the act through symbolizing rhetoric as enabling the
becoming of meaning rather than Being as it is traditionally understood within Western
Platonic philosophic thought (“Reflections” 74). “Our interpretations become
‘transformed and deformed’ as we enter into them. There is only a thematic of
becoming, absent Being” (“Reflections” 74). The performance of rhetoric then becomes
the means through which it reveals its multiplicity, how it connects the real with the
possible. “As Whitson and Poulakos illustrate, for Nietzsche, appearance is the reality,
and an aesthetic kairos accounts for the emergence of more successful discourses”
(“Reflections” 75). The art of timely discursive argument becomes the standard for
judgment between competing claims.
Third and finally, the reward of rhetoric as simulacrum “frees rhetoric from the
yoke of Platonism” (“Reflections” 75). Rhetoric functions as a means to author
possibilities, to generate perspectives to guide future word and action, not to end
conversation by providing a final answer. From this perspective, rhetoric again posits
knowing as a process, not a product; therefore its conclusions remain open to
reinterpretation when conditions seem to warrant revision. “The power of the
simulacrum is its ability to affirm difference without the necessity of denying similarity”
(“Reflections” 75). The both/and solution of rhetoric as simulacrum then destroys
traditional Platonic distinctions between real and representation, offering instead how
“Appearances become the convergent, the product of lived experience, essences become
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divergent, moving away from those experiences and existing only as the conditions of
possibility” (“Reflections” 75). Therefore, reversal leads to indistinguishability and
hence to their subversion (“Reflections” 75). A subversion Thomas claims the process of
aestheticization accomplishes and thereby provides the escape of rhetoric from the
shadow of Platonic philosophy, which has sought to devalue it for millennia, a new dawn
for an old idea?
As acknowledged above, Nietzsche does not offer merely a theory or conception
of rhetoric. Nietzsche also employs rhetoric throughout his works. How does this
rhetoric work within Nietzsche’s names, how does it function as rhetoric and in what
ways does this function shape the values that it communicates and from which it
discovers and creates meanings in discourse? Closer attention to Nietzsche's
communicative activity at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric reveal a different path.
Therefore, it will be argued that what Nietzsche offers rhetoricians is rather a textured
understanding of an architectonic rhetoric witnessed in the interplay of dialogue and
rhetoric, enacting the seminal position of rhetoric inherent in language, interpretation,
communication, and ethics.

Nietzsche and Burke: Connections and Possibilities
Awareness of the interpenetrating nature of the interplay between dialogue and
rhetoric leads further into the implications of Nietzsche’s values upon his philosophy and
ideas regarding communication, rhetoric, and ethics. This trio of articles’ insights draws
from explications of the connections between Nietzsche and Kenneth Burke. Thomas
employs ideas culled from the works of Nietzsche, Burke, and Lacan to posit order as
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“central to understanding rhetoric” and hence describes “a rhetoric of order [that]
examines how the individual interacts with his or her community through the influence,
development, and maintenance of intersubjective agreements” (“Burke, Nietzsche,
Lacan” 336). Two articles, one by Desilet and one by Hawhee, pursue connections solely
between Burke and Nietzsche. Their inquiries revolve around Burke’s appropriations of
Nietzsche’s ideas and their possible influence upon Burke’s theory of the development of
the negative in human language; dramatism and the relationship between language and
interpretation; and the drama of the ethics of poetry revealed through a study of rhetorical
style.
Working from the periphery to the center of these divergent studies of Nietzsche’s
rhetorical connections with Burke, we begin with Thomas’s discussion of the
relationships that adhere between the ideas of Nietzsche, Burke, Lacan, and the notion of
rhetoric as a hierarchical tool of social organization and order. Thomas bases his study
upon two central metaphors, hierarchy and order. Rhetoric is then positioned as a
mediating tool between the competing claims of community and self. Thomas focuses
his analysis upon two key features of these central metaphors. First, “rhetorics of order
are both produced by the intersubjective agreements that surround them and maintained
and constructed by the inherent dimensions of power that subsist within them” (Thomas,
“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 337). Second, “in each system of rhetoric and order is the
means by which supernatural, socio-political, ideological constraints position the human
subject” (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 337). These traditional hierarchies limit
the forms order may take in different contexts. “One must remain within the order as a
subject through identification or suffer the consequences of division, the denial of
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positioning as a subject within a community” (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 337).
Subjectivity becomes a function of the agreements of social powers and ordering
hierarchies that form specific contexts. Subjectivity as a function exists as a rhetorical
dramatic phenomenon embodying inclusion or exclusion, purgation, and redemption.
Additionally, rhetoric serves as the means to order and give form to these
powerful hierarchies of socio-political, supernatural, and natural orders rests upon its
unique ontology and epistemology according to Thomas. The interaction of the
rhetorical elements of “the social, or order, and trope” results in the correspondence to
trope, epistemology, and social order (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 339). The
convergence of rhetoric, epistemology, and social order “allows for the evaluation of the
strategic uses of language” (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 339). The social nature
of rhetoric allows for the rhetorical evaluation of social phenomenon such as recognition
of order through hierarchy in the social sphere. Language determines social, political,
natural and supernatural potentialities as these determine language and its potentialities.
Therefore, the rhetorical determination of the form of society through the
mediation of hierarchy and order arguably suggests “that Nietzsche develops a
dramatism, similar to Burke’s, through his analysis of active and reactive forces”
(Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 341). Based on this characterization, Thomas
claims that “For Nietzsche, the very basis of communication is rooted in questions of
rhetoric and order” (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 341). Lacan is employed by Thomas to
account for the “motivation for individual human action” (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan”
353). Lacan’s psychological studies then allow for this new dramatism to emerge
through sustained analysis of the conflict of choice brought about by interaction between
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the Real and the Symbolic wherein the “subject’s relationship to the community is
contingent upon a choice that is always already made” (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 347).
Communication built upon the social domain out of which it originated therefore shapes
and is shaped by the social order it gives rise to, articulates, and sustains through its
interpretation and use of powers employed to create, revise, and destroy.
Such an outline Thomas asserts reveals “the ‘primeval problem,’ that Nietzsche
seeks to explain is how to create a “memory for the human animal” such that the will of
the master may be followed by the slave” (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 341). Thomas
draws from this assertion Nietzsche’s distinction between motives, one seeks either to
affirm and celebrate the organizing order of the aristocracy or to spur the resentment of
the priestly and lower classes excluded from this particular source of order in society
(“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 343). The consequences of resentment as a source for
rhetoric of order Thomas traces through Hobbes’s writings. These are said to illustrate
how at the socio-political level Hobbes and the commonwealth are able to “naturalize
coercion and reformulate it as the appropriate response to the social demand for order”
(“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 348-50). Order directed not by natural and social conditions
and temporal context but order directed by the political and rhetorical will to power
currently at the top of the ruling hierarchy.
Thomas concludes that these different perspectives provide added clarity to the
central question, “rhetoric both produces and is produced by the way in which we order
our world” (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 353). Rhetoric organizes subjectivity
just as the form subjectivity may take is limited by the social order that rhetoric
empowers. Likewise rhetoric provides the potential tools for dismantling socio-political
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orders, calling for the eternal work of rhetoric within societies as a mediating tool
between individual and community.
As stated above, only two other articles focus attention upon the complex (and
largely unexplored) nature of Nietzsche’s role in the evolution of Kenneth Burke’s ideas
on language and rhetoric. Gregory Desilet began the scholarly conversation on the nature
of the relationship between the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and Kenneth Burke with
his 1989 article, “Nietzsche Contra Burke: The Melodrama in Dramatism.” Desilet’s
argument grows out of the comparison of their different perspectives on the negative,
leading to the recognition of two “distinctive genres of dramatism” (65). The
significance of these differing approaches to “the symbolic action of drama” (65) reveals
the deeply situated nature of Nietzsche’s rhetorical and communicative praxis. As
Desilet states
Before Burke, Nietzsche also noted the inseparableness of living
and judging and used this connection as the cornerstone of his
perspectivist theory of thought and language. That judgments must be
made, regardless of the firmness of the foundation upon which they are
weighed, is an inescapable consequence of living [. . .] Language-using, as
identifying and knowing, rests upon value, requires interpretation, and
reflects what Nietzsche calls perspectivism. (70-1)
However, despite these noted similarities, Desilet states that this leads the two in different
directions, leading to competing genres of dramatism. Desilet claims that Burke presents
a dialectical mode of argumentation that utilizes the negative as a means of excisement in
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his comic vision of dramatic conflict (64-9, 79). Dramatic conflict ordered through the
dialectic that composes the tension between comedic episodes.
On the other hand, Nietzsche’s espoused attitude of amor fati offers a nondialectical and tragic, though not pessimistic, vision of the drama of symbolic activity in
everyday life (Desilet 74-80). Nietzsche therefore provides an alternative to Burke whom
Desilet casts as “fashioning a drama of human relations more melodramatic, and
consequently more victimizing, than it need be” (80). Desilet concludes that to lessen the
victimage inherent in human development and relations as exhibited through symbolic
activity, “it will turn upon a shift in methodological perspective from the moralistic
negative to the discriminative negative, from an exclusive to an inclusive process” (80).
A shift Nietzsche’s attitude of amor fati and destructive as well as affirmative
architectonic rhetoric of his communication ethic, dialogic meeting may yet reveal.
A decade later, Debra Hawhee extends this conversation with her 1999 article,
“Burke and Nietzsche.” Hawhee begins by noting that the “general trend in rhetoric’s
Burke scholarship, it seems, is to sidle around his connections to Nietzsche” although
“the connections are definitely there” (Hawhee 129). One connection Hawhee develops
in detail is the central importance of ethics for both Burke and Nietzsche in their
understanding of human language, communication, rhetoric, and relationships.
Here Burke supported his claim by invoking Nietzsche: ‘In a sense
Nietzsche did this [talked of ethics in terms of man], and in a sense he is
impregnable. Nietzsche is the first exclusively ethical philosopher, the
first philosopher to begin on ethical terms, rather than on metaphysical
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ones’ (1). In short, Burke writes, ‘Nietzsche made the necessary modern
step of starting directly with ethics’ (1). (Hawhee 132-33)
Such interpretations by Burke of Nietzsche show the importance of analyzing Nietzsche’s
ideas on language, communication, and rhetoric alongside his ideas on ethics rather than
parsing these two imbricating domains.
According to Hawhee, another ethical concern shared by Burke and Nietzsche is
the interdependent nature of the relationship between language and values. Hawhee
claims that Burke, “Following Nietzsche . . . cited language as the shaper of values”
(135). Through a close reading of similarities between Burke’s Permanence and Change
and Nietzsche’s early-unpublished yet highly influential essay, “On Truth and Lying in a
Non-Moral Sense,” Hawhee discusses the personal and cultural impact of the
metaphorical and rhetorical nature of language and its powerful role in shaping the
horizons of thought and of human ethics (133-37). Ethics most clearly realized through
the artifice of poetry.
These characteristics lead to the relationship between art and ethics in the thought
of Burke and Nietzsche as Hawhee states: “Poetry signifies a becoming, the furnishing of
what Burke calls a “master-purpose” (163); hence, for both Burke and Nietzsche, ethical
systems are built from poetry” (139). Hawhee reinforces this point in Burke’s thought
quoting from a letter he penned to Frank on September 4, 1922: “Ethics is the aesthetics
of living, or aesthetics is the ethics of art” (Burke qtd. in Hawhee 139). Ethics and
aesthetics fuse in Nietzsche and later Burke’s thought.
This fusion reveals the pragmatic nature of Nietzsche’s writing styles as
embodiment of his perspectivism and ideas regarding the inseparable bonds between
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ethics, communication, art, and rhetoric (Hawhee 141). “For Burke, Nietzsche enacted
his own principles” as evinced by how “Nietzsche enacted his critique of language by
using language, by demonstrating metaphor’s residue (“Truth and Lying” 251), by
deploying metaphor after metaphor, comparing perceptions to spider webs (253) even as
he spun his own” (Hawhee 141). Ideas Burke “examined in complex ways” (Hawhee
141). Such commonplaces between Burke and Nietzsche reinforce Hawhee’s claim of
the congruities between these two thinkers. Such commonplaces ultimately point toward
Nietzsche’s role in Burke’s development of his celebrated theory of “perspective by
incongruity” which when integrated into his ideas of dramatism and symbolic action help
to “carve out a discipline” (142). However, despite these important points of
convergence between Burke and Nietzsche and the possibilities they open for greater
understanding of the thought of each and their formidable contributions to the study of
rhetoric, these two articles remain the only scholarly excursions along this path.

Nietzsche, Ethics, and Rhetoric
The final perspective discovered among rhetorical scholarship on Nietzsche
employs his work as a standpoint from which to develop an ethic of rhetoric. McGuire’s
1980 article, “The Ethics of Rhetoric: The Morality of Knowledge,” remains the only
comment in the discipline that explicitly cites Nietzsche as potentially offering an ethics
of rhetoric through his analysis of Nietzsche’s will to power as an enactment of rhetorical
force in the world (146-48). Two later articles by Conway and Hawes extend the
possibilities for Nietzsche’s work as means to constructing a dialogic rhetorical ethic in
relation to specific communication paradigms and speech situations.
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Conway explores what Nietzsche might “contribute to our understanding of the
ethical dilemmas that beset the complex, totalizing broadcast media of the late twentieth
century” (217). Conway concludes that Nietzsche offers a more honest speech situation
than the idealized one promoted by Habermas. Nietzsche, he claims, offers a speech
situation in which we may utilize self-knowledge to better interpret the distortions that
plague all human communication situations (228-9). Nietzsche offers a representation of
how to use this self-knowledge to better guide our decision-making.
In confronting decision-making situations Hawes looks toward dialogue as a
possible paradigm of communication in contrast to dialectic (229). Hawes’s ideas
converge with McGuire’s thoughts on the rhetorical nature of some of Nietzsche’s key
philosophical metaphors as he states, “For Nietzsche, interpreting and evaluating
constitute the eternal return. That which does the interpreting and evaluating is the will
to power” (234). Hawes also presents assumptions analogous to those of this study that
“Nietzsche strives to be an affirmative philosopher, a dialogician, one who is both an
interpreter-physician . . . and an evaluator-artist” (237). Hawes’s article then moves onto
explore Bateson’s works and the connections between cybernetic minds and dialogue
(243-56). This theoretical move extends his work outside the scope of the present study.
However, the connection between Nietzsche and Bakhtin’s ideas on dialogue serve as
crucial insights in guiding the present study and opening a path to interpreting Nietzsche
otherwise than from the standard deconstructive hermeneutic bias.
McGuire’s path-making article subsequently begins with the articulation of an
assumption that remains the case twenty-five years later, “that existentialism in general
and Friedrich Nietzsche in particular have been overlooked by persons making statements
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about the ethics of rhetoric” (“The Ethics of Knowledge” 133). The reasons for this
exclusion of Nietzsche and existentialism from discussion of ethics and rhetoric stem
from the traditionalism of rational reasoning and “True” appeals as the ground of
decision-making. Quantitative information places the question of ethics in relation to
rhetoric as academic, occurring mainly “in textbooks and consists of repetitions of moral
maxims about the responsibilities of speakers” (McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge”
134). Finally, McGuire asserts that
statements about ethical rhetoric have been borrowed from the more
general realm of statements about human conduct; this is philosophically
naive because it ignores the conditionality of ethical judgments. In sum,
we have not elaborated an ethic for rhetoric. (“The Ethics of Knowledge”
134)
From this perspective, McGuire is not arguing for an epistemic or eristic characterization
of rhetoric as Hikins does above but rather one that is constructed with an awareness of
the conditionality of any suggestion of an ethic for rhetoric. The difference becomes
clearer in describing McGuire’s concise definitions of rhetoric and rhetorical knowing,
not bound solely by traditional philosophical positivist definitions.
McGuire therefore suggests that “rhetoric in any condition serves the general
function of contributing to what counts as knowledge in society—that rhetoric is an agent
for the social construction of reality” (“The Ethics of Knowledge” 137). Rhetoric as
social reality confines the epistemological issue to one contingent upon social factors.
Rhetorical knowledge “does not mean “verifiable” or “true” propositions, but whatever
counts and works as knowledge in a particular culture” (McGuire, “The Ethics of
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Knowledge” 137). These social qualifications of knowledge also call for a revised
understanding of rhetoric, one that describes “models for making discourse . . . in a
particular social reality” (McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge” 137). The knowing of
this characterization of rhetoric deals not only with speakers “but with how one manages
or participates in certain kinds of social intercourse, and with what kinds of verbal or
nonverbal strategies may have efficacy in the society” (McGuire, “The Ethics of
Knowledge” 137). Rhetoric then “means pieces of social discourse, it consists of verbal
models of human thought. . . . how a rhetor views and constructs the subject of discourse,
or what society has need of knowing, hearing or saying” (McGuire, “The Ethics of
Knowledge” 138). Rhetoric enacts a process that involves creating a discursive or
rhetorical knowledge as a foundation for determining persuasive practices, practices
judged against the social realities that call the discourse into being.
Yet how could an ethic of rhetoric so conceived then aid in choosing between the
alternatives rhetoric makes available to a social reality? McGuire sees an answer in
Nietzsche’s revision of objectivity as not meaning the discovery of one “Truth” but rather
“Here “objectivity” means allowing a diversity or multiplicity of visions, not insisting
upon one” (“The Ethics of Knowledge” 141). Following Nietzsche, McGuire states that
the question upon which ethics turns is whether particular versions of reality, traditional
or institutional perspectives have “hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity?”
(“The Ethics of Knowledge” 142), perspectives ultimately implicating the will to power.
To put the perspective of Nietzsche’s critiques in a nutshell: all value
judgments (all judgments) originate in a human motive to define,
structure, and control—that motive is the will to power. All human
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“knowledge” is directed at simplification and “taking possession of
things”—in the end, Nietzsche says, “We can only comprehend a world
that we ourselves have made.” (Nietzsche, Will to Power 495, 503 qtd. in
McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge” 142-43)
Nietzsche’s perspective works from an assumption of rhetoric as ordering social reality, a
social reality dependent on rhetoric to aid in its functioning and choosing between
competing perspectives, competing wills to power.
However, the question remains how does Nietzsche or Nietzsche’s works offer an
ethic for rhetoric? The will to power reframes the question at the ground of an ethic of
rhetoric as McGuire notes. The question becomes not one of truth or lie but one of value.
The existential component of the equation makes rhetoric “the means for living the public
life—it was for participants in society, not viewers” (McGuire, “The Ethics of
Knowledge” 146). Rhetoric not only shapes the alternatives but also compels selection
between them. An ethic of rhetoric actualizes the theoretical assumptions and bases of its
will to power, of its perspective and associated choices. As enactment of judgment
between choices or wills to power, “the morality of knowledge is measured against
enhancement of humans’ willingness to assume responsibility as co-creators of social
belief and action” (McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge” 147). Rhetoric adheres to each
component of this description as rhetoric also shapes the alternatives and means for
constructing, measuring, and comparing values.
Additionally could a morality of knowledge employ rhetoric in its engagement
with a multiplicity of perspectives to situate choice and to enhance human action? Two
associated closing points Hawes raises are worth noting due to their importance in
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response to this question and due to their importance for the present study. First, Hawes
sees his work as pointing toward a “decidedly more participatory ethic. It is also an
ontological shift from objectivity toward answerability” (257). These insights are crucial
for they foreshadow the understanding of rhetorical ethics to be addressed by this study.
A rhetorical ethic constructed from interpretation of Nietzsche’s works demands an
existential approach whereby the interpretation and evaluation of philosophical ethical
perspectives are always undertaken through analysis of their dialogic enactment through
word and deed, through their communication with the conditions of their continual
becoming.
Second, Hawes states he seeks “to keep dialogic conversation an open
(im)possibility” guided by a “praxis of dialogics” that requires “more theoretical and
empirical attention devoted to them” (257). While Hawes continues along a separate path
in his work writing these ideas into other concerns regarding the nature of human life and
its interface with technology, this idea will resonate throughout the present study. The
perspectival approach that Nietzsche employs as will be argued here builds upon this
approach to rhetoric and ethics, the eternally recurring demand that one meet each face
and situation anew, aware of the unknowable difference at the heart of all human
cognition, interpretation, communication, and activity. The present then seeks to take up
this proposal by Hawes to further explicate what such a ‘praxis of dialogics’ would look
like if constructed upon the ground cleared by Nietzsche as one open path.

Implications
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The following present excursion into Nietzsche’s works provides such attention
by seeking to reveal how Nietzsche authors an inherently dialogic orientation to values,
the process of valuation, and ethics. Such a standpoint drawn from interpretation of
Nietzsche’s thought contributes to presentation of a communication ethic, not forever
deferring judgment as with deconstruction but in offering a constructive alternative that
calls for answerability. Rather Nietzsche offers a communication ethic guided by a stated
set of values but also open to the possibility of change. When a revision to a previously
perceived fitting response to the rhetorical situation demands, the dialogic meeting of
difference within the mud and mystery of the temporal, existential moment allows for
new meanings of traditions to emerge.
The saying of the said accomplished by these two interconnected chapters on
Nietzsche scholarship within communication and rhetorical studies reveal an interesting
paradox. Nietzsche, a figure whose works revolve around values and ethics, yet only a
single article foregrounds the question of ethics as its point of hermeneutic entry into
explicating Nietzsche’s rhetoric. Additionally, few sought to speak Nietzsche’s
language, with little account taken of his own terms and their significance for unfolding
the multiplicity of meanings his works offer the study of dialogue, rhetoric, and
communication ethics.
These elements of the landmarks of contemporary rhetorical scholarship on
Nietzsche point toward the path taken by the present study. Guided by these insights and
debates, metaphors from Nietzsche’s own texts will provide hermeneutic entry into his
architectonic rhetoric and communication ethic, realized most fully through its practice,
for as he states, “Good style in itself--a pure folly, mere ‘idealism’” (Ecce Homo “Why I
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Write Such Good Books” 4). This is not to deny the worth of theory drawn from careful
reflection; however it does post an important warning, not to let theory overwrite its
significance, one Nietzsche never tired of demanding. To act with unyielding honesty in
the service, not only discovery or creation of knowledge, aware of one’s situated
standpoint within the limits and opportunities of our natural human condition (Nietzsche,
On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Exegesis of what these and other related ideas on
the questions of value, morality, and the dynamic interplay of dialogue and rhetoric as a
process of making meaning out of the chaos of human existence point toward other
unexplored territory in the Nietzschean corpus. The following chapters carry forward the
said of the above noted scholarship as a background to meet these foreground concerns.
Now we turn to the issues at the heart of the present study. What may Nietzsche’s corpus
offer towards advancement of understanding the unbreakable union between word and
deed, communication ethics and rhetoric, the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric? With
the disciplinary scholarship on Nietzsche serving as the said, the background, the present
study proceeds to a textured saying and dialogic meeting of Nietzsche through his
thought and words implicated within this postmodern historical moment after illusion
amid metanarrative disintegration.
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Chapter Four: Nietzsche’s Perspectivism as Ground of Dialogic Meeting

The present study positions Nietzsche as an important hermeneutic entrance into
conversations on communication ethics amid contemporary postmodern narrative and
virtue contention. Nietzsche’s metaphor of perspectivism announces the ground of
dialogic meeting, a communication ethic for a postmodern historical moment defined by
difference, change, and contesting values after illusion. Nietzsche’s perspectivism
situated at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric engages existential and temporal reality
and the difference manifest in human existence through the metaphor of dialogic
meeting.
Dialogic meeting articulates a stabilizing of the ground of ethics, the relationship
between word and deed. Dialogic meeting, situated within the realities which unite word
and deed reveals the concretion of communication, ethics, and rhetoric into what Schrag
identifies as “the rhetorical conversation of mankind, setting forth and making manifest
to the hearer and reader multiple perspectives of world, self, and other” (Communicative
Praxis 190). The ethics of this union, which dialogic meeting discloses, resonates
throughout Nietzsche’s works as his abiding concern with the power and values of
morality attest. The importance of the influence of morality cannot be overestimated as
Nietzsche deems morality “the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of
‘life’ comes to be” (Beyond Good and Evil 19). Exploration of this seminal
interrelationship discloses morality, the life-giving phenomenon, beginning with
concretion of communication, rhetoric, and ethics, as interpreted through Nietzsche’s
metaphor of perspectivism.
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Introduction
Perspectivism implies the inescapable necessity of meeting reality, of giving order
to the chaos, to give life a goal. Perspectivism expands the notion of rhetoric. Nietzsche
revalues rhetoric not as mere technē but conditions, interweaving threads of the fabric of
human communication. Human communication viewed as the window framing human
consciousness as dialogue, power, and life. The determining criteria of rhetoric exist in
the communicative activity of answerability for the other as well as reflexivity.
Meeting discloses an understanding of the self as implicated in ethics, communication,
and rhetoric. Meeting is not mere dialoging as telling but rather engaging reality in the
moment amid present, past, and future. Meeting does not presuppose an ending or a
possibility of an end except in death and its attendant silence.
Dialogic meeting melds communication and action, not communicative praxis but
a communication ethic as hub at the axis of interplay between communication, ethics, and
rhetoric. Values serve as the ground of communication and the play of rhetoric for
Nietzsche. Rhetoric and style are grounded in ethical concerns such as truth made known
through meeting. Communication enacts perspectivism as disclosing the situated nature
of all forms of meaning. Meaning arising from questions of ethics and values, which
relations drive to the fore.
Why turn to Nietzsche as entry into the discussion of possibilities for developing
a dialogic communication ethic? Because Nietzsche enacts ethics as grounded in meeting
reality as communication. At the interplay of communication, ethics, and rhetoric this
hermeneutic entrance provides the grounds and means for dialogic meeting.
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Dialogic meeting serves as an appropriate hermeneutic entrance to engage questions in a
postmodern historical moment after illusion—age defined through virtue contention
following the fall of metanarratives. Perspectivism enacts an ethics of invention as
ground for a communication ethic. Invention realized not through individual agency but
through acknowledgement of the necessity of difference, others, alterity, as providing the
necessary background against which one responds and creates meanings. Genealogy
offers a communication ethic through architectonic rhetoric. Architectonic rhetoric
understood in the classical sense Bakhtin advocates, “a concrete architectonic
interrelationship” of meanings built to order the chaos of reality and assign values to
competing ideas and stimuli (Toward a Philosophy of the Act 63). Revaluation of values
provides the concretion of ethics, rhetoric, and communication at the point of union
between word and deed, each element implicated and implicating the others.
What results from this Nietzschean perspectivism is a de-centered rhetoric
definable only in terms of the ethics and communication of meanings it discloses through
the meeting of difference as reality in dialogue. Rhetoric de-centered and refocused not
on the agency or subjectivity of the speaker but upon the deed, the communicative
activity, which the rhetoric discloses, its ethical and communicative ground that call it
forth into being. Rhetoric exists only as the meeting of the exigencies of reality through
discourse. Meeting that occurs through the creation, realization, and communication of
the meanings of meeting.
Levinas’ following statement augments our discussion as he articulates several
motifs that recur in Nietzsche’s development of the metaphor demonstrating the

Prellwitz, Chapter Four 99

imbricating nature of hermeneutical and rhetorical activity of interpretation and invention
as grounded in the values and morals of dialogic meeting, perspectivism.
Perhaps the names of persons whose saying signifies a face—
proper names, in the middle of all these common names and
commonplaces—can resist the dissolution of meaning and help us to
speak. Perhaps they will enable us to divine, behind the downfall to
discourse, the end of a certain intelligibility but the dawning of a new one.
What is coming to a close may be a rationality tied exclusively to the being
that is sustained by words, the Said of the Saying, the Said conveying
fields of knowledge and truths in the form of unchanging identities,
merging with the self-sufficient Identity of a being or system—complete,
perfect, denying or absorbing the differences that appear to betray or limit
it. This intelligibility reaches its apotheosis in the ultimate identity of ‘the
identical and the non-identical’ asserted by Hegel, which probably
completes and concludes the philosophy of the Same and of immanence,
or ontology. (Levinas, foreword 5, Proper Names)
Several connections appear between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and Levinas’ notion of
moving beyond the humanistic dependence upon the name to bestow meaning. First, we
must always recall that Nietzsche works from a Classical understanding of the person as
grounded in the affects that one enacts, character interpreted and evaluated by the ethos
and pathos their speech and acts disclose. Identity becomes a conditional relation born in
the social fabric of existence, not the sole possession of the individual. Second, the
multiple ways dialogic meeting may be manifested comprise the destructive and creative
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energies of interpretation, invention, and style used to communicate ideas. Third,
difference and change permeates the nucleus of human being and knowing and the denial
of this fact of life finally appears to have been put to rest by the critics of the modern said
of knowing and living. Finally, a meeting of the said of the past through the saying of its
meanings in meeting the exigencies of the contemporary historical moment may offer a
new path to living speech through dialogue.
Dialogue as a metaphor of speaking and meeting therefore provides a saying of
the said within the shared space of speech and activity. Nietzsche’s communication ethic
grounded in the style of his architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting clears a
constructive path to encounter exigencies by a discourse that enacts one’s values and
morals through the reunion of the ethical unity of wisdom and eloquence in the activity of
life. To this possibility attention now turns to sketch the contours of Nietzsche’s
metaphor of perspectivism as a means to knowing and making known the saying of the
said through dialogic meeting.

A Genealogy of Perspectivism
Our journey begins by meeting Nietzsche’s “most important published discussion
of perspectivism” which appears in his work, On the Genealogy of Morals (III: 12)
(Leiter 13). Nietzsche begins his explication of the nature of perspectivism by seeking to
direct its affective stance in meeting “resolute reversals of accustomed perspectives and
valuations with which the spirit has, with apparent mischievousness and futility, raged
against itself for so long” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Nietzsche requests that
the seeker of knowledge view differently these twists that shape the quest.
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Nietzsche requests that the knowledge seeker affirms and welcomes such
upheavals of one’s convictions, values, and morals by subsequent inquiries. This
“discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future ‘objectivity’” requires one to
interpret otherwise (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). The future objectivity to which
one disciplines oneself revalued by Nietzsche to express not the “nonsensical absurdity”
of “‘contemplation without interest’” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Rather,
Nietzsche advocates an interpreting otherwise than modern notions of objectivity to posit
human knowing as a hermeneutical and rhetorical process that actively expresses one’s
wills and affects in directing one’s reasons “in the service of knowledge” (On the
Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Nietzsche’s revalued notion of interested objectivity
understood as “the ability to control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that
one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the
service of knowledge” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). We will pursue in detail
later in this chapter how perspectivism echoes guiding tenets of Aristotle’s venerable
definition of rhetoric as “an ability, in each particular case, to see the available means of
persuasion” (On Rhetoric I.2.1). For now, it is sufficient to state the potential connection
to allow us to return to Nietzsche’s further elaboration of the nature of his metaphor of
perspectivism.
Nietzsche then earlier in his preface to On the Genealogy of Morals hints at how one
may act in the service of knowledge. Discussing his reaction and rejection of the “Pro
and Con” of Dr. Paul Ree’s 1877 book The Origin of the Moral Sensations, Nietzsche
met Ree’s propositions “not in order to refute them—what have I to do with
refutations!—but, as becomes a positive spirit, to replace the improbable with the more
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probable, possibly one error with another” (On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 4).
Nietzsche thereby urges one to serve knowledge through perspectivism not necessarily by
“hypothesis-mongering” but rather by enacting perspectivism as a saying of the
primordial function of rhetoric [. . .] to ‘make-known’ meaning both to oneself
and to others. Meaning is derived by a human being in and through the
interpretive understanding of reality. Rhetoric is the process of making-known
that meaning. (Hyde and Smith 348)
Perspectivism develops a way of approaching the task of serving knowledge through the
interpretive activity of making known meaning through the dialogic meeting of one’s
experiencing of existence.
Nietzsche further textures the metaphor of perspectivism with perhaps its
penultimate articulation of the existential, situated nature of the relationship between the
subject and the process of knowing. He warns against unchallenged acceptance of what
knowing for the human subject is not, what it has never been, and what it can never
become expressed in “the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a ‘pure, will-less,
painless, timeless knowing subject’” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12).
For Nietzsche such a view to knowledge as a said, unchanging and existent outside the
bounds of human experience turns “reason against reason” for it works to
downgrade physicality to an illusion; likewise pain, multiplicity, the entire
conceptual antithesis ‘subject and ‘object’——errors, nothing but errors!
To renounce belief in one’s ego, to deny one’s own ‘reality’—what a
triumph! not merely over the senses, over appearance, but a much higher
kind of triumph, a violation and cruelty against reason—a voluptuous
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pleasure that reaches its height when the ascetic self-contempt and selfmockery of reason declares: ‘there is a realm of truth and being, but
reason is excluded from it!’ (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12)
Such assertions mark the ruptures, which Nietzsche authors in the said of the modern
facade, finding space for the emergence of the postmodern. Nietzsche claims that such
ascetic, Kantian presuppositions regarding knowledge forbid knowledge due to their
unquestioned grounds or reasons (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Such
a denial of the conditions that shape human knowing Nietzsche perceives as inherent
within the concept of knowledge that dominated his modern historical moment.
Nietzsche’s severe concern with this blindness to the situated nature of human
knowing even begins his polemic. In the first section of his preface to On the Genealogy
of Morals he warns that “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge . . .
Present experience has, I am afraid, always found us ‘absent-minded’” (Nietzsche,
preface 1). Such lack of awareness of the embedded nature of our experience of knowing
and knowledge leads to “count the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our
life, our being—and alas! Miscount them” (Nietzsche, preface 1, On the Genealogy of
Morals). Lack of awareness of the how one’s situatedness of their existence implicates
contextual influences upon their knowing as a saying of the said of experience leads not
to eternal, stable, unchanging Truth. Rather, falsification of the truth of the human
condition leads to error and denial of reason through one’s denial of the situated character
of human reason, knowledge, and being, as always situated and temporally bound.
Additionally significant to Nietzsche’s critique of such false ways of knowing
arises as he attacks this perspective on knowledge based on its values and morals. The
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perspective of reason it claims, one founded on truth, Nietzsche proceeds to assert is
actually founded upon lies against the nature of human knowing as it occurs within the
interestedness, contingent, temporal plane of human existence. Change does not imply
the impossibility of truth but rather a revision and revaluation of its rhetoric, its claim to
the status of the said of the categorical imperative.
Likewise, the denial of “one’s ego” and “one’s own reality” results in an erasure
of one’s responsibility for the consequences of their knowledge claims. If one acquires
knowledge as if it were a commodity open to all that merely repeat the same method,
one’s personal responsibility in implementing this knowledge disappears. For example,
in the same way that the soldier who pleads his innocence to a murder charge under the
guise that he was only following the orders of his commanding officer. Knowledge of
the said effaces personal responsibility in exchange for monologic universalizability,
denies responsibility by denying its grounds, in turning reason into “an incarnate will to
contradiction and antinaturalness” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Such
a will brings forth not saying but said, not dialogic meeting but monologic denial of
difference and the effacement of responsibility behind the mask of epistemological
method.
Turning to discovery from the ashes of critique, Nietzsche advances his metaphor
of perspectivism. Perspectivism Nietzsche designated to be truer to the conditions and
conditional nature of human knowledge as well as to human reason situated within the
currents of difference that animate human existence. Nietzsche claims that the
aforementioned pretensions and illusions of knowledge “demand of the eye an absurdity
and a nonsense” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). The use of an embodied,
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physiological metaphor for the knowing process, one that occurs through the flesh of the
eyes, is not to be ignored. Seeing is an embodied means of knowing which is exactly
Nietzsche’s core of perspectivism. To deny the body and all associated notions such as
affects, interest, and physical opportunities and limitations, denies the ground of human
reason and life. One cannot offer a rational account if one denies the conditions that
frame it. Nietzsche continues
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the
more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different
eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our
‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’ be. But to eliminate the will
altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable
of this—what would that mean but to castrate the intellect?— (On the
Genealogy of Morals III: 12)
Interestingly, Nietzsche ends his elaboration of the guiding ideas of his metaphor of
perspectivism not with a characteristic exclamation point but with a question mark. In
the manner in which Nietzsche communicates the insight of perspectivism seeks to enact
its meaning, to be a saying of the said, to engage the other in the activity the speech
suggests. One is called to ponder whether or not Nietzsche’s idea holds or whether one
discovers reasons against its veracity. Engaged in this way, we begin to glimpse how
perspectivism enacts Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting. The
interpretive process of making known meanings shaped by one’s meeting difference,
meeting other perspectives in the open space of dialogue. To better understand the
multiple textures of this grounding metaphor the present study explores the significance
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of perspectivism through interpretation of related themes and extensions in Nietzsche’s
works.

Perspectivism: Communication of Consciousness as Dialogic Meeting
Under what conditions and why does invention in the form of perspectivism occur
according to Nietzsche? What needs does it serve, what sorts of knowledge does it offer,
to what values and morals may it enact in helping to pose a fitting response to temporal
moment of meeting everyday exigencies? Sketching the background of perspectivism,
the conditions of human knowing, offers an illuminating path into the concretion of
contemplation and action, which perspectivism enacts in Nietzsche’s work and here
begins that activity.
Perspectivism as Nietzsche envisions it then begins with conscious perception, as
the beginning of one’s awareness of the taking in of stimuli. To the value of
consciousness he turns for it is here that he finds the dawn of human knowledge
determined by its communicability between persons. According to Nietzsche, “the
subtlety and strength of consciousness always were proportionate to a man’s (or
animal’s) capacity for communication, and as if this capacity in turn were proportionate
to the need for communication” (The Gay Science 354). Communication of one’s
perceptions, of one’s knowledge, then becomes the horizons of what one may come to
perceive and know. In this way Nietzsche revalues the common sense relationship
between language and experience as one not directed by the conscious perception of
something, which then prompts its communication through the translation of one’s
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perception into recognizable signs and symbols. Rather the primal and survival needs of
human communication prompt what we may say and thereby see and come to know.
Yet such a process implies a multidirectional and layered understanding of how
consciousness and communication interpenetrate human time and being beyond the
directions and boundaries of mere individual will and agency.
Add to this that not only language serves as a bridge between human
beings but also a mien, a pressure, a gesture. The emergence of our sense
impressions into our consciousness, the ability to fix them and, as it were,
exhibit them externally, increased proportionately with the need to
communicate them to others by means of signs. The human being
inventing signs is at the same time the human being who becomes ever
more keenly conscious of himself. It was only as a social animal that man
acquired self-consciousness—which he is still in the process of doing
more and more. (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 354)
Life then directs our consciousness of self and other according to our need to
communicate. Because communication requires an other-directed focus to manifest
meaning between persons, it is the social situation that fosters self-awareness. Such a
conception of consciousness as intertwined with communication presents problems and
opportunities for Nietzsche. In developing our self-understanding we become conscious
only of that for which our social language can communicate, limiting our sense of self to
that for which our language possesses words to express. “Our thoughts . . . are
continually governed by the character of consciousness—by the ‘genius of the species’
that commands it—and translated back into the perspective of the herd” (Nietzsche, The
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Gay Science 354). However, such a concretion of consciousness and communication
offers a novel conception of the unity of speech and activity to be discovered through the
perception of consciousness through the lens of communication.
Jaspers points toward this emerging union of word and deed in Nietzsche’s
thought. According to Jaspers, Nietzsche “takes all existence to be a kind of speech
‘through which the forces understand one another’” (299). Speech that authors
understanding reinforces a textured conception of communication as the activity of
saying, of actively responding to the exigencies and questions of a situation a person
meets through the activity of saying their interpretation to an other, real and/or imagined.
This activity of consciousness as communication, as saying, leads one to “the
essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand them . . . the world of
which we can become conscious is only a surface- and sign-world, a world made
common and meaner” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 354). Perspectivism in this sense
ascribes invention at the core of the values and meaning of communication and
consciousness. Language shapes consciousness in providing the signs through which we
encounter it in communication, in the active processing of consciousness in the words
that speak its meanings.
While the social nature of consciousness shaped by the possibilities embedded in
language affords sharing of meaning between persons it also simultaneously limits
meanings to those shared words and their attendant meanings that reside within the
language. This limitation also affects the significance of human knowledge. Nietzsche
concludes that “We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for ‘truth’: we ‘know’ (or
believe or imagine) just as much as may be useful in the interests of the human herd, the

Prellwitz, Chapter Four 109

species” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 354). The utility of knowledge then comes under
further scrutiny as a valuation for “‘utility’ is ultimately a mere belief, something
imaginary, and perhaps precisely that most calamitous stupidity of which we shall perish
some day” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 354). The scathing critique Nietzsche advances
emanates from what he sees as the questionable intellectual conscience that claims for
human knowledge more than can be allotted given the facts of our ever-changing human
condition. We also perceive from this dour pronouncement Nietzsche’s perspectivism,
for it holds no truth, belief, or fact beyond ongoing interpretation.
The destructive potential of this insight Nietzsche mediates by connecting
interpretation with the very existence of truth within the activity of interpretation,
communicability, the limit of knowledge. “The metaphor of ‘exegesis,’ used to express
the basic relation of human existence to being” claims Jaspers (289) describes the
unfinalizability of the inherent perspectival character of human existence. What Jaspers
perceives is that Nietzsche views the attaining of truth as an inherently dialogic process.
“The word ‘truth’ is the name of a process . . . that in itself is never final: not a process of
becoming aware of the truth as something initially independent, fixed, and determinate
but of conferring and actively deciding the truth’” (Jaspers 187). Truth emerges through
analysis of the process and orientation to interpretation one brings to the questions that
call for response. Truth emerges through acknowledgment of the values and morals that
guide one’s interpretive acts. The kinds of truths one encounters then are understandable
and gain meaning through how well they accord with one’s values that order their
interpretive processes of knowing.
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This is nowhere so clearly communicated by Nietzsche than when he states,
“‘Alone one is always in the wrong; the truth begins with two’” (Nietzsche qtd. in Jaspers
403), illustrating Nietzsche’s dialogic orientation. For Nietzsche, truth emerges through
dialogic meeting, through the encounter of an other. Such a dialogic orientation to
knowing and truth acknowledges the role language plays in shaping the communicability
of truth as the center of meeting.
If truth is not directly given, then the mask is part and parcel of
existence—not the mask that is intended merely to deceive, but rather the
protective mask that can be penetrated only by those whose vision is
sufficiently authentic to hit upon the truth. Indirectness is no longer a
technique of communication; it is the truth of being, manifest in existence
and conveyed in speech. The mask involves both the common lie and
authentic truth; as a mask a work offers changeability through ambiguity
and foreground. (Jaspers 406)
Indirectness revealed as a component of the inherent character of the truth of being.
Being situated not as a passive intake of stimuli but as the communicative and rhetorical
activity of making meaning and assigning value to difference manifest through meeting
the eternal changes of temporal existential moment in which human life occurs. The
limits of the truth of human life occur through the communicability of such meanings and
values beyond the personal and into the social. A social fabric to which they are
inextricably wedded due to the residue of others’ meanings that reside in all language
use.
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Therefore truth and communicability comprise forces residing at the stormy
center of Nietzsche’s work. “In understanding his own philosophizing, he reflected upon
no problems as often as those relating to what is communicable, how it can be
communicated, what underlies incommunicability, and what conclusions follow from
this” (Jaspers 403). This coincides with Nietzsche’s orientation through dialogic
meeting; one must not act scientifically or dogmatically but metaphorically to meet others
in dialogue, adept enough to change to meet the circumstances of one’s encounter with
the other. “The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive,
which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for one would thereby
dispense with man himself” (Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” 88-9).
Metaphor provides an opportunity to enact a saying of the said to counter the inherent
recalcitrance in any saying of the said, the possibility of inherited meaning effacing the
invention of meaning through meeting difference within the temporal existential moment.
Hence it can be said that Nietzsche’s overriding task, along whichever philosophical lines
one places it, remains dependent upon the possibility of communication.
So what does knowledge as framed by communicability convey in Nietzsche’s
skeptical characterization? In many passages we find a similar answer or perhaps, an
implicit rendering of the need for perspectivism as a saying of the meeting of the
individual and social enacted by the metaphor of perspectivism. Nietzsche begins by
offering an explanation from listening to the chatter on the streets.
What do they want when they want ‘knowledge’? Nothing more than this:
Something strange is to be reduced to something familiar. And we
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philosophers—have we really meant more than this when we have spoken
of knowledge? What is familiar means what we are used to so that we no
longer marvel at it, our everyday, some rule in which we are stuck,
anything at all in which we feel at home. Look, isn’t our need for
knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover under
everything strange, unusual, and questionable something that no longer
disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the
jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the
restoration of a sense of security? (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 355)
Perhaps more important, Nietzsche offers a way to more, to live a richer fuller
questioning life where knowledge is to be made not known or owned. Knowledge made
by meeting others in the network of conscious communication. Through which our lives
may become a saying, not a mere repetition of machines, a said of the same to silence
difference of others. In other words, the known is exactly what requires continued
questioning, not the monologic silencing within the straightjacket of a system imposed
upon the dynamic nature of the ‘world riddle.’
Nietzsche reveals elements of his timeliness in confronting the biases of his age
such as the unquestioned acceptance of the value of science. A scientific interpretation
“that permits counting, calculating, seeing, touching, and nothing more—this is a crudity
and a naiveté, assuming that it is not a mental illness, an idiocy” (The Gay Science 373).
Such a prejudice removes the human, the perspective, from the interpretation and leaves
the residue of one’s reasoning. A more truthful accounting arises through the traces of
emergent perspectivism. “Knowledge, saying Yes to reality, is just as necessary for the
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strong as cowardice and the flight from reality--as the ‘ideal’ is for the weak, who are
inspired by weakness” (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo “The Birth of Tragedy” 2). Strength
arises not out of conviction or repetition or representational correspondence but in the
mud and mystery of meeting difference in the temporal existential moment. Truth found
not in precision and accuracy but the ethics of meeting of difference, of perspective.
I favor any skepsis to which I may reply: ‘Let us try it!’ But I no longer
wish to hear anything of all those things that do not permit any
experiment. This is the limit of my ‘truthfulness’; for there courage has
lost its right. (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 51)
The values that order inquiry then become important criteria when interpreting meanings
of competing claims. Has the claim acknowledged its situatedness to acknowledge the
limits of its applicability? Is the knowledge claimed of a human, perspectival sort or
mere masking of unquestioned foundations set only outside contingent reality? Meanings
and their invention become a question of the value of style in meeting the questions faced
in times of narrative and virtue contention, the ethics of meeting thereby inform the
meanings perspectives occupy as resources for an architectonic rhetoric of response.

The Classical Rhetorical Roots of Nietzsche’s Perspectivism
We begin our discussion of Nietzsche’s lecture notes on rhetoric with his
comments on Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric since “Nietzsche finds the most impressive
conception of rhetoric in Aristotle” (Behler 20). Starting from this Aristotelian
standpoint, we progress to Nietzsche’s evolving genealogy of the relationship between
rhetoric and language and how meaning emerges through language, highlighting
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language’s inherent possibilities and limitations. Finally the notes lead to consideration
of how Nietzsche regarded style as rhetoric’s resultant language art and how the style
enacted through language discloses the communication ethics that adhere to any
rhetorical language act.
Following a brief introductory sketch of conditions that comprise the origin of
rhetoric and a preliminary overview of Plato’s critiques, Nietzsche moves onto the “most
influential for all later conceptual determinations of the concept . . . the Rhetoric of
Aristotle” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 100). Nietzsche, quoting Aristotle
states “[rhetoric is the power (faculty, ability) about each thing to observe all possible
means of persuasion], “all that is feasibly probable and convincing” (Aristotle, Rhetoric I,
2 as qtd. in Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 100). Nietzsche proceeds to interpret
Aristotle as positing rhetoric as “neither epistēmē [knowledge in a scientific sense] nor
technē [art or craft], but dynamis [power (faculty or ability)], which, however, could be
elevated to a technē” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 100). Nietzsche continues
by emphasizing that it is not persuasion that serves as the object of rhetoric according to
Aristotle’s definition.
Rather the definition turns upon the textured sense of the power to observe all the
available means of persuasion for the “rhetor can defend a difficult cause, just as a
physician who cares for an incurable patient” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric”
100). Nietzsche also cites that it is the hermeneutic element of Aristotle’s definition to
which “all later definitions hold firmly,” namely “to this kata to endechomenon peithein
[according to all available means of persuasion]” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on
Rhetoric” 100). It is the hermeneutic element of attaining awareness of all available
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topoi of persuasion that for Nietzsche lends rhetoric its “universal” element “applicable to
all disciplines” and as such “is very important. It is a purely formal art” (“Lecture Notes
on Rhetoric” 100). Art in the sense of a technē with the power to give form or order
chaos according to the logos of the form persuasion should apparently take given the
context. Rhetoric as an architectonic art of making meaning through meeting difference.
However, aside from acknowledgment of this universal element within Aristotle’s
influential definition of rhetoric, Nietzsche finds fault within Aristotle’s lack of comment
regarding “the fact that what has been seen is also to be presented somehow” (“Lecture
Notes on Rhetoric” 101). This glaring omission of the necessity to communicate one’s
interpretations by Aristotle Nietzsche suggests results from Aristotle’s bias against the
later elaborated canons of “elocutio, dispositio, memoria, and pronunciatio” (“Lecture
Notes on Rhetoric” 100). Overemphasis on the contemplative element or theory of
rhetoric therefore according to Nietzsche impoverishes Aristotle’s contributions to
understanding of the practice or praxis of rhetoric as a power working within the human
world.
Nietzsche continues with his critique by stating that the communication of one’s
interpretation must subsequently occur. Nietzsche claims that this “is already contained
in pithanon [calculated to persuade]” therefore implying that Aristotle devalues delivery
to the point where his conception of rhetoric could imply that “Even the legein [speaking]
is not essential” (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 101). The corrective to this loss of the
mean and unwarranted inclination toward interpretation and contemplation to neglect of
the performative and practical components of rhetoric Nietzsche finds in Quintilian’s
definition of rhetoric.
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In contras to Aristotle, Nietzsche positions Quintilian as one who describes
rhetoric as “the science of correct conception, arrangement and utterance, coupled with a
retentive memory and a dignified delivery” (V, x, 54 as qtd. in Nietzsche, (“Lecture
Notes on Rhetoric” 102). The significance of this genealogy of classical theory lies in the
relationship Nietzsche perceives existent between rhetoric and language.
Without relinquishing the Aristotelian connection, Nietzsche states
The power to discover and to make operative that which works and
impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which Aristotle calls
rhetoric, is, at the same time, the essence of language; the latter is based
just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of
things. Language does not desire to instruct, but to convey a subjective
impulse and its acceptance. (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 107)
Language serves as a means of meeting difference-offering opportunity for
communication, for exchange of meaning between persons as a co-construction.
Language describes a perspective towards truth, a perspective towards the untruth, but
not the things themselves. Nietzsche desires we recall what language is at its base, a
metaphor of our meeting reality, not a universal, unchanging saying of a Truth beyond
human understanding.
However, that does not entail that language cannot convey truth. Nietzsche
advocates language conveys the metaphorical interpretation, the perspective towards
truth, given one’s situated nature as a speaker speaking within a temporal historical
context to an audience addressing the said of other speakers and/or other exigency
inherent to the specific act of speech articulated. To forget the embedded nature of all
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communicative acts, especially rhetorical acts lead to misapplication of the dynamis of
the art and distortion of its meanings.
Therefore Nietzsche claims language signifies the metaphorical process of
knowing as “Man, who forms language, does not perceive things or procedures, but
impulses: he does not apprehend sensations, but merely copies of sensations” (“Lecture
Notes on Rhetoric” 107). Language as the container of meaning and its metaphorical
translation from impulse to linguistic communication, conveys not objects “but the
manner in which we stand toward them, the pithanon [power of persuasion (plausibility;
also a thing producing illusion)]. The full essence of things will never be grasped”
(Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 107). This crucial insight serves to justify the
situating of perspectivism as the ground of Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of his
communication ethic as it conveys the substance of rhetorical activity, the interplay of
perspectives. Perspectives constructed through the manifold resources of human
language.
A complex of sources, from conscious and unconscious impulses to the context in
which these impulses are perceived and interpreted determines the function of language.
“Language never expresses something completely but displays only a characteristic
which appears to be prominent to it [language]. . . . A partial perception takes the place of
the entire and complete intuition” as evidenced by the works of synecdoche, for example
(Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 106-7). Given this metaphorical and partial
rendering of the impulses which our language seeks to convey Nietzsche concludes,
“language is rhetoric, because it desires to convey only a doxa [opinion], not an epistēmē
[knowledge]” (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 107). Language is rhetoric; language is the
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partial metaphorical translation of impulses, unconscious and conscious sensations into
the signs made communicable through human language.
Language crafts the metaphors that congeal into perspectives, the topoi of
rhetorical activity making meaning through meeting existential reality amid the temporal
contextual impulses that influence language. Language defined through the rhetorical
and metaphorical tools it affords to create meaning out of meeting difference, making
order out of the contact of chaos, which pervades the existential and temporal moments
of human life viewed through the perspective of language.
However, the characteristic linguistic element of a sensation that is most
prominent is also the consequence of a mediation of personal and social forces. “What is
usually called language is actually all figuration. Language is created by the individual
speech artist, but it is determined by the fact that the taste of the many makes choices”
(Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 108). Nietzsche suggests that social, not only
internal, subjective, contingent forces shape language and impact communication
wherein physis influences style and figuration to express perspectives.
Meaning then remains under a plethora of influences determined by these original
choices made by situated speech as a form of response or as Ijessling describes speech as
“always understood as a listening” (129). Nietzsche states that “It is a matter of
importance to observe for whom, and among whom, one speaks, at which time, at which
place, and for what cause” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 113). Style and
meaning then result from meeting as listening and response to and within a complex of
temporal, existential forces. “Therefore, in sum, purity and clarity everywhere; but all
modified according to characteristics of place, occasion, speakers, and listeners—”
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(Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 113). Yet if situational constraints hold such
sway, how may one succeed in conveying their perspective to an audience? Nietzsche
finds a response in the consideration of the inherent rhetorical nature of language, style.
The work of the rhetor then demands the fashioning of a “characteristic style”
because the rhetor “practices a free plastic art; the language is his material which has
already been prepared” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 113). One speaks with
plastic forms, words and symbols present within cultural history and whose meanings
still resonate with the significance attached to those past utterances. The rhetor then
communicates in the person of an “imitative artist; he speaks similarly to the actor, out of
a strange person, or to him, a strange object” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric”
113). Again, we see the power of physis as significant in the contest to persuade and
convey a convincing perspective toward difference in person, idea, or situation. To
achieve a convincing manner, a rhetor must not appear to be out of tune with their
audience whereby one’s style appears as artificial for it is at that moment that for
Nietzsche the bond of identification between speaker and audience tears.
Style for Nietzsche involves successful mediation of the rhetorical situation
through the correct translation of personal metaphors into proposed social metaphors or
figures, which subsequently come to guide others’ reception of meaning and use of style.
Style becomes simultaneously a comprehensive description and prescription of
communicative possibilities. Given this proposed exchange between speaker and hearers,
what determines results? “A figure which finds no buyer becomes an error. An error
which is accepted by some usus or other becomes a figure” answers Nietzsche (“Lecture
Notes on Rhetoric” 109). An answer, which emphasizes the contingent nature of rhetoric
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and meaning, evoked through language, an answer that implicates rhetoric as the art of
the probable, an architectonic art of perspectivism as ground for dialogic meeting. The
determining factor as to acceptance and error remains a mystery acted out “according to
unconscious laws and analogies” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 109). A closer
inspection of the form and content of the process appears to signal an adequate guide. It
appears that Nietzsche anticipates this puzzle and situates his response as arising out of
the relationship that adheres or appears to adhere between a speaker’s style and the values
that follow from such a rhetorically constructed perspective.
Could values and moral sensation then be posited as natural guides to rhetorical
style and action? If so, error then becomes a consequence of the artificiality of language.
As Nietzsche claims, “It is in this way that the listener perceives the naturalness, viz., the
absolute appropriateness and uniformity, whereas with each deviation from the natural,
he perceives the artificiality and becomes distrustful about the matter presented”
(“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 113-14). Through the perception of the naturalness of
language, the appropriate form of the message given the situation appears as word meets
the act of meeting. We now glimpse the ancient connection Nietzsche follows in his
characterization of the imbricating relationship between rhetoric, values, and the ethical
perspectives they signify.
The listener will believe in the earnestness of the speaker and the truth of
the thing advocated only if the speaker and his language are adequately
suited to one another: he takes a lively interest in the speaker and believes
in him—that is, the speaker himself believes in the thing, and thus is
sincere. Therefore, ‘appropriateness’ aims at a moral effect, clarity (and
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purity) at an intellectual one: one will want to be understood, and one
wishes to be considered sincere. (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric”
114)
The results of different styles and their effects upon their audiences result from the
naturalness one’s language evokes. The convincing combination of moral and logical
appeals between saying and the act of meeting difference in the temporal moment
realized through the speech one employs to voice their interpretations to others. As
Nietzsche reveals “The real secret of the rhetorical art is now the prudent relation of both
aspects, of the sincere and the artistic” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 115).
This prudent relation indicates where neither is sufficient alone but one may achieve
persuasion only through the fitting combination given the rhetorical situation the speaker
inhabits. Therefore, a speaker constructs a fitting response by
playing at the boundary of the aesthetic and the moral: any one-sidedness destroys
the outcome. The aesthetic fascination must join the moral confidence; but they
should not cancel one another out: the admiratio [admiration] is a basic means of
the pithanon [persuasion]. (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 115)
The advised combination of ethos and logos drawn forth through pathos compels
multiple perspectives on beauty as it discloses available resources for persuasion through
meeting, answering drawn forth from listening. For just as the logical conveys a sense of
beauty, so does the naturalness of the appearance of truth convey the logical veracity of
moral reasoning as an available proof of persuasion.
Therefore, Nietzsche states that “Beauty is, indeed, the most noble and divine
thing there is; whatever lacks it is despised. Even virtue is praised only because it is the
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most beautiful of strivings” (Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language
147). Through recognition of the appropriate coupling of logic, beauty, and virtue does
“stylistic expression becomes a power for itself” (Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on
Rhetoric and Language 216). Style revealed as a power through the use of language as a
means to convey as well as employ available means of persuasion in meeting temporal
and existential situations and responding through discourse. For Nietzsche even traces
the origins of rhetoric back to dialogue (Nietzsche, KSA 1:545 qtd. in Behler 10).
Rhetoric emerges from the interplay of a dialogue with the audience and the meeting of
the temporal existential moment, saying driven by listening. As style now represents
power we see the culmination of Nietzsche’s appropriation and extension of Aristotle’s
notion of the dynamis of rhetoric. Rhetoric viewed as a power emerging not only through
the ability to observe in a situation all available means of persuasion, but also through the
construction and delivery of one’s message. A message one learns how to communicate
through a dialogic meeting of difference in the situation addressed through discourse.
Therefore Nietzsche’s more expansive conception of rhetoric’s dynamis than
Aristotle’s more contemplative notion leaves us with an initial summary of what a
communication ethic grounded in an architectonic rhetoric could look like from the
vantage of Nietzsche’s early writings on rhetoric. Nietzsche posits rhetoric as always
situated. Rhetoric originates as a called for response, it is inherently social in nature, in
the source of its style as well as its reception, and that the appeals of rhetoric as
articulated through language characterize the process of communication as a whole.
Language is rhetoric, all language seeks to persuade in response utilizing not the Truth
but available perspectives toward the true, as the limits of language illustrate. What of
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the true remains limited by the existential, temporal difference of a communicative
context, truth exists as it can be communicated. What can be conveyed via language is an
impulse, a situated perspective. The evaluation of rhetoric is always contingent, as words
and meanings change with the ebb and flow of the tides of culture and custom.
Difference and change not only determine what can be discovered but what can
be created within the natural world. A natural world marked by human perspectives
designated through discourse and language as forms of activity that shape the discovery,
critique, and creation of future perspectives. Perspectives shaped through language
providing contact points of thought, emotion, word, and deed in meeting difference.
Perspectives presented through discourse drawn from the power of rhetoric to
communicate word and deed in the moment of existential and temporal meeting.
Rhetoric then revalued by Nietzsche, building upon classical sources, as a dialogic
meeting of difference occurring at the interplay of self and other, intra- and interpersonal,
the perspectival textures of values and ethics disclosed through interplay of dialogue and
rhetoric.

Implications of Nietzsche’s Perspectivism
Explanation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism charts the coordinates that will guide
and frame the horizons of significance of the present study. Consideration of
communication, rhetoric, and ethics leads to how Nietzsche enacts these interrelated
areas through his metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of values.
Study of the enactment of these metaphors lead to the original contribution of the present
study, Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting. Dialogic meeting
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constructs a communication ethic that his rhetoric announces and advocates through his
saying of his ideas in dialogue with the said, the traditions that permeated his historical
moment and resonate throughout contemporary times after illusion amid metanarrative
disintegration.
Dialogic meeting therefore permeates Nietzsche’s three leading metaphors that
explain how he situates rhetoric at the intersection of dialogue, communication, and
ethics. It also sketches Nietzsche’s understanding of communication as dialogue of, with,
and amid difference saturated with pressures of contesting values and narratives seeking
to guide thought, speech, and act. Perspectivism provides the necessary theoretical
ground for the emergence of Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting.
Perspectivism presents the inseparable character of communication, rhetoric, and ethics
as they are understood “when see through the prism of life” (Nietzsche, The Birth of
Tragedy “An Attempt at Self-Criticism” 4). Situating perspectivism at the intersection of
communication, rhetoric, and ethics reveals Nietzsche’s dialogic, affective perspective
towards these imbricating penultimate areas of study as ways to achieve his goals of
enriching life through affirming life, meeting the manifold difference in which we are
entangled, the mud and mystery of everyday.
The perspective of perspectivism forms the focus of this chapter as it provides the
theoretical ground and background for the further unfolding of Nietzsche’s architectonic
rhetoric of dialogic meeting as enacted through his related metaphors of genealogy and
revaluation. In addition, perspectivism is most clearly presented through a genealogical
saying of its development through Nietzsche’s thought. A genealogical excavation of
Nietzsche’s textured metaphor of perspectivism begins with its implicit assumption of a
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rhetorical perspective through its most complete articulation embedded within the
textures of On the Genealogy of Morals as revaluation of modern Kantian objectivity and
the Platonic-Christian philosophical standpoint dominant during Nietzsche’s career. This
revaluation of values states the perspective from which operates Nietzsche’s
communication ethic and its architectonic rhetoric. A communication ethic realized
through the architectonic rhetoric of its saying of the said by following chapters on
genealogy and revaluation of values.
Perspectivism situates Nietzsche’s concretion of communication, ethics, and
rhetoric through enactment of a dialogic perspective toward difference. What the present
study renders as the architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting, Nietzsche’s
communication to confront the modern exigency of the death of God within the turmoil
of Statism, Progress, and Industrial Revolutions amid world war and political strife.
Articulation of how dialogic meeting emerges in Nietzsche’s works requires explanation
of how Nietzsche understands communication, rhetoric, and ethics as interrelated and
intersecting forces at play approached through the prism of life. Such a prism denotes
life characterized by perspectivism, the conditions of communication and consciousness.
Perspectivism provides theoretical ground and communicative space for
genealogy to meet the said of traditions through dialogue of the contemporary existential
and temporal moment of meeting. A meeting that implies a revaluation of values,
necessitated through saying of the said, the encountering of traditions, narratives,
between the past, present, and future, which the event of meeting enacts. Meeting that
begins with dialogue invites exploration of perspectives available in any given situation.
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Awareness of perspectives then leads to genealogical inquiry and judgment on future
action expressed through revaluation of values undertaken from the situated perspective
within the rhetorical conversation of humankind. Rhetorical conversation embedded
within a specific existential and temporal reality that calls forth communication as a way
to meet reality in dialogue, creating meanings from such encounters from which to live.
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Chapter Five: Nietzsche’s Genealogy as Rhetorical Deconstruction

Perspectivism is meeting in dialogue. Reality prescribes this fitting response
given the contingent, temporal nature of the human condition, one shaped by the dialogic
meeting of difference. Genealogy designates the materials of dialogic meeting, the
values that order interpretations resulting from meeting reality. Materials include the
traditions, narrative histories, language, values, and ethics that influence present and
future communication and action. Nietzsche designates values and ethics as the names at
the pinnacle of the hierarchy of ordering schemes that mask reality in human terms.
Genealogy seeks to interpret and narrate the said, the traditions that provide the sources
of language and possibilities for meaning otherwise. Genealogy encounters reality
through the architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting, the rhetorical realm of the
probable, in which life is lived rather than the universal logic of the philosophical, outside
time flesh wandering amid towers of ivory inconsequence.
Genealogy undertakes an exegesis of the past to discern the ground of traditions,
the perspectives of values and affects from which they spring to serve life. Nietzsche
employs genealogy to engender objectivity through communication between competing
perspectives. Genealogy enacts a saying of the said as dialogic meeting of history and its
transformation when resurrected in the temporal existential moment of dialogic meeting.

Introduction
To understand Nietzsche’s metaphor of genealogy is to understand what
Nietzsche interprets through genealogy: perspectives, values, and affects, power within
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human life. Genealogy undertakes a rhetorical inquiry into the communicative power of
affects in interpreting reality through the lens of the values and affects that influence
meeting of difference. For Nietzsche, the style of meeting difference indicates a will to
power—a will to creative life and affirmation or a diseased will to nothingness,
decadence, and resentment (On the Genealogy of Morals II: 12-25). Genealogy enacts an
exegesis that discloses its biases while simultaneously seeking to interpret and make
meaning of these competing perspectives after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration.
Seeking after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration to serve life in the
temporal existential moment genealogy enacts a perspectival meeting of morals and
values. Perspectivism, necessary limits, is embedded within Nietzsche’s genealogy of
morals. Therefore, the character of any genealogical inquiry is necessarily perspectival
as it works from the perspective of the probable, the rhetorical, not the universal,
philosophical standpoint. This shift announces the path of genealogy as clearing the
ground of the architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting. For as Ijessling states, rhetoric
serves as a foundation of Nietzsche’s thought.
Rhetoric has an extremely important role in Nietzsche’s analysis of the
structure of philosophy and the function of philosophical speech, in the
genealogical detection of the factors responsible for the factum of
philosophy and in the question of the precise nature of formulation and
interpretation. One can even say that the problem of rhetoric has been a
decisive influence on his thought and that much of his ‘philosophical’
terminology is derived from the classical rhetorical tradition. This also
applies to the so-called ‘will to power.’ (106)
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Genealogy interprets not to discover facts but to generate perspectives, alternative views,
from which to encourage dialogue with others on the question addressed. The response
influenced more by the moment in which the genealogical exegesis takes place than
against the shifting fortunes of eternity. Genealogy aims to provide tangible insights that
generate new perspectives and aid in decision-making, communication and action in the
temporal moment and the future dawning from these perspectives, speech, and deeds.
How can insights, perspectives gained through the exegetical practice of genealogy, serve
life, how may the knowledge generated serve life? These are Nietzsche’s questions that
drive his genealogical inquiries into the metanarratives shaping his historical moment and
to understand his practices, they must also become the ones used to guide subsequent
genealogies of Nietzsche’s own works.
Therefore, while perspectivism situates the novel hermeneutic entrance Nietzsche
opens upon discussion of the dominant rhetoric of everyday decision-making, values and
morals, genealogy enacts Nietzsche’s communication ethic of ethics. Genealogy,
functioning upon a perspectival approach to the rhetoric inherent in ethical claims and
reasoning, seeks to revalue such value-laden appeals through criticism of the values and
ethics these perspectives disclose upon meeting in dialogue. Genealogy therefore
functions at a tension between destruction and construction in its perspectival inquiries,
inquiries that acknowledge and do not deny their biases. Genealogy seeks to understand
the conditions under which particular values and ethics rise to the fore to guide human
action and prefigure human perspectives. For example, how does good become a known
designation and evil an easily identifiable quality and act to communities and within
narrative traditions?
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The perspectival framework of ethics as epideictic rhetoric of human thought,
speech, and activity becomes the subject of study for Nietzsche’s genealogy because no
other single subject has attained such power. Ethics determines what is real and not,
what is right and wrong, what the nature of the universe and the human person is and how
one should act in response to these truths as justification for advocacy of perspectives and
acts. Truths knowable only through the symbols and language of ethics and the names
ethics bestows upon ideas, events, and persons to explain and value of the past to shape
future perspectives and activity. This power attracts Nietzsche’s genealogical enterprise
as no other. For has this penultimate question sufficiently been addressed given this
power of ethics and moral reasoning? “What was at stake was the value of morality—”
(Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 5). Nietzsche employs genealogy as a
revaluation of ethics done from a perspectival standpoint because according to Nietzsche,
this path provides a more truthful, honest, and just approach to help guide human life
through the “chaos and labyrinth of existence” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 322).
Genealogy then affords a new way of understanding and enacting ethics as meeting
difference through a dialogic perspective framed by the pressures of the temporal
existential moment of meeting.
Genealogy then does not seek to destroy or deny ethics because for Nietzsche
ethics and values are seminal elements of the character of human thought and reasoning.
Rather, with genealogy, Nietzsche seeks to interpret ethics and the valuations it advocates
differently. By investigating dominant ethical perspectives and values within his
historical moment, Nietzsche employs genealogy as a path to interpreting otherwise the
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modern values and ethics that colored the life of his historical moment and continues to
influence contemporary questions of truth, value, and good and evil.
Pathos of distance allows greater understanding of the communities of
interpreters, genealogists, and others who collaboratively shape the perspectives available
from which to make sense of the traditions, the echoes and shadows history provides to
guide exegesis. History provides the language, values, and perspectives through which
and against which genealogy works. Therefore to understand genealogy as a saying of
history interpreted otherwise from convention, history must be revalued as a living
record. Genealogy then analyzes and recalls, and in its saying of the said from the
rhetorical perspective of affect and values resurrects history not as a said but as a saying
in the course of meeting present conversations to aid living now and in the future.

A Genealogy of Nietzschean Genealogy
Explication of Nietzsche’s metaphor of genealogy begins with a question: Why
might Nietzsche append the subtitle “A Polemic,” to his work, On the Genealogy of
Morals? The Oxford English Dictionary defines a polemic as “a controversial argument
or discussion; argumentation against some opinion, doctrine, etc.” Exegesis of this
significant subtitle opens discussion of Nietzsche’s metaphor of genealogy because it
reveals the rhetorical rather than philosophical nature of genealogy as critical moral
inquiry. Genealogy implies a perspectival understanding of knowledge and knowing as
always occurring within the situated historical, linguistic, political, moral, hermeneutical,
and rhetorical perspective of the genealogist.
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Therefore, emerging through the prejudices inherent in one’s perspective, one
interprets, evaluates, speaks, and acts. The acknowledgement of the perspectival nature
of knowing grounds Nietzsche’s metaphor of genealogy as polemic—as situated
rhetorical inquiry, not seeking Truth as a final said, an ideal situated outside temporality
and beyond human reason. Rather, genealogy engages in dialogic meeting of the
question of the origin of values as a hermeneutic entrance into the question of the value
of morality, of the value of the values our morals enact, situated firmly within the
countercurrents of the contingent nature of Nietzsche’s contemporary historical moment.
Nietzsche, through his metaphor of genealogy, seeks understanding and knowledge of the
significance of morality for human living. Genealogy therefore engages in a rhetorical
inquiry into the mud and mystery of how humans live their values and morals within the
irony and paradox of everyday life. Genealogy does not imply a modern perspective-less
mode of philosophical inquiry, undertaken amid the ideals and categorical imperatives of
a truth one infers from observation or flurries of theoretical flight outside temporality,
historicity, society, and contingency, outside of the human condition.
Otherwise than modern philosophical convention, Nietzsche further emphasizes
the rhetorical nature of the hermeneutics of genealogy in his preface, “ideas on the origin
of our moral prejudices” serves as the “subject of this polemic” (Nietzsche, On the
Genealogy of Morals, preface 2). The polemic nature of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of
Morals offers an interested, situated critical inquiry that seeks not solely the origin of
morality. Rather Nietzsche seeks greater understanding of the prejudices that condition
our understanding of its values, which we utilize to interpret the past as a background to
guide future thought, word, and deed, situated within and against the demands of the
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present. Paying greater attention to Nietzsche’s hermeneutical cues within his preface
reveals genealogy as a rhetorical rendering of morality as a paradigm for making
meaning within his modern age. To understand how Nietzsche undertakes this rhetorical
critical inquiry into the origin and nature of the value of morality for life, we begin by
rendering a genealogy of genealogy beginning with his preface to On the Genealogy of
Morals, Nietzsche’s guide to his evolving project.
Understanding this evolving project begins with the question of origin, not yet of
morality but of perspective concerning “where the beehives of our knowledge are,”
where “we men of knowledge find “our treasure” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of
Morals, preface 1). Yet Nietzsche immediately complicates the sense of knowledge
possible from the perspective of "men of knowledge” for “We are unknown to ourselves .
. . and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves—how would it happen that we
should ever find ourselves?” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 1).
Nietzsche alludes to this lack of self-knowledge as a problem of perspective. “Whatever
else there is in life, so-called ‘experiences’—which of us has sufficient earnestness for
them? Alternatively, sufficient time? Present experience has, I am afraid, always found
us ‘absent-minded’: we cannot give our hearts to it—not even our ears!” (Nietzsche, On
the Genealogy of Morals P: 1). Yet what sort of initial ‘knowledge’ could exist apart
from our empirical perception of our experiences? How could one attain ‘knowledge’
without first considering the organic source of one’s capacities for knowing?
The consequence of such absent-mindedness posits a “pure, will-less, painless,
timeless knowing subject” that “always demand we think of an eye that is completely
unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction . . . these always demand of the eye
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an absurdity and a nonsense” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). The
absurdity and nonsense that argues for a ‘knowledge’ separate from the physiological,
psychological, empirical, and social conditions from which it dawns ironically denies the
possibility of ‘knowledge’ it seeks to acquire. In this way, trapped within the monologic
meeting of reality in the said, the denial of difference, such ‘men of knowledge’ “count
the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our life, our being—and alas!
miscount them” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 1). Denial of the limits
of one’s knowledge as perspectival, interested, and situated eliminates the possibility of
“bringing something home” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 1). In this
way, such ‘knowledge’ becomes incommunicable. Hence nonexistent for such
chimerical treasures of our own making exist only within our closed, self-directed
monologues outside of time, reason, and communal reality.
In contrast to the preceding suprahistorical monologic perspective on knowing,
Nietzsche prescribes genealogy as a dialogic alternative attuned to the inherently social
dimensions of communicable knowledge. “We have no right to isolated acts of any kind:
we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths” (Nietzsche, On the
Genealogy of Morals, preface 2). Such self-imposed isolation through a monologic
meeting of difference wrenches knowledge from its roots and robs it of its connection to
life and to the background history of bodies of knowledge to which it is connected,
leaving it perspective-less and incommunicable, meaningless. One cannot discover the
atom without first relying upon the said of previous errors and discoveries, collected in
technical apparatus and writings of past investigations, why should one seek to self-deify
the fruits of one’s inquiries?
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Nietzsche proposes an alternative narrative structure of communicating
knowledge. He asserts that we always, with or without acknowledgement, speak from
the interests, soil, person, and background history that bring knowledge to light.
Rather do our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow
out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit—related and each
with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil, one
sun. (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 2)
Perspectives always situated as Nietzsche’s natural terminology states, our ideas and
intellect the yield of fruit we bear from our soil and sun, fruit that we as the tree bear
responsibility for coming forth from our will and health. We are called to answerability
for the ideas that we present under our name.
Thus Nietzsche also resituates and naturalizes human agency as a responsive
affair of answerability to the perceptions and creations of reality in which one resides and
out of which one speaks and writes their name into “the basic text of homo natura”
(Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 230). Agency resides in the person as meeting, as a
collection of forces, which enters the communicative fray and speaks and writes what
one’s perspective compels one to utter. In loosing the bonds of the situated character of
the human condition, such metaphysical illusion to heroes in the quest for knowledge as
self-rolled wheels of progress shatter when run upon the rocky, muddy ground of the
chaotic contingent nature of everyday life.
To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain
and overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far
been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of homo natura; to
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see to it that man henceforth stands before man as even today, hardened in
the discipline of science, he stands before the rest of nature, with intrepid
Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of old
metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, ‘you
are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin!’ (Nietzsche,
Beyond Good and Evil 230)
Nietzsche’s translating of the genealogist back within nature, the flesh out of which the
flights of the mind occur, lays a radical responsibility upon the subject. As he famously
remarks, “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a
fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of
Morals I: 13). Human identity, in other words, reflects a “seduction of language (and of
the fundamental errors of reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and
misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a ‘subject,’
can it appear otherwise” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals I: 13). We find
ourselves in our relations with reality, in our dialogic meeting of the everyday demands
of living; we author the path of our lives by walking and living each day as if we were
enacting this drama as a work of art, the highest form of human living, creation.
Therefore, the process of genealogy as a way of seeking knowledge revalues the
modern notions of objectivity, disinterest, and progress as bearer of Truth. In contrast,
Nietzsche offers a way that realizes its metaphorical ground situated within language as a
translation of perceived reality into symbols of its existence by an actor situated within
temporality, historicity, and the social circumstances of their language, affects, and body.
The limits upon one’s claims then exclude categorical imperatives and universal accuracy
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and applicability in favor of a more honest recounting of the limited nature of human
truth and knowledge. Bounded by the shapes of language within the storm and stress of
the unknown and unknowable past, present, and future, yet demanding the responsibility
of the tongue and hand which author what forces under and beyond their control compel
them to utter.
A genealogy of morals articulates the task and problem of morality as a
hermeneutical, ethical, and rhetorical question of value eternally recurring and
demanding response. Genealogy therefore turns on the moral domain of the promise, the
origin of responsibility as value that Nietzsche suspends within the dialogic tension of
forgetting and remembering. A genealogy of morals then meets the values inherent in the
act of making promises, meeting the significance and consequences emanating from this
origin of moral valuation. From Nietzsche’s perspective, the promise of genealogy
resides in the inquiry into the value of living one’s morals thus accomplishing the goal of
translating human back into nature. This translation then grounds the perspective of
morals, viewed as the human ordering of the chaos of existence, according to the
conditions of human living.
Nietzsche traces important consequences from this single simultaneous event of
giving and bearing responsibility for one’s actions through speech. The promise serves
as the foundation of relations, be it from economic trade, political treaty, or marriage
compact. A genealogy of morals originates from morality enacted through the promise.
Genealogy of the promise as communicative activity emergent between modes of
temporality, between persons, and through language directing action highlights the
significance of this origin of the prejudice of morals and foreshadows their penultimate
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concern, “So let us add the hardest question of all! What, when seen through the prism of
life, is the meaning of morality?” (Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, preface 4). For
Nietzsche, morality as perspectival answerability to the demands of the contemporaneous
historical, rhetorical, hermeneutic, and moral moment becomes the perennial question as
to what fruit the trees of our values bear.
Nietzsche centers the nature of this responsibility in one’s orientation to the past
as an inherently moral act—“To breed an animal with the right to make promises—is this
the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man? is it not the real problem
regarding man?” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals II: 1). It is this central task of
promising, be it of repayment of a debt, honest accounting of an event or idea, or as
surety on a bank note, balanced against the compulsion of forgetting, in which Nietzsche
orients his genealogy of morals. Genealogy appears then as a promise given Nietzsche’s
hermeneutical prejudices, as a grounding communication ethic of dialogic meeting for his
critical and rhetorical process of inquiry, inquiry realized through simultaneous
inseparable tasks of destruction and construction.
The project is to traverse with quite novel questions, and as though with
new eyes, the enormous, distant, and so well hidden land of morality—of
morality that has actually existed, actually been lived; and does this not
mean virtually to discover this land for the first time? (Nietzsche, On the
Genealogy of Morals, preface 7)
Note that Nietzsche characterizes this new land as one which the genealogist discovers,
not creates. Genealogy offers a grounded perspective from which to view the paradigm
of Nietzsche’s historical moment, and from which to center his self-proclaimed task of a
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revaluation of values. We engage the nature of morality and the values that ground its
adherence through Nietzsche’s promise of genealogy as a guiding architectonic rhetoric
and communication ethic of rhetorical criticism and inquiry.

The Nietzschean Union: Genealogy and Morals
Genealogy as reported above can be succinctly characterized as Nietzsche’s views
of history honestly conducted, history ordered not by a will to truth or a will to
knowledge but ordered by a will to power in service of and affirmation of creation and
thereby life. Nietzsche directs his genealogical inquiries towards morality, the study of
values that guide how life is lived and the penultimate power in shaping thought, word,
and deed as well as perspectives upon past, present, and future. Nietzsche utilizes
genealogy to discern what values and morals mark perspectives of growth or decline.
Once this genealogical description has been conducted and analyzed, meeting as many
perspectives and attendant values, what powers they serve, action can be taken resulting
from this awareness.
Judgment sanctioned through the play of forces to praise or blame then help
render the options available in meeting difference and exigencies within the temporal
existential moment at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric. This dialogue frames the
communicative activity of interpretation of the play of perspectives that seeks power
within any society or culture. Thus rhetoric shapes these perspectives to meet difference
in an epideictic play of available possibilities of values and morals to guide future
perspectives and the thoughts, words, and deeds they engender in the dialogic meeting of
difference.
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To understand this interplay of dialogue and rhetoric from the perspective of a
genealogy of morals requires a textured impression of Nietzsche’s perspectives on morals
and moralities as the foremost powers in shaping thought, word, and deed in ethics and
through the conducting of human affairs. Nietzsche then employs genealogy to discover
the values that ground, frame and promote particular moralities as a promise to do so
honestly and with justice, not to secure scientific accuracy regarding the origins of
morality. On the contrary, genealogy sought to explore Nietzsche’s “real concern [. . .]
What was at stake was the value of morality” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals
preface 5). The value of morality Nietzsche claims emerges through looking “in the
direction of an actual history of morality” (On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 7). What
this ‘actual history of morality’ would comprise Nietzsche characteristically never fully
defines. However, he alludes to its imposing significance in his preface crucial to
understanding the rhetorical union between genealogy and morality.
Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the
value of these values themselves must first be called in question—and for
that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in
which they grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality as
consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as
misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as remedy, as stimulant, as
restraint, as poison), a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or
even been desired. One has taken the value of these ‘values’ as given, as
factual, as beyond all question; one has hitherto never doubted or hesitated
in the slightest degree in supposing ‘the good man’ to be of greater value
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than ‘the evil man,’ of greater value in the sense of furthering the
advancement and prosperity of man in general (the future of man
included). But what if the reverse were true? What if a symptom of
regression were inherent in the ‘good,’ likewise a danger, a seduction, a
poison, a narcotic, through which the present was possibly living at the
expense of the future? Perhaps more comfortably, less dangerously, but
at the same time in a meaner style, more basely?—So that precisely
morality would be to blame if the higher power and splendor actually
possible to the type man was never in fact attained? So that precisely
morality was the danger of dangers? (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of
Morals, preface 6)
This quoted passage foreshadows Nietzsche’s textured perspective toward morality as a
perennial polemic on values. A genealogy of morals constitutes a perspectival retelling
of the history of morals, seeking to influence, while simultaneously enacting, a morality
of values through its speaking. In this way, we see morality as a danger due to its
persuasive power, morality as compulsion.
Genealogy and morality thereby become dangers when one acknowledges the
promise inherent in each, the ground of a rhetorical contest of meaning making. A
genealogy of morals then serves as the retelling of the polemic on values that the history
of morality relates and simultaneously enacts through its telling and retelling. Morality
orders these perspectives and makes them communicable, although it also dilutes them
through the socialization of one’s impulses through their communication within the
accepted systems of language. The consequence of one’s meeting of this difference, this
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recognition of the necessity of others and alterity for the construction of communicable
meaning determines one’s communicative and rhetorical possibilities for either
affirmation or denial of this foundation of the human condition. Genealogy of morality
serves as a promise concerning explication of this process. Genealogical inquiry explores
whether one affirms nobly this limited agency and subjectivity in the face of the
contingent contours of existential reality. Alternatively, working from the slavish
perspective, one seeks to impose one’s decadent denial through a nihilistic effacing of the
face of the other that confronts them in the intertwined construction and destruction of
meanings.
Morality emerges as a problem because for Nietzsche it signifies the ground upon
which perspectives that shape perspectives emerge. However, he quickly explains that
this relates not to mere semantic meaning but to social significance. For as Nietzsche
traces morality to its ground, he pursues the roots of its power. The power of morality
Nietzsche finds in what he designates as the morality of custom, the morality of the
masses, and the morality of mores. The morality of mores Nietzsche posits as “the truly
decisive history that determined the character of mankind” (On the Genealogy of Morals
III: 9). This model of morality turned to custom to verify its values and ethics to guide
action for as Nietzsche states, “the ‘sense of community’ masters us: please note this is
almost a definition of morality” (Will to Power 281). Yet, ‘almost’ still leaves room for
questioning and inquiry in testing the veracity of such traditions and socially sanctioned,
taken for granted values, for with this loophole Nietzsche urges an interpreting otherwise
in meeting the exigencies of the present.
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A dialogic meeting of tradition situated within the temporal existential moment
leads toward a morality of revaluation. Revaluation of morals authored through the
dialogic tension between the contrasting moralities of slave and noble, a moral
orientation not as much to material and social position as to how one orients oneself to
one’s perspectives of value and values. What matters and why to this community, to this
situation, given what can be known now?
However, Nietzsche did not seem to find this morality, a morality lived through
questioning, through living the values the morality expressed in meeting difference in the
“chaos and labyrinth of existence” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 322). Rather, Nietzsche
characterized the morality he met in Europe during his day as herd morality, morality
diagnosed as a problem, an inhibition to human achievement (Beyond Good and Evil
202). Herd morality characterized not by nobility of spirit but a much more plebian
spark, “here, too, fear is again the mother of morals” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
201). Fear of difference, fear of one’s neighbor prompts admonitions to love one’s
neighbor, not filial concern (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 201). Judging reality
through this lens leads to decadent morality for it “reproaches those who are different”
(Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man” 34). The decadence
then spreads outward from a personal disgust to articulation of disgust with life, a denial
of life, a refusal to live life, to avoid it in meeting through a monological silencing of
difference. Such a monological meeting of difference denies life and wills destruction
and cynicism, authoring self-fulfilling prophecies of failure and destruction.
A crucial insight within Nietzsche’s criticisms of modern morality from his
perspective is that meanings of morals and values that guide human living can only be
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known and questioned as interpretations. Morals and values do not designate eternal
facts as they designate the said of morality, the facts of meeting reality as recorded and
said from a situated perspective in time and situation. Nietzsche elaborates upon this
[A]n insight first formulated by me: that there are no moral facts whatever
[. . .] Morality is only an interpretation of certain phenomena, more
precisely a misinterpretation [. . .] But as semeiotics it remains of
incalculable value: it reveals, to the informed man at least, the most
precious realities of cultures and inner worlds, which did not know enough
to ‘understand’ themselves. Morality is merely sign-language, merely
symptomatology: one must already know what it is about to derive profit
from it. (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols “The Improvers of Mankind” 1)
Nietzsche objects to this curled tail of moral reasoning; the tail the snake consumes as
monologic self-confession—what does it mean, what I say it means, in other words. This
does not mean that meeting difference does not require naming. Rather it requires a
certain meeting of the requirements of naming as a sort of ‘legislating of values’ or as a
rhetoric and hermeneutic and communication ethic of the meeting of difference, of
dialogic meeting of the phenomenal reality that we live. Those who profit from such a
morality are those that use it as expression of their decadent will to power to rule others
through mastery at interpretation through the monolithic symbols of the one claim it will
express.
These dangers Nietzsche perceives emanating from the improvers of humankind’s
use of morality as a tool of social organization and fear-mongering prompt an associated
rise in another of the plagues of modern moral perspective, ressentiment (On the
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Genealogy of Morals I: 10). Ressentiment describes a disease of the affect or will that
corrupt one’s perspectives toward meeting difference within daily life, leading to a
nihilistic effacement of difference through a monologic avoidance of the alterity in
meeting. Ressentiment works to cripple one’s perspective so that “the sight of man now
makes us weary—what is nihilism today if it is not that? — We are weary of man”
(Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals I: 12). Nihilism bears weariness of others
leading to an ignorance of life in exchange for a comfort in self-absorption and forgetting
promises made, shutting out difference and the meeting life demands.
However, despite this danger within moralities of the modern age, Nietzsche
glimpses possibilities of hope and affirmation of life and creation. Creation arising in the
natural rhythms language employs in the saying of these perspectives in meeting reality
that envelops human life, the natural world.
I formulate a principle. All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy
morality, is dominated by an instinct of life — some commandment of life
is fulfilled through a certain canon of ‘shall’ and ‘shall not’, some
hindrance and hostile element on life’s road is thereby removed. Antinatural morality, that is virtually every morality that has hitherto been
taught, reverenced and preached, turns on the contrary precisely against
the instincts of life — it is a now secret, now loud and impudent
condemnation of these instincts. (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
“Morality as Anti-Nature” 4)
A genealogy of morality reveals a need for revaluation of modern values to their premodern bases in the classical world. The error of modern moralists revealed in their
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repeated decadent interpretations that make the different the same, turning this into that,
morality into one’s personal virtues. “Différence engendre haine:” states Nietzsche
regarding the “baseness of some people” (Beyond Good and Evil 263). Difference
engenders hatred, hatred bred from denials of difference as denials of life, signs of
decadence, yet these cling to all forms of morality according to Nietzsche. “In short,
moralities are also merely a sign language of the affects” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and
Evil 187). How can meeting be dialogic in inviting the responses of others in crafting its
own perspectives to make meaning of meeting temporal existential moments if its morals
are passing emotions? Nietzsche offers as an answer an example of genealogy as
revaluation of values of traditional modern morality as grounded in the logic and
conviction of eternal, universal Truth.
Rather, for Nietzsche truth is found in the dialogic meeting of difference
acknowledging the limitations imposed upon making meaning by the conditions of
communicative activity within the temporal moment. “I understand by ‘morality’ a
system of evaluations that partially coincides with the conditions of a creature’s life”
(The Will to Power 256). Affect emerges as a personal contribution that augments the
meanings of one’s existential situation. “Moral evaluation is an exegesis, a way of
interpreting [. . .] Who interprets? — Our affects” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 254).
Morality revalued through genealogy frees morality from the straightjacket of blind
repetition as said and returns it to the realm of dialogic meeting as a saying. Recognition
of the limits of morality as a way of communicating, of making meaning of meeting the
existential temporal moment, revalues morality as a natural emanation of the meeting of
affect and situation within the natural fabric of the human condition.
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The act of the promise offered within the textures of remembering and forgetting,
affords not only the possibility of forgiveness but also relates a metaphor of the eternally
recurring concretion of speech and act within the event of morality as a rhetoric and
hermeneutic of life. The promise encourages the meeting of difference as the prospect of
relations and the construction of community. What conditions meeting as a moral
undertaking Nietzsche situates within the affects as will and emotion foreground the
promise, a pathos of distance or a pathos of proximity to which genealogy leads and
returns. Nietzsche identifies the metaphor of pathos of distance as a skeleton key to
discerning the prejudices that nourish or pollute the soil from which springs morals and
values.

Nietzschean Shadows: Morality, Power, Distance and Dialogic Meeting
Morality as connected with communication articulates a social not an individual
need. The study of morals reveals a study of the values that narrate and hence order
meaning taken from experience, morality as the lens through which we interpret the
world and ourselves within it. As Kaufmann notes, Nietzsche functions as a “problemthinker” who views morality as phenomena, as knowledge, as problem, as perspective
towards phenomenal life, existential reality (Nietzsche 82). Nietzsche’s genealogy of
morals provides a polemical account, an evaluative interpretive accounting from an
embedded perspective. Nietzsche locates the ground of such an embedded perspective
within the affects, the seedbed from which values and ethics grow through meeting of
tradition, of said and the temporal existential moment. To understand the nature of this
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meeting and how it influences subsequent perspectives requires awareness of the role of
the affects in influencing how humans meet life through thought, word, and deed.
Nietzsche investigates the notion of pathos by uniting it with distance, implying
that space is required to interpret the passions that direct one’s communicative activity
and consciousness. Nietzsche’s idea of pathos of distance reveals the values and morals
that order and are enacted by one’s communication and rhetoric: How one meets
difference—answered through genealogical inquiry into one’s perspectivism toward
difference, one’s pathos of distance.
The pathos of distance emerges as an important metaphor across several texts (On
the Genealogy of Morals I: 2, III: 14; Beyond Good and Evil 257; Twilight of the Idols,
“Expeditions of an Untimely Man” 37) as Nietzsche’s characterization of difference
between the noble and the servile, referring both to differences in social economic status
and values. Nietzsche situates this integral metaphor, the pathos of distance, as
communicative space that allows for a more honest accounting and interpretation.
Nietzsche also suggests that the difference in values may be employed in meeting as
distinguishing a ‘higher nature’ (On the Genealogy of Morals I: 16). The development of
distance as a pathos or perspective toward meeting difference adds texture to a mistaken
characterization of binary opposition (Smith, On the Genealogy of Morals, explanatory
notes 139-40). This texturing of the pathos of distance that grounds perspective in
meeting difference also speaks to the inherently dialogic nature of Nietzsche’s
perspective on pathos and his own idea of pathos of distance.
Distance provides a way to discern unfulfilled promises in which Nietzsche
begins to suggest the necessity of disembedding one from illusions. To do this, Nietzsche
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urges acknowledgement of one’s embeddedness in an era where prejudice, bias,
multiplicity of ground carry forth the power no longer able to turn to the assurance of
metanarrative promise. Without the assurance of a metanarrative promise, life is
immoral. What permits morality to make a return visit is acknowledgement, not promise.
Passions and emotions captivate our attention as a response, a condition resultant
from interaction with other forces. In this way, pathos of distance communicates the
necessity of space for discernment, physical, intellectual, and social. Distance also
implies the inherent difference present in discernment between competing forces that vie
for attention and call for response. Viewed from this perspective, it follows that
Nietzsche would proclaim “In short, moralities are also merely a sign language of the
affects” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 187). A logical progression from this insight
would be to further investigate the ethics of this association, which he proceeds to do as
he enacts his genealogical inquiries. He concludes that “Différence engendre haine:”
states Nietzsche regarding the “baseness of some people” (Beyond Good and Evil 263).
Difference engenders hatred. Nietzsche traces decadence in values and morals to one’s
perspective towards meeting difference, as problem or opportunity.
Further illustrative of this point are Nietzsche’s comments regarding the ethical
situation guiding his practice of genealogy of morals and the values they enact in meeting
the existential temporal moment. Morality as an affect driven interpretation of reality
occurs within Nietzsche’s textured interpretation of life as will to power (Beyond Good
and Evil 259). Explicating the textured nature of the relationship between affect and will,
Nietzsche provides another layering of the notion of meeting, the interrelated nature of
affect and will. Nietzsche states that “the will is not only a complex of sensation and
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thinking, but it is above all an affect, and specifically the affect of command” (Beyond
Good and Evil 19). This connection between affect and will reveals their nature when
viewed from a communication perspective. Affect influences perception, interpretation,
and communication as reception and action. Affect works as a multi-layered and multidirectional force on the meanings that emerge from dialogic meeting of difference due to
the conception of the will in relation to power as a natural component of life as will to
power.
Pathos of distance then plays an important role in ordering life, as affecting will to
power in ways it manages difference as a background and foreground issue when meeting
difference. Interestingly, given this seemingly subjective accounting of this crucial
relationship, Nietzsche situates its governance within the realm of the social. As he states
regarding the limiting of the will to power as a manifestation within human life, he states
that “the ‘sense of community’ [that] masters us: please note that this is almost a
definition of morality” (The Will to Power 281). Affect and will to power are shaped and
directed by the pathos of perspective toward dialogic meeting of difference within the
existential temporal moment. The meeting orders the meanings to emerge and the
directions to take not thought, word, and deed resulting from agency, for agency itself
can be manifest only through the relations that enable its emergence.
Hence, meanings and perspectives attain power through their perceived
appearance as the union between perception and reality and communicated through the
union of word and deed. A union from which we derive the notions of self, identity, and
I, in terms of how it is reflected in the eyes of the Thou, or Other. “Always presupposing
that there are ears—that there are those capable and worthy of the same pathos, that there
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is no lack of those to whom one may communicate oneself” (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo
“Why I Write Such Good Books” 4). Nietzsche designates dialogue as good style, as
enacting the pathos of good style, dialogue as the ground of a rhetoric that can
communicate itself, in communication lies possibilities of persuasion. Dialogue then
fosters naming through meeting, negotiating of the distance of affect and will to dialogue
as a component of genealogy.
Dialogic meeting then employs naming not as a sparring of neologisms but
naming as the granting of value, valuing methods, perspectives and prejudices,
communicative acts, deeds. Valuing implies or compels one to adopt a dialogic
orientation to the imbricating rhetoricity of description and prescription. As the strands
of a rope or the roots of the plant, values emanate above and below ground from these
roots embedded in the soil of existential, phenomenal reality.
Leiter points towards the nature of the dialogic meeting of genealogy as he states
important limits to recognize in explicating Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiries.
[B]oth slave and master moralities are examples of morality: they are
both evaluative practices, concerned not with things or texts or foods, but
with human beings, both the actor himself and his fellow humans. This
allows conceptual space in which ‘moralities’ can still differ dramatically
as to their value or purpose. (Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality 172)
Related to sophistic insights into the influential power of cultural context on shaping
values and moralities, Nietzsche acknowledges their diachronic nature. Such recognition
of limits of moral meanings and values offers health for one but destruction for another if
haphazardly prescribed, ignorant of the forces shaping the context of the situation.
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Nietzsche’s perspective towards a genealogy of morality is realized through the
promise of meeting, of memory and forgetting, truth—not forgetting origin as
interpretation. Genealogy embeds morals and values born of interpretations of
phenomenal reality through the metaphor of language, not found within nature
objectively outside the bounds of time and change.
Such change, Nietzsche posits, occurs dramatically through his stated perspective
towards morality as the rhetorical activity of naming (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 58).
What we call things becomes more important than what they are, for that knowing of
what they are is always at the mercy of the moment of their meeting, what is already
known, the said, and what from the said conditions its saying. Therefore, the task of
translating man back into nature as an unsaying of the said is a genealogical retranslating
of a present perspective on the past back into conversation with previous accounts. The
contemporary moment demands that one engages the unsaying of the said through a new
situating of the saying of the said in meeting questions through dialogue.
Genealogy works at this translating back as unsaying of the said, accomplishing
the freeing of the said from its monologic straitjacket of the subjectivity of the speaker
and positing said as said, as soil from which this saying as dialogic meeting now comes
forth. Walk and work again begun on this soil, this past said, allows for new growth, for
the saying of this said as an unsaying, as a planting in a new season uproots and effaces
the traces of the growth of the previous season, an uprooting compelled not by the self
but by one’s meeting of the difference that pulses at the heart of the human condition, at
the core of language, and at the becoming of our being as realized through events situated
within the phenomenal world within and without our mind, spirit, and flesh.
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Implications
The “long story of how responsibility originated” presupposes the “tremendous
labor of that which I have called ‘morality of mores’” for “with the aid of the morality of
mores and the social straitjacket, man was actually made calculable” (Nietzsche, On the
Genealogy of Morals II: 2). This rendering of morality enacts and illustrates genealogy as
unmasking of the rhetorical foundations of history as forgetting and remembering of the
past, a past one in essence chooses to will. The territory of the past then becomes a
promise, a responsibility the human person lays at their feet in undertaking any act of
promising, or willing a version of the past into the future by relating it within the present.
Morality reveals the values that congeal within the paradigms of morality, the
stories that order these values into hierarchies that guide thought, word, and deed. The
prejudices one brings into or communicates reveals their values and morals, the
organizing interpretive frame one applies to guide their understanding of how they meet
reality or at least, their interpretation of reality as received through their senses.
These insights into the ground of morals and values subsequently call for
revaluation as a necessary component of the unsaying of the said through the dialogic
meeting of difference in the existential temporal moment. Traditions and histories are
shaped through their telling as the oral stories of Homer trickle down through thousands
of ears and mouths and centuries. Change as difference blooms with the activity of
meeting as meeting changes the conditions of the available interpretations of traditions
and histories met, let alone the affective influences on meanings created through this
dialogic encounter. Revaluation of values results as a natural progression from
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Nietzsche’s perspectival orientation towards communication at the interplay of dialogue
and rhetoric engaging and enacting the recurring questions of ethics and values after
illusion amid metanarrative disintegration.
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Chapter Six: Nietzsche’s Epideictic Revaluation of Values

Revaluation of values is epideictic rhetoric of values at the interplay of dialogue
and rhetoric. At this interplay, revaluation articulates acknowledgement of the embedded
nature of discourse within competing perspectives on ethics in an era after illusion amid
metanarrative disintegration. This situation privileges multiplicity and difference as
perspectives towards values and ethics. Nietzsche’s metaphor of revaluation of values
employs dialogue as an ethic to guide rhetorical deconstruction and architectonic
construction of perspectival values and ethics meeting difference within the exigency of
the existential temporal moment. Epideictic revaluation of values praises and blames,
says yes and no to competing perspectives within a framework of acknowledgement. The
limits of this perspectival standpoint informed through genealogical inquiry at the
interplay of dialogue and rhetoric calls forth a dialogic ethic of meeting multiplicity and
difference in ethical discourse seeking to guide word and deed after metanarrative
disintegration.
Perspectivism entails the perceptual beginnings of rhetoric as the communicative
ordering of our cognitive receptions of the stimuli that form our perceptions of reality.
Genealogy further engages these communicative orderings by inquiring into their values.
Inquiries question the operative perspective of a physiological, psychological, and social
standpoint embedded within contingent human temporality. Revaluation creates an
ordering of values out of an epideictic rendering of the values and morals that appear to
direct thought, word, and deed within the historical moment of saying. Rhetoric emerges
from invention as a context that calls forth-continual interpretation from an inherently
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organic dialogic ground. The act of interpretation, of naming and as such conveying
value upon objects through our interpretations, enacts epideictic rhetoric of values.
Values become the topoi with which rhetoric constructs the architecture of reason, of
past, present, future judgment. Revaluation of values enacts an architectonic rhetoric of
dialogic meeting, rhetoric that answers the existential reality that compels its
responsibility, the promise of its being as the event of answerability, of a response.

Introduction
The revaluation of values is the metaphor whose activity most explicitly
demonstrates a concern with rhetoric of values. Nietzsche utilizes epideictic rhetoric,
drawn from the character of a speaker, following Aristotle’s understanding of ethos,
ethics derived from character, to highlight the rhetorical nature of the struggle between
competing moralities.
Revaluation emerges then from a dialogic perspective on the genealogy of morals
that it has undertaken to question and study. Revaluation serves as a component of
perspectivism, which one must not deny because it is uncomfortable. The
acknowledgement of the affective, unprovable, rhetorical foundations of truths is a
requirement of intellectual honesty and rigor, one to be embraced as providing additional
objectivity regarding the situated, contingent nature of truth in a given context.
For Nietzsche implies the necessity of a dialogue on revaluation as he states of
perspectivism: “because we seek knowledge, let us not be ungrateful to such resolute
reversals of accustomed perspectives and valuations with which the spirit has [. . .] raged
against itself for so long” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). This acceptance of
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reversals discloses one’s pathos of distance, one’s perspective towards revaluation of
values, a revaluation of reasons, when warranted, even as a theoretical means of opening
new vistas of investigation. Revaluation from such a perspectival bias allows one “to see
differently [. . .] to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of the
intellect for its future ‘objectivity’” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). The
articulation of this perspective of revaluation allows for an unrestrained striving for the
truth of a given question, founded upon the theoretical base of perspectivism.
[T]he latter understood not as "contemplation without interest” (which is a
nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to control one’s Pro and Con and
to dispose of them” illustrating and proving that "one knows how to
employ a variety of perspective and affective interpretations in the service
of knowledge. (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12)
Hence appears an opening for a more expansive view of argumentation as
acknowledgement. Acknowledgement of the biases of embedded perspectives seeking to
persuade while simultaneously engaging in the dialogic struggle for power through
revaluation.
Nietzsche, through the dialogic perspectival investigations of genealogy, clears
the ground for epideictic rhetoric of revaluation. This epideictic rhetoric of morals
accepts the inherent rhetoric of interpretation, perspectives generated through
genealogical inquiry as dialogic meeting. Revaluation acknowledges the necessity of
utilizing more than merely the dialectic sparring of pro and con. Rather, such rhetoric
would seek to engage in a dialogue with a multiplicity of voices. Thereby in the enduring
struggle to be heard, dialogue acknowledges and is guided by the acceptance of the
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necessity of multiplicity to grasp the unity of a decision to further knowledge, speech,
and action in the service of life.
The objectivity gleaned through a genealogy guided by perspectivism grounded in
dialogic meeting allows for the eternally recurring contest of competing values to
struggle for adherence within revaluation conducted in an era after illusion. Revaluation
becomes rhetoric in service of a dialogic ethic as it seeks to utilize its objectivity as a
means of persuasion. Revaluation seeks to praise and blame to accomplish the
persuasion of its hearers, as an esoteric or exoteric undertaking of the rhetor.
Revaluation remains tied to perspectivism in that it seeks not to refute standpoints via
traditional logical argumentation. Revaluation rather engages competing wills to power
in dialogic meeting of alterity affirming and opposing views. Therefore, revaluation
explores a greater quantity of views to approach the truths that characterize the situation
or question under analysis, enhancing the Nietzschean objectivity of these perspectives.
Revaluation illustrates not the completed task but the ongoing questioning of
presuppositions of accepted, embedded traditional viewpoints, acknowledgement of the
“fact that man is the as yet undetermined animal” (Beyond Good and Evil 62) as are the
questions regarding the values and morals that guide human word and deed. Revaluation
embodies a controlled will to truth, one that does not cede questioning. One that
questions with awareness as to what social impact revelation of some questions may have
for people unaccustomed to such an honest embrace of truth’s significance as ugliness
and beauty. For example, revaluation may be said to seek to provide greater objectivity
and thereby greater clarity as to the nature of truth and lie through a genealogical moral
inquiry into the origin of these concepts and their influence on our present values and
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ethics. Through its saying of the ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ our situated existence demands of the
said as background to the foreground of saying as dialogic meeting; we advance dialogic
meeting as the recurring contest of the revaluation of the values in which we dwell.
Revaluation then operates within the duality of construction. Revaluation as a
constructive rhetorical hermeneutic arising out of the necessity of destruction as
demanded by the perspectival human condition in which we are called to meet difference
in dialogue. Revaluation is grounded in dialogic meeting allowing for answerability of
the other as a no and/or yes to the recurring epideictic contests of the values in which we
dwell and out of which we think, feel, speak, and act.
To understand Nietzsche’s metaphor of revaluation of values, explication of its
language and form, its epideictic character, is necessary. The epideictic rhetoric of
revaluation influences Nietzsche’s perspective as it orders the arguments it makes in
destroying and building perspectives from which to speak and act and linking the activity
of revaluation with the dialogic ethic that directs its rhetorical activity.

A Genealogy of Epideictic Rhetoric
The rhetoric of revaluation adopts an epideictic character due to the nature of
Nietzsche’s task. Epideictic rhetoric sets out to meet this task as a discourse of
acknowledgement of values that emerge from dialogic meeting of ethos and pathos
according to the logos of one’s perspective toward the reality that demands a response.
As the variety of rhetoric Aristotle and others most closely associate with the task of
ordering perspectives via appeal to passions, and arguing for values and affirmation of
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morals as ordering of values, epideictic rhetoric affords a way to constructive
engagement.
The adjective epideictic comes from the Greek verb epideiknumi, which
seems to have a nontechnical sense of ‘to reveal’ or ‘to tell,’ [. . .] and
performance are original and central to the aim of the genre of epideictic
discourse. Following Aristotle, Greek and Roman authors state that
epideictic rhetoric involves praise (Gk. epainos) or blame (Gk. psogos)
(Rhetoric 1358b12-13, 27-28; Herennium 1.2.2, 3.6.10; Cicero De
inventione 1.5.7; Laudandi et vituperandi officium, Quintilian Institutio
oratoria 3.4.3). (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 251)
In this way, epideictic rhetoric weaves ethos into the nature of its appeals and reasons for
speaking as a necessary common place of discourse directed to create perspectives and
persuade audiences through disclosure and celebration of shared values. “The orator
praises or censures actions, individuals, speeches, and qualities, drawing attention to
external circumstances, physical attributes, and character and attributing characteristics
that are not present” (Alexandrum 1425b38 and Herennium 3.6.10 as qtd. in Too,
“Epideictic Genre” 251). In this way, epideictic rhetoric foreshadows dialogic meeting as
it discloses its biases in constructing perspectives from which to order through the tension
of praise and blame interpretation and future action.
Epideictic rhetoric exemplifies rhetoric as a language of revaluation—of old to
new, of noble and good to slavish and bad and evil, of different to same (Isocrates 4.8;
Plato Phaedrus 267a; Pseudo-Plutarch Life of the Ten Orators 838f as qtd. in Too,
“Epideictic Genre” 251). Stylized language as dramatic tropes employed to encourage
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and emphasize the praiseworthy and to chastise the reprehensible (Alexandrum 1425b3940, 1426b13-22). The setting of such rhetorical disclosures occurred in a variety of
settings in the classical world and spoke across temporal planes.
The third genre, epideictic (sometimes called ‘demonstrative’), however,
was without a distinct or fixed setting; it mostly concerned the present, but
might also invoke the past and the future (Rhetoric 1358b18-20); and this
in turn left its audience less clearly defined. Aristotle refers to the
recipient of this speech simply as ‘spectator’ (theōros; Rhetoric 1358b6) .
. . (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 251)
These theoretical insights gave way to the emerging psychological understanding of
discourse as a social power and as a tool for social edification and education in values
and embraced moral perspectives.
Aristotle advances important notions of the epideictic approach to rhetoric
foreshadowing a move toward recognition of the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric in the
activity of persuasion. Aristotle states that “the audience member must be involved in the
speech such that he thinks he himself, or his family, or actions, or some other aspect of
his life, is being praised [. . .] (Rhetoric 1451b28-32)” (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 252).
This notion of meeting Plato emphasizes as well although for the related purpose of
education through praise and blame (Republic 492b-c; Protagoras 326a; 822d-3a; 829ce; Gorgias 483b-c). Such educational considerations emerge for Aristotle and others as
well in consideration of ethical questions at the core of any discourse designed to order
perspectives and direct action through habituation of the values the discourse sanctions.
Aristotle acknowledges a distinct ethical dimension of praise and blame
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when he declares that the aim of the genre is to praise what is good (to
kalon) and to blame what is base (to aischron) (Rhetoric 1358b28);
however, Quintilian declares that both the philosopher and Thoephrastus
(c.372-287 BCE) removed it entirely from the realm of public and political
life (3.7.1). Cicero reinforces the ethical program of epideictic speech,
observing that it encourages men to virtue and draws them back from vice
(De oratore 2.9.35), while elsewhere he observes that there can be no
form of rhetoric that is more useful for city-states than one in which the
orator is engaged in the recognition of virtues and vices, that is epideictic
(De partitione oratoria 20.69; also 21.70). While affirming that the
pleasure of the audience is the goal of epideictic discourse, Quintilian still
attests to its usefulness when he affirms that panegyric, an example of the
speech of praise and blame treats what is useful for Greece (3.4.14). (Too,
“Epideictic Genre” 255)
Too notes that after the collapse of Athens as an intellectual and cultural center ironically
epideictic rhetoric flourished. He even claims that
epideictic became the prominent form of oratory to the extent that it was imposed
upon all other forms of discourse—poetry, history, and even philosophy—from
the Hellenistic period onward, which sustained a highly rhetorical culture. (Too,
“Epideictic Genre” 255)
The continued development of epideictic rhetoric across genres and situations speaks to
its architectonic qualities. As a genre of rhetoric, epideictic due to its boundless setting
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and basic structure of praise or blame, its adaptability and multitude of purposes make it
attractive as a means of discourse to direct perspective and activity.
The continued expansion of epideictic rhetoric leads to the perception that “in the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, epideictic rhetoric came to eclipse the other two
genres: all literature came to be subsumed under the category of praise and blame”
(Vickers 54 cited in Too, “Epideictic Genre” 256). With the advances in education and
literacy through the Renaissance, epideictic discourse became interwoven throughout
emerging writings of a growing literary perspective. Even in the controlled prose and
official documents dedicated to theological instruction and church doctrine, “sermons
sought to persuade their audiences to assume moral behavior through praise of virtue and
censure of immoral activities [. . .] in drama [. . .] in poetry” (Too, “Epideictic Genre”
256). Given its adaptability to situations and multiple purposes, the Renaissance also
realized a re-emergence of the “sophistic mode of paradoxical encomium made a notable
resurgence with a work such as Desiderius Erasmus’s The Praise of Folly (1511), in
which Folly offers praise of herself” (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 256). Through his
textured understanding of style, the way one communicates exerts great force upon
interpretations of one’s meaning. Nietzsche emphasizes his concern for the metonymical
relationship that adheres between form and content in his repeated appeals to pay greater
attention to the affects, rhythm, and gestures that accompany discourse as hermeneutic
cues of its interpretation in dialogic meeting of the situation in which it is said.
Epideictic and The New Rhetoric: Values, Education, and Revaluation
Meeting the situation between saying and said becomes a task addressed most
fully through a dialogic perspective towards difference and multiplicity that invites
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response in order to engage the eternally recurring rhetorical conversation of human
history. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca extend the metaphor of dialogue in relation to
epideictic rhetoric within their elaboration of the tenets of a new rhetoric. The authors
state that
Dialogue, as we consider it, is not supposed to be a debate, in which the
partisans of opposed settled convictions defend their respective views, but
rather a discussion, in which the interlocutors search honestly and without
bias for the best solution to a controversial problem. (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca 37)
Such an orientation suggests that dialogue enacts a “heuristic viewpoint, as against the
eristic one [. . .] that discussion is the ideal instrument for reaching objectively valid
conclusions” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 37). What Nietzsche undertakes is a
species of revalued epideictic rhetoric as a path to change and discovery through his
revaluation of the decadent values he encountered guiding perspective, speech, and
activity in his modern historical moment.
Other connections emerge between characterizations of epideictic rhetoric from
classical theory to the new rhetoric the authors elaborate. According to Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, to the Roman “theoreticians, [epideictic] was a degenerate kind of
eloquence with no other aim than to please and to enhance, by embellishing them, facts
that were certain or, at least, uncontested” (48). Such appraisals from the Second
Sophistic help to characterize the general causes for the decline in epideictic rhetoric and
its use as a commonplace to slander rhetoric as mere cookery and cosmetic conjuring
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 48). Despite the excesses of blind application of
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technique and memorization of worn, flowery orations poorly suited to the audiences
before them during the decline of the Roman Empire, the authors advance a more
positive view, as occurred in the Renaissance. “Our own view, is that epideictic oratory
forms a central part of the art of persuasion, and the lack of understanding shown toward
it results from a false conception of the effects of argumentation” (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca 49). This perspective points toward the existential elements within
Nietzsche’s rhetoric; he seeks not passive agreement but active, full engagement.
Nietzsche demands his readers meet him fully within the nets of language, each
struggling to discern the meaning of their experiences by meeting difference in dialogue.
Such dialogic meeting compels the concretion of thought and action as communicative
activity, demands a reunion of word and deed as arbiter of value among contending
perspectives.
Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca continue to explain their point through use of
Demosthenes as an example, one that relates to discussion of Nietzsche’s rhetoric for as
Merrow notes, Demosthenes serves as a model of ancient eloquence for Nietzsche, even
in his last book the Greek orator garners his praise (Merrow 285).
Demosthenes, considered to be one of the models of classical eloquence,
spent most of his efforts not just in getting the Athenians to make
decisions in conformity with his wishes, but in urging them, by every
means at his command, to carry out decisions once they were made. He
wanted the Athenians to wage against Philip, not just ‘a war of decrees
and letters, but a war of action.’ (49)
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Discourse serves activity and communication as interpretation and rhetoric struggle to
guide decision-making. According to Nietzsche, “Thoughts are actions” (Writings from
the Late Notebooks 55). Therefore, the perspectives one accepts divulge their origin in
cognition as communication, the physiological valuation that leads to the rhetoric of the
senses. However, implicit within this multi-directional progression lay the values and
morals that guide the rhetoric of word and deed as the reality of the metonymical
relationship between ethics and rhetoric.
However, this does not mean to suggest a narrow view of rhetoric as the Progress
of discourse. Rather, “The taking of a decision stands halfway, so to speak, between a
disposition to take action and the action itself, between pure speculation and effective
action” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 49). The authors continued discussion of the
epideictic genre provides a synecdoche to characterize the main metaphors that reveal
Nietzsche’s rhetoric, intensity of adherence as the power, the dynamis of rhetoric as
architectonic.
Such a constructive approach leads to how Nietzsche undertakes rhetoric as
epideictic revaluation otherwise than convention. First, greater discussion of the
conventional descriptions of epideictic need to be pursued to illustrate Nietzsche’s
interpreting and enacting epideictic rhetoric otherwise than rhetorical convention.
“Epideictic speeches are most prone to appeal to a universal order, to a nature, or a god
that would vouch for the unquestioned, and supposedly unquestionable, values. In
epideictic oratory, the speaker turns educator” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 51). The
epideictic rhetoric Nietzsche advances constructs an architectonic rhetoric of values built
from dialogic meeting of difference in the temporal existential moment. Such rhetoric
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develops perspectives from which to meet competing values and morals in conversations
shaping ideas and action within the reality of human activity.
However, Nietzsche as educator turns education otherwise than convention
through his epideictic revaluation of values that serve as the ground of education.
Equally important to remember is Nietzsche’s unique understanding of his audience. In
this way Nietzsche’s criticisms are less directed at those criticized as they are epideictic
appeals to the esoteric “good Europeans” that comprise his audience, those for whom his
words reinforce shared values and perspectives (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 357).
Nietzsche’s rhetoric becomes education, education as revaluation, education to interpret
otherwise than convention, education as affirmation of life, all life, and education in the
service of life.
Educational discourse, like the epideictic one, is not designed to promote
the speaker, but for the creation of a certain disposition in those who hear
it. Unlike deliberative and legal speeches, which aim at obtaining a
decision to act, the educational and epideictic speeches create a mere
disposition toward action, which makes them comparable to philosophical
thought. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 54)
The speaker’s ethos emerges through the paths taken via discourse to meet the situation
and audiences that call forth the response. This perspective levels the competing power
of agency by emphasizing the insight that power and agency emerge through meeting,
through the relations that enable dialogue and rhetoric to interact in giving meaning to the
moment. “Epideictic discourse, as well as all education, is less directed toward changing
beliefs than to strengthening the adherence to what is already accepted” (Perelman and
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Olbrechts-Tyteca 54). Epideictic rhetoric, through the construction of perspectives,
strengthens the perspectival approach to dialogic meeting of the difference encountered
in the temporal existential moment. It is the moment of meeting that authors the event of
discourse, a power the speaker is called upon not to forget or risk in advancing only
‘mere rhetoric’ rather than helping to construct perspectives for meaning and responsible
response.
Nietzsche’s rhetoric seeks to advance adherence to values that undergird his
ethics, not to argue for questions of truth or lie. For Nietzsche, what needs further study
are the values of these values underneath questions of truth or lie, why does such a
distinction appear as paramount when making decisions? For Nietzsche, rhetoric grows
out of the garden of values that drive communication. Communication orders cognition.
Cognition values, chooses and selects what is of import to note and what can be ignored
and forgotten, this physiological ordering informs our consciousness and our rhetoric, the
communication of values we accept and urge upon others through our words and actions.
Rhetoric works not to solve but to answer, not to proclaim but to question, not to
express but to respond. Rhetoric describes discourse that attains power through its ability
to order human life and activity through the values for which it garners adherence.
Nietzsche views rhetoric following Aristotle, as conveying a dynamis, a power inherent
within language to reveal paths to persuasion. The stones with which we lay this path and
upon which we walk this path mark the values that guide our valuation and ordering of
values with which we make our way.

Nietzsche’s Revaluation of Values
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Nietzsche’s task of revaluation of values seeks to author the translation of the
human back into nature with acknowledgement of situatedness of human person as
meeting of multiplicity and difference in dialogue after illusion amid metanarrative
disintegration. The perspectival nature of reality demands genealogical investigation of
values and morals competing in the void created by unmasking of the illusion of
metanarrative explanations of reality and justifications for action. Following this
deconstruction of the illusions of past metanarratives through genealogy, Nietzsche seeks
a return to the future through the past. As a means of embedding humans within the
temporal and existential moment he engages in dialogic meeting of difference within the
historical moment. The dialogic nature of this embedding activity engages epideictic
rhetoric as a call for response and mutual engagement. Epideictic rhetoric constructs
values revalued through their saying in the activity of meeting difference and multiplicity
of perspectives in dialogue. To understand the task of revaluation this work turns to the
perspective Nietzsche adopts in enacting a perspectival revaluation of values guided by
genealogical insights of meeting difference in the saying of the said of values that
influence human communication and activity.
Values are explainable through their rhetoric, their ability to create meaning and
persuade of the veracity of their meanings in the social struggle for meaning and value.
In other words, “Power might thus be construed as the standard and measure of values”
(Kaufmann, Nietzsche 196). Values serve as motives and evaluations inextricably linked
in a grammar and vocabulary of human explanations of life and reason. Perspectives are
grounded in the reasons for their calling forth, for their discovery prompted by the
estimation of their value in constructively meeting the situation. Perspectives emerge
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from the play of forces of competing to direct attention, word, and action. Genealogy
undertakes to explain these perspectives in terms of their values, to draw back the mask
of their rationalizations and perceive who is their advocate. Genealogy of perspectives
undertakes to discern value, to debate and in so doing, destroy and construct values in
response to meeting perspectives in question in dialogue amid the competing interests of
other perspectives seeking power in the temporal existential moment of decision.
The conversation then becomes a play between competing values: Explication of
these values, the perspectives they support and explain, the necessity of choice and
action, which these values urge:
Let at least this much be admitted: there would be no life at all if not on
the basis of perspective estimates and appearances . . . Indeed, what forces
us at all to suppose that there is an essential opposition of ‘true’ and
‘false’? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it
were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance—different
‘values,’ to use the language of painters? (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and
Evil 34)
Values then perceived as the ground of perspectives and hence the ground of action
functions as the topic of critique implicitly and explicitly. The response articulates values
as a response in itself silently bestows value upon process, persons involved and
conclusions reached. In the end, the ground of rhetoric becomes valuation and
revaluation. Dialogic meeting of the exigency seeking to shape the genealogical
excavations of its values and meanings in the temporal existential moment and
subsequent perspectives rendered and interpreted.
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These introductions convey why Nietzsche attached such import to questions of
value, because they enable meaning, perspective, reflection, and action as they
interpenetrate any conscious act of communication, cognition, and activity. Values and
valuation permeate even the marrow of humanity itself. “Perhaps our word ‘man’ still
expresses something of precisely this feeling of self-satisfaction: man designated himself
as the creature that measures values, evaluates and measures, as the ‘valuating animal as
such” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals II: 8). How this process of valuation
works Nietzsche elaborates in a section of his notes collected in The Will to Power.
Therein he states that “The apparent world, i.e., a world viewed according to values;
ordered, selected according to values [. . .] The perspective therefore decides the
character of the ‘appearance’!” (567). In this way, values become knowable only through
their employment. The sense of these values and perspectives we inherit from language,
science, religion, and other traditions whose narratives organize these values into
meanings, recognizable interpretations of meeting the chaos of reality in the temporal
existential moment.
Values characterize the situation of valuation as well determining which values
attain power to direct human attention, word, and action and in what manner, to whom,
and for what reasons. Likewise, values characterize the stimuli being met in discourse,
“Our values are interpreted into things” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 590). What value
resides in gold except for the value individuals, societies, and markets convey upon it?
The metal itself does nothing; it is not employed except in costuming and consuming yet
commands incredible economic value, value not in or of itself. The value of honesty or
lying shaped by the parameters of the situation, taking bread to feed a starving child
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versus preserving rights of ownership—the highest ranking value compelling the
appropriate action from the perspective of the person confronted with the choice and
demand for action. Whether the act denotes necessity or illegality depends upon the
perspective from which the ranking value is read into interpreting the situation. In this
way, values adhere to the human necessity of judgment and action living in community.
Given the organic quality of values and valuation inherent in human life in
community, why does Nietzsche call for a revaluation of all values as he met his own
historical moment in the dialogue his writings enact? Reasons emerge from Nietzsche’s
genealogical inquiries into the dominant value perspectives and centers of his day, which
he perceived authored only paths to nihilism and destruction. This only further speaks to
power inherent in values as rhetoric of power found in meeting, in saying and said of
competing perspectives in an era of multiplicity and difference after metanarrative
disintegration.
It is the power of the values of his era that Nietzsche perceived needed to be
revalued. To revalue the values of his age required the prescription of a return to
naturalize man back into nature, to naturalize the modern values and lead toward life, not
its denial in waking death of nihilism. As Nietzsche declares, “man would rather will
nothingness than not will” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 28). To redeem activity of
willing within dialogic meeting of difference Nietzsche inaugurates his revaluation of
values. Revaluation announces activity he denotes as his task (Twilight of the Idols
foreword). Revaluation, as Nietzsche’s task, comprises all of his writings that participate
as sayings of the said to prompt revaluation toward a new dawn of values and valuation.
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Nietzsche’s daybreak of new morals and values ironically seeks not creation as
much as it does the brilliance of honesty and truth taken from the natural world
surrounding and bearing the human condition. What Nietzsche then calls for is a
naturalization of the flights of values from embedded reality to the chimerical worlds
beyond reality as a means merely to deny life due to one’s personal decadence.
Revaluation provides a perspective on the central tensions Nietzsche posits, the
competing values in an era after metanarrative disintegration and death of God.
All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an
instinct of life — some commandment of life is fulfilled through a certain
canon of ‘shall’ and shall not’, some hindrance and hostile element on
life’s road is thereby removed. Anti-natural morality, that is virtually
every morality that has hitherto been taught, reverenced and preached,
turns on the contrary precisely against the instincts of life — it is a now
secret, now loud and impudent condemnation of these instincts. By saying
‘God sees into the heart’ it denies the deepest and highest desires of life
and takes God for the enemy of life [. . .] (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols,
“Morality as Anti-Nature” 4)
This passage sheds light on Nietzsche’s task of revaluation of values. The metanarrative
disintegration, which he narrates and as such, participates in, discloses the decadence that
had come to cloud values in his modern era. The appeal to God was not one that sought
to affirm creation and one’s responsibility towards life but one that eased one’s disgust at
the elements of life not to one’s personal liking. Rather than meeting difficulty as
opportunity, modern manifestations and values as calls to God operated more to judge
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and castigate difference to become the same, to speak only from the perspective of the
said (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, “Morality as Anti-Nature”). The activity of
dialogue and meeting removed from the uniqueness of the temporal existential moment
draws forth no meaning, only its lack. Life becomes sleepwalking and repetition, not
making meaning and meeting, living as passive vegetation and not communicative,
cognitive, and physical active. This castration of the human spirit in the name of
obedience and ritualized automatism came not to signify spirituality as to signal silence
and the death.
The decadent silencing of the multiplicity of meanings, which burst forth in the
activity of meeting, and the demands of the temporal existential moment, render life as
living death. “For a condemnation of life by the living is after all no more than the
symptom of a certain kind of life” (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, “Morality as AntiNature” 5). Condemnation of this sort disembeds the critic from the situation he or she
criticizes, unmasking their pretension to knowing the unknowable, speaking with the
insight of all of life from the perspective of a single part. “One would have to be situated
outside life, [. . .] to know it as thoroughly [. . .] as all who have experienced it, to be
permitted to touch on the problem of the value of life at all” (Nietzsche, Twilight of the
Idols, “Morality as Anti-Nature” 5). If one speaks from an inaccessible perspective, one
speaks untruth and thereby falsifies all their speech praises and blames. The
impossibility of speaking from beyond an embedded perspective of the temporal
existential moment leads Nietzsche to conclude “sufficient reason for understanding that
this problem is for us an inaccessible problem” (Twilight of the Idols, "Morality as AntiNature” 5). To accept the situated nature of the human condition breeds alternative paths
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to meeting difference in dialogue. “When we speak of values we do so under the
inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us when we
establish values” (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, “Morality as Anti-Nature” 5). As the
valuating animal, humans take on the responsibility of living life through meeting the
moments and exigencies they encounter from the resources of their embedded
perspective, the only one that life affords and the only one required to enable construction
of a response. For even the anti-natural morality of decadence Nietzsche condemns,
affirms life, illustrating the flaws of the untruth and errors resultant from denying the
perspectival conditions of human life as valuation.
Revaluation of values then inaugurates a rebuilding of the values in which we
dwell. Let the human condition the perspective in which one experiences and lives life,
then frame one’s perspectival understanding, words, and deeds.
Let your gift-giving love and your knowledge serve the meaning of the
earth [. . .] Lead back to the earth the virtue that flew away, as I do—back
to the body, back to life, that it may give the earth a meaning, a human
meaning. (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II: “On the Gift-Giving
Virtue” 2)
The human meaning Nietzsche advocates is found in the epideictic rhetoric of dialogic
meeting of difference in the temporal existential moment. Dialogic meeting builds
meanings and values within the situated perspective human reality and existence affords
as opportunity. Opportunity to make meaning and value and act situated within the
relations that constitute human consciousness and communication, meeting of the
relations and related nature of reality calling for a response. Working from within his
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historical moment, Nietzsche calls for a return to life through a revaluing of the dominant
values that deny the difference and multiplicity of perspectives, values, and meanings that
color each moment.
Revaluation of values, the giving of a human meaning to the earth through
recognition of one’s situated perspective on earth, demands meeting of decadence in the
form of denying life by denying its perspectival, limited, embedded nature.
Indeed, this is my insight: the teachers, leaders of humanity, theologians
all of them, were also, all of them, decadents: hence the revaluation of all
values into hostility to life, hence morality—
Definition of morality: Morality—the idiosyncrasy of decadents,
with the ulterior motive of revenging oneself against life—successfully. I
attach value to this definition. (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, “Why I Am A
Destiny” 7)
The denial of perspective communicates a denial of life and revenge against the limits of
human life as situated living and limited knowledge. Therefore, the epideictic rhetoric of
decadents authors morality as a perspective to persuade further denial and decadent
living. Living as revenge as it works from an unreal sense of agency. Accepting the lie
as if when one spoke, one spoke for the whole although only a part. As if one spoke for
all of humanity through his or her individual words addressed to a situation, a metaphor
of the relations that situate and author one’s life and its meanings in meeting.
Meeting as revaluation offers a situating of one’s discourse within the multiplicity
of difference and relations that provide meanings to one’s life as a dialogue. Dialogue
that unfolds through and with the ways in which one constructs meaning out of the
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encounters the temporal existential moment affords. Dialogue enacted from this
perspective considers the conditions of its occurrence as important in ascertaining its
possible meanings and value.
One will ask me why on earth I’ve been relating all these small
things which are generally considered matters of complete indifference . . .
Answer: these small things—nutrition, place, climate, recreation, the
whole casuistry of selfishness—are inconceivably more important than
everything one has taken to be important so far. Precisely here one must
begin to relearn. (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, “Why I Am So Clever” 10)
The knowledge of one’s embedded nature allows for greater insight into meeting, greater
awareness of the forces at play and the sources of influence upon perspectives and their
perception within the activity of dialogic meeting of difference and multiplicity after
illusion amid metanarrative disintegration.
Nietzsche’s metaphor of revaluation begins with rhetoric, advances to rhetorical
exegesis of nature of truth and lie, advances to Greek tragedy as affirmation of life in
contrast to Platonic denial. Then through Zarathustra the revaluation of life’s values—
Dionysian/Zarathustran values as against the prevailing code of Christianity; re-write
nature into the text of life, homo natura. Now to enact these revalued values as a way to
meet difference in a postmodern context, a way to guide rhetoric as a communicative
activity, a saying of the said as dialogic meeting. This meeting affords an architectonic
rhetoric of bildung, in order to harmonize the relation of individual to community through
shared culture: the values and language that speak and animate life between persons
embedded within the historicity and contingency of the human condition.
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A genealogy of the perspective of revaluation as a stance toward dialogic meeting
multiplicity and difference explicates what Nietzsche understands the materials of
revaluation to be: the rhetorical power of values and their influence on human word and
deed. The metonymical connection between the form of revaluation and its content and
values serves as the subject of the following section. This work continues its exegesis of
values as elements, common places of epideictic interplay of dialogue and rhetoric in the
communicative activity of Nietzschean revaluation.

Implications: Nietzsche’s Epideictic Rhetoric of Revaluation as Dialogic Meeting
Nietzsche meets morals through epideictic saying of the said as critique to create
new values. He draws values from classical sources revalued through meeting the
temporal existential moment through the perspective of these classical values. In this
selection of classical values, Nietzsche aides his task of naturalizing values and morals to
help translate man back into nature. “It is the Saying that always opens up a passage
from the Same to the Other, where there is yet nothing in common. A non-indifference
of one toward the other!” (Levinas, Proper Names 6) This foreshadows key elements of
Nietzsche’s epideictic revaluation of values, one engaged with pathos of non-indifference
towards those to whom he seeks to meet in dialogue through his writings after the
shattering of illusions and metanarrative disintegration.
Drawing from genealogical inquiries into the values and moral perspectives,
Nietzsche engages in dialogic meeting through his task of an epideictic revaluation of
values. The argumentation supporting the truthfulness of Nietzsche’s perspective
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articulates an architectonic rhetoric as acknowledgement in an era after metanarrative
illusion and disintegration.
Revaluation of values begins with acknowledgement of the “fact that man is the
as yet undetermined animal” (Beyond Good and Evil 62). Nietzsche’s perspectival
characterization and approach to reality prompts a revaluation of values and ideas of self
and agency. Word and deed resulting from relations that influence meeting difference
and multiplicity in the perspective of a self, not from a fixed self, one fluid and constantly
confronting consciously and unconsciously meanings and values struggling to gain
adherence. In this way, the person engaging in revaluation of values as Nietzsche
suggests is called to praise and blame, to author distance and attain perspective.
Nietzsche considers such a grounded perspective as necessary to provide distance and to
enable the discernment of difference and act in response.
To assist in how to perceive a healthy, situated perspective from a decadent, lifedenying perspective, Nietzsche authors a dramatic metaphor of the consequences of how
one meets reality. Nietzsche narrates the notion of the drama of meeting through the
metaphor of the eternal recurrence. The eternal recurrence provides an existential
temporal moment in which the reader is called to enact their perspective from which they
meet the difference inherent in living life in the event of meeting as being. The situation
of the eternal recurrence also demands accounting of one’s values and morals and enacts
an epideictic accounting through one’s response to the questions posed. The scene, titled
“the great weight” by Nietzsche follows as its rendering is the only way to communicate
its possible meanings and illustrate how it elaborates upon the tenets of revaluation, the
topic of this chapter.
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What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into
your loneliest loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and
have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times
more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and
every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your
life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—
even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this
moment and myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside
down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!’
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and
curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a
tremendous moment when you would have answered him: ‘You are a god
and never have I heard anything more divine.’ If this thought gained
possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you.
The question in each and every thing, ‘Do you desire this once more and
innumerable times more?’ would lie upon your actions as the greatest
weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and
to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal
confirmation and seal? (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 341)
The struggle Nietzsche imagines through this scene, the ordeal of meeting the demon’s
provocation of the eternal recurrence announces all the central elements of Nietzsche’s
metaphor of revaluation of values. The question requires an evaluation of the perspective
from which one meets the difference and multiplicity one encounters after metanarrative

Prellwitz, Chapter Six 180

disintegration. The illusion of agency and one functioning as a self-determining and selfpropelled wheel independent of alterity and the situatuedness of one’s reality are
deconstructed in the question demanding a response. The question requires accounting of
one’s acknowledgement of their values and ideas as constructed through the awareness of
their perspectival existence and knowledge. One knows through one’s perspective, one’s
situation, values, and ethics. Meeting enacts the epideictic rhetoric of one’s dialogic
meeting. The pressures of the need to communicate in speech and activity direct one’s
architectonic rhetoric of building meanings and praising and blaming values through the
words and deeds of one’s life in conversation with the cultural and social relations that
texture one’s communication and consciousness.
The challenge that the eternal recurrence presents is acknowledgement after
meeting metanarrative disintegration. Meeting this challenge discloses a revaluation of
agency and an interpreting otherwise of modern subjectivity, selfhood as meeting not as
individual expression of preference. The person existed through dialogic meeting of
difference in the temporal existential moment. One’s pathos of distance in genealogical
investigation of possible perspectives and values from which to speak and act construct
the path from which emerges one’s ethos, one’s self born in meeting difference in a
dialogic ethic.
The ethical has to do with ethos in its originative sense of a cultural
dwelling, a mode or manner of historical existence, a way of being in the
world that exhibits a responsibility both to oneself and to others. It is this
that defines the bearing of self as ethical subject, whose subjectivity is
always that of an intersubjectivity. (Schrag, The Self after Postmodernity
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101)
Schrag’s rendering of subjectivity knowable only as intersubjectivity points to the heart
of a dialogic ethic that Nietzsche anticipates. As a prophet of a dialogic ethic, Nietzsche
calls forth deconstruction situated within his modern historical moment to meet the
excesses of perspectives that he determined sought to deny and destroy life. Perspectives
whose danger resided in their displacement outside of time, and hence outside of human
meaning, value, and reality.
Nietzsche, as prophet of a dialogic ethic, authors an epideictic rhetoric of values
to guide the activity of meeting. As he states in a work subtitled, “Thoughts on the
Prejudices of Morality,” he praises virtues to guide one’s genealogical investigations that
enable the construction and destruction of perspectives affirming or denying of life from
which to live. “Honest towards ourselves and whoever else is a friend to us; brave
towards the enemy; magnanimous towards the defeated; polite — always: this is what the
four cardinal virtues want us to be” (Nietzsche, Daybreak 556). This naming of guiding
virtues communicates values to ground his dialogic ethic. These virtues are not open to
choice but are compelled upon us from the perspective of the cardinal virtues. The values
and ethics that guide life are found in living. Life as dialogic meeting of difference is
aware of one’s perspective as a life situated amid the difference and multiplicity of the
existential and temporal moment after metanarrative disintegration. Such a situated
perspective after illusion compels honesty as one lives the mystery of unfinished dialogue
that one is invited to engage. What will one make of one’s time—what a glorious
challenge Nietzsche claims awaits our future heroes of the spirit and artists of human
living in dialogic meeting of the mysteries of the temporal moment.
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Chapter Seven: Nietzsche’s Dialogic Ethic After Illusion: Dialogic Meeting

Nietzsche provides through his imbricating metaphors of perspectivism,
genealogy, and revaluation of values the ground from which to construct a
communication ethic to meet the contemporary postmodern historical moment. The
communication ethic Nietzsche authors, dialogic meeting engages reality at the interplay
of dialogue and rhetoric. At the interplay of these forces, dialogic meeting articulates an
architectonic rhetoric that affirms reality through communicative meeting of the
exigencies and questions that surround an age after illusion amid metanarrative
disintegration. In terms of a dialogic ethic, Nietzsche offers fundamentally an ethic of
acknowledgement that does not begin with humanism but with meeting the historical
moment in which we live.
Dialogic meeting and its architectonic rhetoric construct perspectives from which
meaning is made from the meeting of difference within the textured conversations of the
existential temporal moment. Meanings emerge through genealogical inquiry into the
ground of the perspectives of history and traditions that from the past direct present and
future perspectives. Working from such a perspectival standpoint, revaluation enacts the
architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting through saying of the said of these histories,
traditions, and ethics within the difference of the contemporaneous moment. Saying of
the said leads to revaluation of values to resurrect traditions necessary to making meaning
of the chaos of the existential temporal moment, to use communication as way to order
the chaos of reality with the assistance of the resources of history.
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Dialogic meeting orders this communicative activity affirming difference through
meeting of its manifold nature within the postmodern historical moment. As difference
characterizes a time after illusion, dialogic meeting affords a constructive perspective
from which to make meaning through meeting difference in dialogue. Dialogue serves to
ground affirmation of the possibility of meeting through the communicative construction
of perspectives. Perspectives emerge from the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric to help
order and further engender the inclusion of difference within the ongoing rhetorical
conversation of humanity. Dialogic meeting enacts a communication ethic as it
articulates its values and ethics in its meeting of reality in communicative activity that
unites word and deed in the artful activity of an architectonic rhetoric.

Introduction
Now as developed earlier in chapter four, Nietzsche positions perspectivism “to
control one’s Pro and Con [. . .] in the service of knowledge” (Nietzsche, On the
Genealogy of Morals III: 12). However, knowledge is embedded within and occluded by
language as “thoughts are the shadows of our feelings” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science
345). Hence, to understand knowledge and reason one must understand the affects that
serve as the ground of one’s rationality and knowledge communicated through language.
Language creates values such as good and evil, truth and lie that undermine and
conceal the values of nature, hunger, thirst, need for shelter, and procreation. For
Nietzsche, these natural values exist and evolve beneath the human created symbol and
sign world of grammar and linguistic systems of language. What Nietzsche seeks to
author through genealogical analysis of the rhetoric of values communicated through
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language is a revaluation of the values language writes into and upon nature. Nietzsche
seeks to return our gaze to the physiological, psychological, and environmental values
that undergird the values of language, i.e., the values of morality. Genealogy is
Nietzsche’s metaphor of this practice of history as rhetorical exegesis, of discovering the
pathos of distance that orders our dialogic meeting between saying and said, and of the
eternally recurring communicative contest for influence between nomos and physis,
cultural convention or natural will to power.
Genealogy as a critical interpretive practice has been preempted by predominantly
French poststructural and deconstructionist appropriations as the exploration of
commentary on Nietzsche within communication and rhetorical studies in chapter two
illustrated. Readings inspired by the work of Derrida and de Man especially are cited to
support the heralding of a “Nietzschean call for an end to interpretation” (Norris 66).
Norris furthers this link as he claims that “This bottomless relativity of meaning, and the
ways philosophers have disguised or occluded their ruling metaphors, are the point of
departure for Derrida’s writing like Nietzsche’s before him” (Norris 57). However, there
is another side to the notion of the question of meaning which Nietzsche’s legacy also
alludes, an echo of Sophistic perspectives on the inherent rhetoricity of all claims to truth
and knowledge. “Nietzsche in the end ‘rehabilitates persuasion’ by showing that
language in its performative aspects both pervades and delimits the project of
philosophy” (Norris 104). Unlike the debated deconstructionist appropriation of
Nietzsche, scholars in the Anglo-American philosophical community situate Nietzsche
along more naturalistic lines due to the purposes to which Nietzsche puts his rhetoric.
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The present study concurs with Leiter’s assertion that “Nietzsche belongs not in
the company of postmodernists like Foucault and Derrida, but rather in the company of
naturalists like Hume and Freud [. . .] philosophers of human nature” (2-3). Yet that
does not mean to suggest than anything near agreement has emerged within
contemporary philosophical interpretations of Nietzsche. For example, consider the
ambivalence of noted ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre on Nietzsche. In MacIntyre’s noted
volume, After Virtue Nietzsche is chastised for his “emotivism” and “prophetic
irrationalism” but MacIntyre in the same text later notes “that Nietzsche rejects
emotivism” (Cohen 270-1). In a later work MacIntyre asserts that the flaws of
genealogy include “incommensurability with classical thought is thus a prerequisite for
the genealogical enterprise” and “that there is no way of posing questions about
accountability” (Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry 208-9). However, Cohen states
that “in a largely ignored recent work” First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary
Philosophical Issues, MacIntyre admits that “‘a theory about the predicaments of
contemporary philosophy [. . .] requires the construction of something akin to what
Nietzsche called a genealogy’” (MacIntyre qtd. in Cohen 271). MacIntyre also concedes
that “my own argument obliges me to agree with Nietzsche that the philosophers of the
Enlightenment never succeeded in providing grounds for doubting his central thesis”
(After Virtue 117). MacIntyre renders Nietzsche’s central thesis regarding a genealogy of
morality “that all rational vindications of morality manifestly fail and that therefore belief
in the tenets of morality needs to be explained in terms of a set of rationalizations which
conceal the fundamentally non-rational phenomena of the will” (After Virtue 117). A
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phenomena Nietzsche anchors in the orientation towards meeting difference within the
temporal moment.
However, this does not indicate that Nietzsche advocates a subjective,
individualistic, cult of personality style that rejects community. Nietzsche does reject the
herd, but as a barrier to self-knowledge. Nietzsche rejects as the only path a seeking after
self-knowledge, following dialectical methods of Socratic introspection, or a turn toward
dialogic meeting the temporal existential moment. Nietzsche’s version of self knowledge
is one that seeks to find the harmony between one’s body, mind, spirit, culture, historical
moment, not only one’s subjective desires (“Philosophy in Hard Times” 48-9). Harmony
one discerns only in meeting, in the communicability of one’s affects in the face of
social, temporal, existential meeting. Architectonic rhetoric constructs to give meaning
to the chaos of sensations and experiences in an ever-changing world.
Does this require an I-focus for such work? Nietzsche solidly answers with a
conditional No. The activity, including the words of one’s life, defines the meanings
attributed to our names; who we are becomes what we are known through what we
communicate through our doing and saying. That is style grafted upon character, not vice
versa. Nietzsche most often characterizes the font of subjectivity, the I, not as a path to
truth or spiritual joy but error and lies. “[T]here is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting,
becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything”
(Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals I: 13). The individual actor does not exist
except as a force within a network of relationships; the I emerges only as a product of a
we within the communicative activity of engaging others (Poulakos and Whitson,
“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 135). Obviously, Nietzsche is asking us to be
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more honest and to look for more as the I becomes not cause but effect when seeking the
soil of ethics and activity.
As he states regarding Zarathustra, “Not only does he speak differently, he also is
different” (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo preface 4). Not disciples are sought here, reject me,
find your own way, and then you may return, return as friend not follower, alongside not
behind in my shadows (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra I: “On the Gift-Giving
Virtue”). In this way, we perceive again Kaufmann’s insight that Nietzsche writes as a
“problem-thinker” not a system-thinker (Nietzsche 98). Nietzsche’s ideas become too
dirtied growing amid the mud of everyday mysteries of meeting difference. Not a Kant’s
objectivity but an existential, phenomenological objectivity, rather a perspectival, limited
dialogic meeting of difference in the existential temporal moment. Objectivity as
perspectival notion defined not by answers but by questions, not by expression but
engagement, not by telling but meeting. Perspectivism gathers together difference in the
existential, temporal moment of dialogic meeting, the fine risk human life demands as
payment for communicative opportunity for leaning, for value, for creating meaning.
Does an investigator possess the hardness, obedience, honesty, for such a task,
nothing less demanded in the highest quest after virtue? If so, Nietzsche offers rhetoric
as a means to an education in bildung, an architectonic rhetoric of a grand style of
intersubjectivity known through its enactment in meeting difference. A dialogic meeting
of difference affords the possibility for understanding, affirmation, and community. A
monologic meeting of difference affords the possibility for resentment, nihilism, and the
destructive denial of life.
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Nietzsche’s Communication Ethic: Dialogic Meeting
The present study seeks to construct from a reading of Nietzsche’s work an
imbricating whole drawn from and through the lenses of rhetoric and communication
ethics. The rhetoric and communication ethic that emerges is that of an architectonic
rhetoric of dialogic meeting. Nietzsche first seeks to understand the conditions of
communication through which he presents a novel understanding of communication
grounded not in the self, other, audience, message, or context, but in the meeting of these
disparate yet interpenetrating elements. Nietzsche perceives that it is through the prism
of communication that humans order their consciousness and encounter reality.
Communication becomes the axis upon which knowledge; value, truth and lie
become determined and subsequently determine through their evolution future thought,
word, and deed. The understanding of the significance of communication Nietzsche
pursues through his noted practice of genealogy. Nietzsche employs genealogy to
discern the values and morals that undergird and serve as the cornerstones of the
perspectives we discover and simultaneously invent in and through their meeting in and
through discourse. Change is this sense Nietzsche sketches on a broad horizon as
inherent not only in and through meeting, persons, contexts, but also within the
temporality of human and natural existence.
Nietzsche seeks to urge us resist the temptation to think, speak, and act outside of
time for such perspectives lead to nihilism, resentment, and destruction when not
grounded in the appropriate affect and will, in a noble perspective. Otherwise, one
employs language to escape the bonds of relation and responsibility that the human
condition casts upon us as persons. We are born into a world not of our choosing and
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must make our way amid others, despite how apart we may perceive or seek to be, we
cannot function outside the nets of communication and social relations. To evaluate and
judge the merits of these perspectives that we invent through meeting Nietzsche charges
the task of genealogy.
However, Nietzsche’s metaphor of genealogy is not concerned with tracing
bloodline but with the marrow of human meaning through language, the atoms of
meaning, the values and morals that bear rhetorical power, persuasion, and possibilities.
What values and morals produce and guide perspectives that affirm and enrich life
through the ways they meet it in and through language? What values and morals produce
and guide perspectives that seek to position one outside of time and the opportunities for
relation and responsibility that deny and devalue life in its saying of life? It is to these
questions that Nietzsche engages genealogy. How best to respond and how to revalue
those decadent perspectives that deny relation, responsibility, and life Nietzsche authors
his own architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting.
Revaluation then becomes the means to praise affirmative perspectives that may
enrich life, reveal, and censure those that deny and devalue life. Nietzsche’s epideictic
revaluation emerges out of rhetoric as dialogic meeting. The present work finds
Nietzsche authoring epideictic rhetoric of revaluation built upon the interpenetration of
three imbricating metaphors, perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation. These
metaphors taken collectively speak to the conditions and activity of making meaning
through language, activity, and human communication. Perspectivism outlines the
situation from which and how human meaning emerges, the concretion of hermeneutic
and rhetoric elements adhering within invention. Genealogy guides judgment between

Prellwitz, Chapter Seven 190

competing perspectives based upon the ground out of which they develop values and
morals. Revaluation serves as Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric as grounded in dialogic
meeting, its communication ethic. Through the activity of this dialogic ethic Nietzsche
leads us toward the construction of an architectonic rhetoric to constructively engage the
questions that arise in our historical moment.
Revaluation, built upon a classical notion of ethos, seeks to enact rhetoric as
meeting by employing epideictic appeals that point toward the elements of the relations
and responsibility through which communication occurs between persons. Revaluation
grounds rhetoric in the dialogic meeting of difference. The epideictic personal appeals
suggest one must not be tempted to escape time as a means of expressing power and
directing meeting to one of commanding and not communicating. Epideictic rhetoric of
revaluation keeps the forces that are situated within the communicative event of meeting
as anchored in a dialogic encounter, not a monologic enactment of emotivism. Epideictic
rhetoric keeps the conversation situated to avoid castration of the intellect and to further
persuade that one’s yes and no be employed in the service of knowledge and the
affirmation of life as perceived through its meeting in communication, the ground of
human experience.
This embedded architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting reunites word and deed
within the praxis of an architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting, a dialogically grounded
rhetoric, which enacts the values and morals out of which it arises. A new dawn or a
retelling of a worn path? That remains for the saying of the said of this meeting of a
great thinker in the architectonic rhetoric of responsibility of responding to the exigencies
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that plague and the questions that drive Nietzsche and what possibilities their saying may
hold for our own.
The present study follows Nietzsche as he undertakes a genealogical inquiry into
communication, the problem and opportunity it provides human life, the possibility of its
affirmation and enhancement as well as its denial and destruction, anchored in the affect,
force, and perspective that brings forth meanings. At the heart of communication
Nietzsche probes the tension to communicate being or the otherwise than being. This
judgment hence brings forth reasons for praise of those who affirm life through its
horrors, ugliness, and beauty like the Greeks through their Dionysian celebration of
tragedy. This judgment likewise brings forth reasons for censure and blame of those who
deny and therefore destroy life through their impositions of guilt, sin, and fear of the
chaos of existence and seek an escape through the construction of a beyond earth or
beyond being through the currents of language.
Nietzsche reserves his harshest criticisms for those who seek to offer meaning for
suffering, the pivotal question upon which human life may turn, through this
communicative escape to a beyond nature and human being in the world. Through the
creation and subsequent sayings of a heaven, hell, and eternal peace earthly, natural,
physical life is devalued and denied in favor of a future static realm of milk and honey.
To stop the upward gaze Nietzsche calls forth revaluation through the currents of
language that are responsible for this escape from meeting the world of earthly, human
reality.
Revaluation becomes Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of an alternative, a
meeting of the exigencies and questions of the temporal moment in dialogue, dialogue as
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a means to make meanings that embrace difference from which human life blooms to
speak its existence and to make sense of past, present, and future. Saying through
meeting in dialogue the reality before its senses that influence the names it gives, the
perspectives it adopts, the knowledge these choices author, that will shape what will
come.
Communication as meeting, its bearing of meanings becomes the axis upon which
the encounter of difference through language in the form and flesh of persons, events,
ideas, and institutions, becomes present and prevalent to us in the varying degrees of
power, in which their communication reveals its level of influence. Will the dawning sun
raise one’s spirits or the completion of a new project or the soft laughter of a child in an
adjacent room inform the mood and gestures that accompany one’s words? This simple
question begins to speak to the power of pathos as Nietzsche breaks forth its meanings as
subtle shading for his ideas regarding communication.
The present study hopes to further these investigations as they provide insights
into multiple areas of inquiry within communication. The present study after illusion
turns to Nietzsche to further inform our understanding of his ideas and their potential
contributions regarding the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric as well as informing
conversations on communication ethics in an age that implicates Nietzsche after
metanarrative disintegration.
Additionally, this work then engages in an ongoing dialogue with Nietzsche’s
writings as a guide to meeting the contemporary historical moment characterized by
metanarrative disintegration, where metanarrative disintegration, difference and
multiplicity are now privileged. The privileging of difference communicates a turn to
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dialogue rather than the modern bias towards telling in shaping communicative activity.
Meeting the alterity within the temporal existential moment occurs through the operative
of metaphor. Levinas’ focus on the dialogic tension between saying and said displays the
manner in which meeting emerges to offer temporal ground. The multiplicity of ways
meanings emerge to offer temporal ground become realized through the imbricating
architectonic Nietzschean metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of
values, producing a dialogic ethic of meeting. This outcome interprets otherwise the
work, as Levinas also does, of one whom many consider the founder of deconstruction,
Friedrich Nietzsche. Countering these perspectives, the present work argues that
Nietzsche’s dialogic ethic displays the ongoing interplay of recognition of decaying said
and the ongoing hope in the saying as dialogic meeting of difference.
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